The Social and the Real: The Idea of Objectivity in Peirce, Brandom, and Mcdowell by Kiryushchenko, Vitaly
 THE SOCIAL AND THE REAL: THE IDEA OF OBJECTIVITY IN  
PEIRCE, BRANDOM, AND MCDOWELL  
by 
Vitaly Kiryushchenko 
 
 
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO 
THE FACUTLY OF GRADUATE STUDIES 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
GRADUATE PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY 
YORK UNIVERSITY 
TORONTO, ONTARIO 
JUNE 2016 
 
 
© Vitaly Kiryushchenko, 2016 
ii 
 
DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
My dissertation focuses on Robert Brandom’s and John McDowell’s philosophies of mind and 
language. Its particular emphasis is on the idea of objectivity as it is presented within the 
framework of Brandom’s and McDowell’s normative theories. There’s a general agreement in the 
literature that the two accounts of the objectivity of norms face a set of unresolved problems. 
According to Brandom, on the one hand, discursive norms are rooted in our reflective capacity 
and are instituted by our own practical attitudes; on the other hand, the objectivity of these norms 
is something irreducible to social consensus. Given this, Brandom faces the challenge of 
explaining how what all the members of a linguistic community take to be correct differs from 
what is correct “objectively”. In McDowell’s case, the problem of the objectivity of norms forms 
a part of his wider ontological project. This project aims to answer the question of how 
experience can be conceptually framed through and through, and yet constitute an independent 
empirical reality, thus accommodating the idea of objective external constraint on our thought 
and judgments. I claim that both accounts are incomplete and that the issues raised by Brandom’s 
and McDowell’s ideas of normativity may be resolved by using some of the conceptual tools 
offered by Charles Peirce’s semiotics and his scientific realism. According to Peirce, norms are 
objective neither because their authority is located in the world that stands up against our social 
conventions, nor because we are creatures capable of reflection, but because our inquiry is always 
headed forward. Taking account of our ideas about the world in terms of future consequences of 
our actions leads to a non-problematic identification of objective reality with the extended notion 
of future community which consists of beliefs about this reality attainable in the long run. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation presents an analysis of the idea of objectivity in Peirce, Brandom, and 
McDowell against a variety of backgrounds, including Kant’s constructivism, Hegel’s 
Phenomenology, and the relationship between the objective and the social. My aim is to show 
that within each of the three theoretical frameworks the idea of objectivity is linked, in one way 
or another, to the idea of a community, but that only in Peirce’s case this link receives its full 
non-contradictory development. Peirce’s pragmatism accommodates the idea of objectivity, while 
eschewing the pitfalls of both Brandom’s phenomenalist treatment of discursive practices and 
McDowell’s content-based realism, which results from his Hegelian reading of Kant’s “Analytic 
of Principles”. 
In all three cases “objectivity” describes the quality of being correct beyond any finite 
number of individual interpretations and, therefore, beyond anything that is correct merely by 
agreement between members of an existent community, consisting of the sum total of such 
interpretations. Hence, in all three cases there is a need to reconcile our knowledge of outside 
objects and the social, or communal character of such knowledge. This reconciliation in each case 
presupposes a particular context within which norms and norm-governed practices are defined. 
In Brandom’s case, the context is provided by the idea of discourse. I take the way 
Brandom uses the term to be somewhat close to how Michelle Foucault uses it. On this view, 
discursive practices are not just linguistic practices; they are recognitive structures that organize 
in repeatable patterns pragmatic relations among matters of fact, subjects, and statements those 
subjects make about matters of fact. Norms, according to Brandom, are standards of correctness 
that implicitly permeate our discursive interactions, but that can be cashed out by being 
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inferentially articulated in our explicitly formulated judgments. Being able to act according to 
discursive norms is being able to engage in discursive practices by mastering some of the 
inferential relations of a concept to a variety of other concepts, as well as to navigate between 
different perspectives on states of affairs that those relations presuppose.  
There is an ambiguity as to the objectivity of discursive norms, thus defined, which I 
address in chapter one. The ambiguity is this. According to Brandom, on the one hand, the 
objectivity of normative statuses is something that holds beyond the assessments of all the 
members of a given community, i.e., it is not reducible to the sum total of all their individual 
perspectives – whatever the number of those perspectives is, as long as it is finite. On the other 
hand, the normative structure of the world we have in common is such that it is not perspective-
independent, i.e. there is no bird’s eye view over and above those perspectives. 
My approach to Brandom is as follows. In Making It Explicit (1994) and, more recently, 
in Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas (2009) Brandom grounds his notion of the objectivity 
of norms in his interpretation of Kant’s constructivism in light of Hegel’s idea of mutual 
recognition. Brandom’s reading of Kant’s 1st and 2nd Critiques, together with relevant sections of 
Hegel’s Phenomenology, has a dual outcome. First, Kant’s moral constructivism, which finds its 
expression in the idea of autonomy, leads Brandom to adopting a phenomenalist approach to 
discursive practices. According to this approach, although discursive norms are instituted by 
individual practical attitudes, the objectivity of these norms is something irreducible to any 
existent social consensus: a given community as a whole can go wrong. Second, in presenting the 
relation between his inferentialist semantics and his normative pragmatics in light of the relation 
between Kant’s 1st and 2nd Critiques, Brandom makes an attempt to adjust Hegel’s idea of mutual 
recognition to his second-personal view on social communication. I claim that, given the 
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presuppositions supporting the considerable architectonic ambitions of Brandom’s early theory, 
this attempt does not resolve all the difficulties that Brandom encounters in reinterpreting Hegel’s 
idea of mutual recognition and in reconciling his phenomenalism about discursive practices with 
his realist intuitions about norms.  
In his (yet unpublished) A Spirit of Trust Brandom provides a new interpretation of 
Hegel’s Phenomenology, which culminates in the idea of language as the basic framework of 
mutual recognition. Within this framework, the recognitive relations of confession, forgiveness, 
and trust find their expression. This new approach helps Brandom tackle some of the problems 
caused by his earlier second-personal account of communication. In particular, it leads Brandom 
to the formulation of the idea of self-correcting community which reconciles the social character 
of the game of giving and asking for reasons and the objective character of its outcomes. 
However, Brandom’s new account faces another challenge. It seems to stand in need of a theory 
that would explain how the game accommodates the emergence of new facts and meanings and 
how it manages to keep the balance between novelty of conceptual contents and external 
constraint on what can be claimed. 
In McDowell’s case, the central notion is that of experience. Experience opens us to the 
space of norms that is objective and autonomous – in the familiar sense of being independent of 
what you and I might actually think of it at any given moment – and, at the same time, natural. 
Consequently, whereas in Brandom’s case the idea of objectivity is used to reconcile his 
phenomenalism about discursive practices and his recognition of the reality of discursive norms, 
in McDowell’s case its primary task is to dissolve the dualism of the normative and the natural.  
My view of McDowell’s handling this task is as follows. McDowell’s aim in Mind and 
World is to answer the question of how both our experience of the world and the world our 
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experience is of can be conceptually framed through and through, and yet the world can be 
understood as a reality independent from our empirical judgements and capable of imposing 
rational constraints on what we think and say. According to McDowell, it is wrong to ground the 
idea of such an independent reality on the claim that our experience constitutes a mediating 
screen between reality and thought. In veridical experience, he says, we are utterly open to 
manifest facts that are part and parcel of the world as it really is. But the idea of our radical 
openness to the world, taken together with the notion that both the world and our experience of it 
are conceptually framed, raise the question: How can reality that is radically open to us and 
available for our empirically grounded thought can at the same time be independent from this 
thought? McDowell’s answer is to offer an account that places a rational constraint on our 
empirical thinking within the conceptual. This account results in a form of normative realism, 
according to which normative relations between mind and world constitute what McDowell calls 
the sphere of the conceptual. The sphere is unbounded and autonomous, i.e., it must be 
understood on its own terms, independently of the space of nature as construed by the natural 
sciences. In pursuing his project, in one of his later works, McDowell makes a rather clear 
distinction between the objective and the social. Namely, he claims that “we cannot make sense 
of discourse-governing social norms prior to and independently of objective purport” (McDowell 
2002: 275). In other words, according to McDowell, our answerability to each other alone is 
insufficient to explain how thought is about the world. In light of this claim, it is important to 
determine if the social, according to McDowell, is in any way constitutive of the idea of objective 
conceptual content.  
In the last lecture of Mind and World McDowell poses a highly important thesis about 
language as a “repository of tradition,” which creates the possibility of building a link between the 
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social aspect of concept application and the objectivity of conceptual content. My principal claim 
in chapter two is that the very idea of conceptual content, as it is introduced in Mind and World, 
allows two conflicting interpretations, which cannot coexist within the framework of McDowell’s 
account, and that, consequently, this idea cannot do the job McDowell wants it to do.  
In Peirce’s case, the idea of objectivity, which is understood as independence from the 
whims and vagaries of individual assessments, attaches to a particular method. I suggest that the 
method, as it is defined in Peirce’s maxim of pragmatism, may be seen as representing a 
synthesis of Brandom’s and McDowell’s approaches. On the one hand, it helps us recognize the 
importance of perceptual experience; on the other hand, it provides a strong link between the 
objective and the social in explaining meanings of our ideas about the world as dependent on our 
capacity to predict practical outcomes of our using the objects which these ideas are about.  
Peirce understands norms, which govern our performances, as ideals, or ends (CP 1.586; 
1.591-616). These ideals, or ends represent the ultimate form of reference to the future: on 
Peirce’s view, everything there is should be defined by the way it conforms to the idea of what it 
is going to ultimately become. The ideal that is central to the method in question is that of the 
community of inquirers. This ideal is implied in both Peirce’s semiotics and his pragmatism, and 
I claim that once we see how the notion of such community is derived in both cases, we will be 
able to obtain all that is necessary to show that Peirce’s conception of objectivity is satisfactory. 
The problem of the relationship between Peirce’s semiotics and his pragmatism has a 
longstanding history in Peirce studies. It is a well-known fact that through the 1900s Peirce 
struggled to formulate a full-fledged proof of his pragmatism, and one of the ways he thought he 
could do this was by reconciling his pragmatic maxim with his definition of sign. The 
reconciliation presupposes finding a link between two facts: first, the fact that the meaning of a 
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concept consists in conceivable practical outcomes of our interaction with objects that fall under 
this concept; and second, the fact that any sign is something that stands for something else to 
someone in some respect or capacity. According to Peirce, these two definitions (of meaning as 
the sum total of practical consequences of actions it implies, and of sign as a triadic entity) have 
to be freely translatable into one another (EP2: 398-433). 
My approach to the problem is to treat the relationship in the manner in which the 
relationship between Brandom’s inferentialist semantics and his normative pragmatism has been 
treated in chapter one; namely, as a reinterpretation of Kant’s two constructivist theses as they 
figure in Kant’s 1st and 2nd Critiques1. My overall claim in chapters three and four is that Peirce’s 
notion of the community of inquirers allows us to accommodate the idea of objectivity and 
eschew the pitfalls of both Brandom’s phenomenalism about discursive practices and 
McDowell’s dual interpretation of conceptual content.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1 This approach is justified by certain obvious analogies between the two philosophers in their approach to 
Kant, as well as by the fact that the special attention to Kantian themes in Peirce has been characteristic 
of Peirce studies from very early on, beginning with Murray Murphey’s 1968 “Kant’s Children: The 
Cambridge Pragmatists”, and up to recent works, such as J. Kaag’s 2005 “Continuity and Inheritance: 
Kant's Critique of Judgment and the Work of C. S. Peirce”, S. Rosenthal’s 2002 "A Pragmatic 
Appropriation of Kant: Lewis and Peirce" and J. Abrams’s 2004 "Peirce, Kant, and Apel on 
Transcendental Semiotics: The Unity of Apperception and the Deduction of the Categories of Signs". 
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1. SEMANTIC CONTENTS AND PRAGMATIC PERSPECTIVES: 
THE IDEA OF OBJECTIVITY IN BRANDOM’S NORMATIVE PRAGMATISM 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
According to Brandom, norms we rely on when participating in communal discursive practices 
are always already implicit in those practices. The norms, however, can be made explicit by being 
inferentially articulated in judgments we make. The idea of an interplay between the implicit and 
the explicit parts of discourse is a linchpin that holds together Brandom’s inferentialist semantics 
and his normative pragmatics. According to the former, what constitutes the content of a claim or 
a judgment is not a sui generis conscious state, but the inferential roles this claim or judgment 
plays in various communicative situations. According to the latter, every claim or judgment we 
make is a move in what Brandom, using one of David Lewis’s seminal ideas, calls the 
“scorekeeping game” (Lewis 1979). The nature of the game may be explained by the analogy of a 
board game where each player has counters that can be put on/taken off the board in consequence 
of the player’s commitment to a particular claim. Making claims is inseparable from tracking other 
players’ moves, which is done by keeping score of the counters that other players add to/remove 
from the board2. As every claim or judgment always entails accepting some new practical 
commitments and rejecting some previously made ones, it inevitably changes the score the 
participants of the game keep on each other and on themselves. The trick is to see the game as a 
                                                          
2 For a brief description of the analogy see Wanderer 2008: 41-48. 
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rule-guided activity without presupposing a normative grid of explicitly stipulated rules that sits 
outside of actual discursive practices.  
What is also important, in Lionel Shapiro’s phrase, is the fact that Brandom’s 
inferentialist semantics is an account of “how propositional content incorporates norms of 
application as roles that are played, not as roles that are described” (Shapiro 2004: 149). 
Likewise, according to Brandom’s normative pragmatics, making a move in the game is doing 
something in a social environment and, in virtue of this, changing the environment – which, in 
Brandom’s own terms, allows us to treat communication as “the social production and 
consumption of reasons” (MIE: 474). Brandom’s attention to actions as opposed to mere 
descriptions is thus an overarching pragmatist aspect of his theory as a whole. In stressing the 
importance of this aspect, Brandom refers to the constructivist stance adopted by Kant in his first 
two Critiques. One of Kant’s central claims in his Critique of Pure Reason is that whatever there 
is to know originates, in part, from a set of a priori concepts that secure the unity of experience. 
The constructivist gist of this claim is that part of what is given in experience owes its objectivity 
to constructive efforts of the transcendentally interpreted subjectivity (KRV: A125). According to 
Brandom’s “phenomenalist” interpretation of this thesis, the cognizing subject makes certain 
things meaningful by taking them to be such. Likewise, the principles of practical reason 
formulated in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason also have their origins in the activity of the 
transcendental subject. The autonomy thesis tells us that the subject must be able to introduce the 
principles and will them as objective laws. This, again, in Brandom’s terms, presupposes that the 
subject must be able to make the laws meaningful by taking them to be such.  
According to Brandom, this capacity of taking something (e.g. a thought, or a rule) as a 
representation of something it itself isn’t (e.g. an object of the thought, or a necessary behavior 
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according to the rule) is a fundamental capacity of us as humans. On his interpretation of Kant, 
what makes us act is not a rule itself, be it a theoretical or a practical one, but our 
acknowledgment of it. Acting in accordance to a rule itself here means acting in accordance to a 
rule that does not depend on our recognition of it, which amounts to simply obeying the rule, as 
distinct from taking ourselves to be acting upon it (MIE: 31), which always amounts to taking up 
a normative stance (Brandom 2009: 118). Brandom and Kant are in agreement as to the fact that 
this intervening attitude of taking something to serve as a representation of something else, which 
implies a peculiar sensitivity to rules, is emphatically human and is certainly not in play in the 
relationship between natural objects and rules that govern them3. According to Brandom, as 
sensitivity to rules implies normativity, an important Kantian insight about the special way in 
which we humans, as opposed to creatures of the natural world, are emphatically normative 
creatures, is cashed out in our human capacity of applying concepts. It is the application of 
concepts of things rather than using things themselves that highlights the reflectivity of human 
consciousness as opposed to unreflective natural sentience, and the normative dimension of 
human action as opposed to mere natural disposition. And indeed, as we act on what we take 
rules to be rather than on the rules themselves, we may do so correctly or incorrectly. 
Consequently, Brandom’s central question here is what exactly one must be able to do “in order 
to count as taking or treating a performance as correct or incorrect” (MIE: 32). 
The answer to this question has two parts. The semantic interpretation of the attitude of 
taking something as a representation of something else is to be non-problematic. From the point 
of view of Brandom’s inferentialist semantics, any concept is a norm that determines whether a 
                                                          
3 See, e.g., the following formulation from Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: “Everything 
in nature works according to laws.  Only a rational being has the power to act according to the idea of 
laws – i.e., according to principles.” (GMM: 36). 
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particular claim is correct or incorrect in virtue of the way it is used in a network of inferences. 
What it boils down to is that I always take someone’s claim as a reason to believe that some other 
claim also ought to be true4. However, when semantic inferential relations between judgments are 
reinstated in pragmatic terms as outputs of social interactions between our commitments and 
entitlements to these judgments, Brandom faces a problem. Namely, he needs to explain how to 
proceed from what we take to be the case to what objectively is the case. 
This explanation is a complex, book-length affair, and in Making It Explicit5 Brandom 
initially chooses to introduce it ex adverso, by displaying his disagreement with Crispin Wright’s 
interpretation of Wittgenstein’s solution of the rule following paradox. From Wright’s 
perspective, we should try to solve this problem with the following dilemma in view. On the one 
hand, communitarians claim that, whatever constitutes the correctness or incorrectness of a 
statement, independently from how we are disposed to assess the statement on a particular 
occasion, is located within the speaker’s linguistic community, and has to be in line with 
assessments of other members of the community. On the other hand, Platonists claim that shared 
assessments are not constitutive of the requirements they might reflect or not reflect properly. 
The former view makes it almost impossible to introduce any notion of objectivity, while the 
latter says that, even the community as a whole can go wrong on an occasion. According to 
Wright, the impression that there are only two options here is a false one. Wright’s response is to 
                                                          
4 This idea of Brandom’s is, in a way, an inferentialist amplification of the Wittgensteinian insight that 
understanding a meaning/grasping a norm is mastering a use of an expression (AR: 27). The 
amplification amounts to saying that norms do their implicit work in discourse, but can be made explicit 
when inferentially articulated in a series of judgments. It is concepts, Brandom says, that are norms that 
implicitly permeate our discursive interactions, but that can be cashed out by being inferentially 
articulated in our explicitly formulated judgments. 
5 Henceforth MIE. 
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show that Wittgenstein provides us with an opportunity to see how we can keep the objectivity 
requirement, and, at the same time, take into account the communal character of linguistic 
practices (Wright 1980; Wright 2007). 
In Wright’s interpretation, the solution requires a clear understanding of the relation 
between uses established in a given community and those that are objectively correct. Wright 
insists that, in order to maintain the distinction between conceptual commitments and their 
assessments, we need to identify an application being correct with the application being taken as 
correct, not by an individual agent, but rather by her community as a whole. In Wright’s view, 
the distinction between correct and incorrect performances, while applicable to an individual, 
does not apply at all to communal assessments. As he claims in his Wittgenstein on the 
Foundations of Mathematics, “we have understanding only of concepts of which we can 
distinctively manifest our understanding” (Wright 1980: 221). Endorsing this claim, according to 
Wright, is enough to reject as empty the idea that a community can be right or wrong in making 
some sort of a communal verdict based on an objective standard. The verdict is the standard; a 
community endorses applications of rules, but itself cannot be mistaken as there is no authority 
over it. A communal assent is an essential part of the background against which individual 
assessments may be acknowledged as correct or incorrect. It is, Wright says, simply not coherent 
to suppose that a community as a whole can go wrong. Thus, Wright wants to hold on to the 
contractual, or communitarian, view, but claims that the patterns of applications to which 
conceptual norms oblige us are independent of assessment.  
12 
 
This attempt to reconcile the social and the objective, according to Brandom, yields a 
result that he deems totally inadmissible for the reason that, contrary to Wright’s allegations, it 
entails the total loss of the objectivity of conceptual norms: 
Indeed the primary explanatory challenge to a social practice theory of discursive 
commitments is to show how... genuine, and therefore objective, conceptual norms can be 
elaborated. These bind the community of concept-users in such a way that it is possible 
not only for individuals but for the whole community to be mistaken in its assessments of 
what they require in particular cases. 
(ME: 54) 
However, having promised his own interpretation of the relation between the social character of 
discursive norms and their objectivity, Brandom keeps his reader in suspense as to the final 
solution up until the last two chapters of his opus magnum.  
Throughout MIE Brandom defends two claims that provide the key to understanding the 
problem of the objectivity of discursive norms. First, he says that discursive norms are objective 
in the sense that they distinguish correct performances from incorrect ones, but, at the same time, 
are not practice-transcendent, in the sense that they do not belong to some noumenal world 
beyond the realm of everyday practices6. Second, according to Brandom, discursive norms 
originate from individual practical attitudes (how I or you take things to be), but are not in any way 
reducible to social consensus (how all of us take things to be). These two claims constitute what 
Brandom construes as his “phenomenalist” approach to discursive practices. According to this 
approach, practical attitudes of individual interlocutors generate norms, but, at the same time, are 
                                                          
6 I am briefly rephrasing a point from chapter one of Jeremy Wanderer’s “Robert Brandom” here. For more 
detail see Wanderer 2008: 17-19. This is one of Brandom’s principal theses which he refers and alludes 
to in numerous places throughout MIE: “Our activity institutes norms, imposes normative significances 
on a natural world that is intrinsically without significance for the guidance and assessment of action 
(MIE: 48, with the reference to Samuel von Pufendorf’s De jure naturae et gentium.1672). See also MIE 
161-167; 623-628). 
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only assessments that we take as conforming to norms and proprieties of practice. In other words, 
on this view, the fact that something, x, is normative supervenes on the fact that we have reasons 
to consider x as normative. Accordingly, a practice is normative just in case it is properly taken to 
be such. Given these claims, the question Brandom has to answer is: How do we pass from 
individual practical attitudes to objective normative statuses? Alternatively, in the context of 
Wright’s objections: How is it possible that any and all members of a given community can be 
mistaken in their understanding of what any given norm objectively requires?7  
Brandom’s short way to define the distinction between objectively correct applications 
and those that are only taken to be objectively correct is to say that the distinction is perspectival. 
Individual perspectives are coordinated in a way that excludes a unique irreducible community 
perspective above and beyond the aggregated actual perspectives of all participants. Brandom 
does not clarify whether his claim is that such perspective is not a real possibility, or that if there 
                                                          
7 Thus formulated, the question requires some clarification: “objectivity” in this case appears to be 
something different from what is usually called “correctness”. Thus, it is sometimes held that one uses an 
expression correctly if and only if the use meets certain conditions of correctness. The conditions are 
defined as a platitude of the form “If ‘X’ means X, then it is correct to apply ‘X’ to any object x if and 
only if x is X”. As has been noted above, according to Brandom, “propositional content incorporates 
norms of application as roles that are played, not as roles that are described” (Shapiro 2004: 149), which 
I take to indicate that no conditions of correctness, abstracted from particular patterns of use, are needed 
when we talk about the objective status of a norm. From Brandom’s point of view, the formula that 
expresses conditions of correctness as described above should be deemed unchallengeable just as much 
as, both semantically and pragmatically, unilluminating. Moreover, as an abstraction from practices of 
use of the expression “X”, such conditions of correctness are itself nothing but an explicitly formulated 
rule, and, therefore, need some further rule, which needs a certain further practice of its application, etc., 
etc. From this point of view, when Wittgenstein claims that no single feature defines what a “game” 
(and, for that matter, similarly, any other word or expression at all) in general is, and that similarities 
between different uses of “game” are best described as “family resemblances”, i.e. “a complicated 
network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing” (PI: 66), he means exactly that no explicitly 
stated condition can describe correctness of an application of the phrase “I am playing a game” in 
abstracto. The correctness will always depend on what I actually do in performing what I call “playing a 
game”. No conditions of correctness, however platitudinous and seemingly obvious, are able to grasp it. 
If the conditions cannot grasp the meaning of what I do when I apply an expression, they themselves 
don’t seem to do any useful job in helping us understand the meaning.  
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were such a perspective, it would still be fallible. He tells us only that we are capable of making 
the distinction between correct and incorrect applications not because our discourse has an 
omniscient Master, but because, as it will be shown below, the objectivity of the norms we apply 
is a structural feature common to each individual practitioner’s perspective captured by the non-
coercive authority of reasons interlocked by mutual accountability of all participants (MIE: 595).8 
A number of philosophers consider this answer to be controversial – hence an extensive 
literature on the subject. One approach is to treat Brandom’s normative pragmatics as a version of 
semantic eliminativism, which simply explains norms away and therefore can tell nothing 
instructive about their ontology. One possible consequence of Brandom’s alleged eliminativism 
(Loeffler 2005: 58-59) is that his theory faces complete indeterminacy of meaning (Whiting 
2006). This criticism of Brandom’s social-perspectival account of objectivity is supplemented by 
arguments against the seeming circularity of the relationship between objective normative 
statuses and subjective practical attitudes (Kiesselbach 2012; Lauer 2009), and by the critique of 
Brandom’s notion of sociality: if the objectivity of conceptual norms rests on the distinction 
between what is true and what is taken to be true, then the shifts in perspective that reveal this 
distinction can be not only interpersonal, but also intrapersonal (Gibbard 1996; Prien 2010). 
From this point of view, given that perspectives change in the course of time, our desire to be 
thorough in our analysis might cause us to abandon a clear idea of a person.  
In what follows, most of these criticisms will be discussed in more detail9 in the context 
of the problems that arise within Brandom’s phenomenalist approach to discursive practices, 
                                                          
8 The idea of perspectival objectivity is discussed at length in section 1.3, where I show how this idea 
emerges from the asymmetry between undertaking and attributing commitments as two kinds of practical 
attitudes. 
9 I will not say anything about the interpersonal/intrapersonal controversy here, as it would lead the 
discussion too far away from my main focus. 
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which is the main focus of the first three sections of this chapter. By adopting this approach, on 
the one hand, Brandom claims that norms are generated by individual practical attitudes. In doing 
so, he rejects the claim that the social has an ontology of its own, apart from particular social 
interactions. On the other hand, Brandom claims that the norms that do their implicit work in 
discourse are objective. The central challenge for Brandom, therefore, is to explain how the 
objectivity thesis can be justified given his insistence on the social character of discursive 
practices and his phenomenalist stance towards normativity (Laurier 2005; Pippin 2005; Rödl 
2000; Rosen 1997).  
My aim in the first three sections of this chapter is to demonstrate that the problem of 
the objectivity of norms cannot be resolved within Brandom’s early theory. My approach in the 
next section is to show that an important part of the reason why it cannot is the way Brandom 
reads some of the fundamentals of Kant’s critical philosophy, Hegel’s Phenomenology, and (to a 
lesser extent) Max Weber’s theory of social action – the three big theoretical frameworks that 
played an important part in creating the historico-philosophical background for Brandom’s 
normative pragmatics. I will begin by providing the Kantian context within which the problem 
of the objectivity of norms is established and explaining why Brandom cannot accept Kant’s 
own architectonic approach to the problem. I will then show that Brandom’s first attempt to 
accept Hegel’s idea of mutual recognition in order to amend the Kantian solution fails due to his 
second-personal view on social communication. In the remaining two sections of this chapter I 
will discuss the way the new interpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology Brandom presents in his 
(yet unpublished) A Spirit of Trust helps him tackle some of the problems caused by his 
phenomenalism about discursive practices. 
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1.2. Kant, Hegel, Weber 
Fairly early in the first chapter of MIE, while giving the initial introduction to his idea of norms 
as rules implicit in discursive practices, Brandom refers to Max Weber’s notion of 
disenchantment (MIE: 48). Weber, who borrowed the term from Friedrich Schiller, used it to 
describe the new secularized rationality and a variety of systems of instrumental action that 
emerged in late seventeenth-century Europe. According to Weber, the Enlightenment 
disenchanted the world in the sense of having it pictured as in itself totally devoid of meaning 
and values, and as something whose only real source from then onwards was recognized to lie in 
symbolically mediated human praxis (Weber 1946).  
The difference between the meaningless world out there and the realm of meaning-
conferring human action was initially introduced by Kant, the paradigmatic philosopher of the 
Enlightenment, in the form of the distinction between self-consciously followed norms and laws 
of nature. Throughout his three Critiques, Kant indefatigably puts emphasis on the fact that the 
world of nature is in itself only a possibility that becomes real through human action – the thesis 
that, as Brandom justly claims in the introduction to his Reason in Philosophy, marks a crucial 
point of early American reception of German idealism. In particular, the transition from Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason to his Critique of Practical Reason cleared the way for the pragmatist 
shift from describing thinking as a sequence of mental events to interpreting meanings in terms of 
consequences of our actions. It is that transition, according to Brandom, that finally made 
rationality a thoroughly normative concept (RP: 2-23). In order to fully understand this claim, we 
need a closer look at the link between Brandom’s inferentialist semantics and his normative 
pragmatics in light of the aforementioned Kantian transition. As I will show, while, on the one 
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hand, Brandom follows Kant and Weber in drawing a rather sharp line of demarcation between 
human freedom and dumb nature, on the other hand, he makes an opposing Hegelian move by 
grounding human knowledge in historically and socially based mutual recognition.  
According to Kant, the gap between the theoretical self of nature and the normative self of 
freedom is inherent to moral consciousness, which seeks to reconcile the two selves in the 
imaginative reinterpretation of the schematism of understanding in aesthetic judgment. Although 
a practical agent may know how she ought to act, she cannot go any further. She doesn’t know to 
what purpose she knows this, i.e. what the practical meaning of this knowledge is. The reason for 
this is that the agent is able to think of her own maxims as practical moral laws only if these latter 
do not contradict the categorical imperative, which provides only a purely formal foundation of 
the will. Accordingly, the laws should be abstracted from all sorts of subject-matter of the will in 
favor of their universal form (KPV: I, 1, §80). The categorical imperative, as a universal 
regulative principle expressed in an explicitly formulated rule, gives us the idea of freedom. But 
the key problem is that Kant does not explain how to proceed from belief to action, because 
knowledge of the rule as such does not constitute any action-guiding competence, i.e. it does not 
prevent a practical agent from behavior that may contradict such knowledge. However, a 
practical agent may resort to an aesthetic judgment. In KU §59 (“Of Beauty as the Symbol of 
Morality”) Kant claims that aesthetic judgments, just like moral judgments, are characterized by 
universality; in both cases, the subjective principle of judging is represented as valid for every 
man. But unlike moral judgments, aesthetic ones are not based on knowledge of any explicitly 
formulated rule (in Kant’s own words, they are “not cognizable through any universal concept” 
– KU: 252). Kant shows, however, that aesthetic judgments help the agent to work her 
knowledge into a finite set of practical habits in appealing to what Kant calls the “communal 
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sense”, a sense, he says, we are “compelled to postulate […] to account for the agreement of men 
in their appreciation of beautiful objects” (KU: xxii). Although an agent cannot rationalize why 
this particular something appears beautiful to her, no one, says Kant, is able to live in an 
aesthetically deficient world, so the changes one makes as an aesthetic creature always conform 
to the law that one cannot formalize. As Hannah Ginsborg nicely summarises it, aesthetic 
judgment  
...can function independently of the understanding in situations where the relevant rules or 
concepts are not already specified. To exercise judgment in this independent way is to judge 
particulars to be contained under rules or concepts which are, so to speak, not already in 
understanding, but rather made possible by those acts of judging, themselves. 
(Ginsborg 2011: 253) 
Accordingly, although Kant’s 2nd and 3rd Critiques, of course, make two different cases 
for our capacity to judge, they also represent two series of arguments, each which form integral 
parts of his architectonics: aware of the categorical imperative, I cannot work it into a finite set of 
practical habits; and conversely, not aware of the law of aesthetic judgment, I always have an 
idea of how to rearrange my setting. Because the normative force of the principles of practical 
reason may not always work in the same way as the normative force of logical forms, Kant offers 
a reinterpretation of logically structured knowledge into ethically sound conduct by an aesthetic 
symbol – a form of possibility, or an aesthetic idea, serving as a means of the moral self’s self-
objectifying. It is the power of aesthetic judgment, according to Kant, that provides the possibility 
to correlate an object of freedom with an object of nature, thus rendering the world surrounding us 
a symbol of the moral, i.e. as something that converts my not understanding why into a symbolic 
experience of freedom.  
Brandom, just like early pragmatist Peirce, is a Kantian only in terms of Kant’s 1st and 2nd 
Critiques. He makes no use of aesthetic judgment as a mediator between the theoretical and the 
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practical, as it is suggested by §59 of the Critique of Judgment. Instead, he seeks to make the 
notions of the practical and the normative, as it were, immediately available. And, just like Peirce 
in his early writings, to accomplish this task, Brandom turns to Hegel. Kant, he writes, “punted 
many hard questions about the nature and origins of normativity”, whereas Hegel “brought these 
issues back to earth by understanding normative statuses as social statuses – by developing a 
view according to which […] all transcendental constitution is social institution” (AR: 33-34).  
Recall that, according to both Kant and Brandom, the distinction between the natural and 
the normative is the one between the capacity of acting according to a rule and the capacity of 
acting according to a conception of a rule. But, according to Brandom, in order to close the 
aforementioned Kantian gap between the theoretical self of nature and the normative self of 
freedom, instead of resorting to the mediating role of aesthetic judgment, we need to appeal to the 
Hegelian transition from the transcendental to the social. On this Brandomean view, by 
performing multiple acts of the social production and consumption of reasons, we get involved in 
the exchange of judgments, which cashes out the mutual recognition of our responsibilities 
towards each other (MIE: 474). It is this shift from Kant to Hegel that finally allows Brandom to 
put together the inferentialist-semantic and the normative-pragmatic parts of his story. On the 
semantic side, we can grasp the content of a concept only if we have an implicit knowledge of its 
inferential relations with a host of other concepts, as well as the circumstances and consequences 
of these relations. In Brandom’s own terms, “our capacity to know that something is the case 
depends on our having a certain kind of know-how: the ability to tell what is reason for what” 
(RP: 118). On the pragmatic side, our ability to place a concept in a network of inferential 
relations can be made explicit in terms of practical commitments, which an actual use of the 
concept implies. Conceptual contents emerge from, and are made explicit by, mutual recognition-
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based rational criticisms available to us in the explicit inferential form as the scorekeeping game 
of giving and asking for reasons.  
On this Hegelian account, we cannot, as it were, begin to be meaningful from scratch, 
from a certain “this”: whenever we happen to make a contentful assertion, we always find 
ourselves already inside the game in which our exchange of reasons is supported by our 
interrelated background beliefs and mutual responsibilities towards each other. Our moves in the 
game always involve commitments that stand in need of justification, mutual critical assessment, 
and acknowledgment of their inferential consequences. In making judgments, we hold each other 
responsible for commitments and entitlements that we attribute to one another, and acknowledge 
each other’s authority. And it is in doing so (that is, in performing an essentially social activity) 
that we do what we must be able to do in order to count as taking or treating a particular 
application of a concept as correct or incorrect. In this way, Brandom’s account of normativity 
combines Kant’s ideas of human action and the reflective character of human consciousness with 
what Brandom takes to be a Hegelian approach to social discursive practices. On this view, what 
is between the reflectivity of consciousness, which expresses our sapience (the Kantian self of 
freedom), and mere natural sentience (the Kantian self of nature), is not a gap, but a continuity. 
That said, the historico-philosophical background of the problem of the objectivity of 
discursive norms in MIE cannot be complete without discussing Brandom’s overall stance 
towards the nature of the social. A brief reference to the basics of Weber’s theory of social action 
will help us here. Apart from the explicit reference to Weber’s notion of disenchantment, as 
discussed in the beginning of this section, with a rare exception (see Detel 2008), philosophers 
pay little or no attention to another, implicit reference that Brandom’s texts make to Weber’s 
works. Recall that, in Brandom’s theory, practical attitudes of individual agents have priority 
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over normative statuses in that the former institute the latter. To put it differently, the authority of 
norms derives entirely from their actual acknowledgment by someone (MIE: 50-52). And it is 
explaining the relationship between individual attitudes (how we take things to be) and statuses 
(how things ought to be objectively) that is the clue to solving the objectivity problem and the 
keystone of Brandom’s whole theoretical edifice. Meanwhile, it was none other than Weber who 
first conceived of the social realm as constituted by social actions, as opposed to Durkheim’s 
understanding of society as reality on its own which consists of facts external to any particular 
group of individuals and their behavior. Whereas, according to Durkheim, an individual action is 
contingent to the social relation and not logically prior to it, Weber insists that what an agent does 
has the primary significance. Brandom and Weber seem to be in agreement as to the fact that, on 
the one hand, what an individual does is always connected with some subjective intentions and 
purposes and, on the other hand, to a large extent depends on the agent’s interpretation of the 
actions of other agents. But according to Weber’s interpretive approach, it makes little sense to 
consider an action as carrying the meaning that is “correct” or “objective” by some metaphysical 
criterion. Different types of actions are performed in a variety of situations in which roles played 
by participants may yield different patterns of results depending on contexts and circumstances 
involved (Weber 1991: 7).  
Needless to say, the account of the Weber-Durkheim controversy just given is 
exceedingly brief, but the very outline of the context it creates can help us properly situate 
Brandom’s approach to the objectivity of norms. On the one hand, like Weber, Brandom 
emphatically denies that the social constitutes a separate ontology and that objectivity should be 
equalised with impersonality. On the other hand, he claims that norms “bind the community of 
concept-users in such a way that it is possible not only for individuals, but for the whole 
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community to be mistaken in its assessments of what they require in particular cases” (ME: 54, 
emphasis added; cf. Wanderer 2008: 19). In this context, the question is whether – and how – 
Brandom’s claim that normative discursive practices are necessarily inferential and social 
coexists with his claim that norms are objective in the sense that even a society of concept-users 
taken as a whole can go wrong. Given that the objectivity of discursive norms, says Brandom, 
“precipitate[s] out of the social soup of norms” (MIE: 54), how can a norm be social, inferentially 
articulated, and objectively valid even in a case in which no one in a given society gets it right? 
Should we simply stop at this point and be, as Robert Pippin puts it, “philosophically satisfied” 
with the formal claim that “the permanent possibility of a distinction between how things are and 
how they are taken to be […] is built into the social articulation of concepts” (MIE: 597; Pippin 
2002: 393)?  
 
 
1.3. Perspectival Objectivity 
Now that the appropriate context is in place, in this section I will proceed by showing in some 
detail how Brandom’s theory leads to the problem of the objectivity of discursive norms and how 
Brandom purports to solve the problem. Recall that, to mean something at all, an expression, 
according to Brandom, has to form a part of a network of other expressions. In his Reason in 
Philosophy: Animating Ideas (2009)10, Brandom illustrates this claim by introducing the 
distinction between describing and mere labelling: While a parrot may learn to repeat the word 
“red” in the presence of red things, a three-year-old child, in responding with just the same word 
                                                          
10 Henceforth RP. 
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in the presence of just the same objects also knows that red lollipops taste like cherry and that a 
red traffic light means “stop.” The difference between the parrot and the child lies in the fact that 
the latter is not merely labelling things, but is able to practically master the inferential relations of 
the concept “red” to a variety of other descriptive concepts and thus to locate it correctly in the 
space of implications that those other concepts constitute (RP: 7-8). In short, a concept can be 
applied only as a node in an inferential network of other concepts, and its inferential articulation 
is a sufficient condition of its conceptual contentfulness (AR: 8). These claims of Brandom echo 
what Sellars wrote on the relation between meanings of expressions and practices of their 
application, in the context of his familiar critique of “the Given”: 
<…> one can have the concept of green only by having a whole battery of concepts of which it is 
one element. It implies that while the process of acquiring the concept of green may … involve a 
long history of acquiring piecemeal habits of response to various objects in various circumstances, 
there is an important sense in which one has no concept pertaining to the observable properties of 
physical objects … unless one has them all. 
(Sellars 1997: 44-45) 
To explain how the treatment of meanings in terms of inferential roles implies 
normativity, Brandom introduces what he calls “a rationalist criterion of demarcation of the 
linguistic.” According to Brandom, the criterion stipulates “that what distinguishes the linguistic 
practice in virtue of which we are sapient and not merely sentient beings is its core practices of 
giving and asking for reasons” (PP: 29-30).The criterion stems from what Brandom takes to be 
the Kantian idea that the most distinctive feature of judgments is that they represent things we are 
responsible for (PP: 31). Again, recall that, according to Brandom, it is our capacity of applying 
concepts that highlights the reflectivity of human consciousness as opposed to mere unreflective 
sentience, and the normative dimension of human action as opposed to mere natural dispositions 
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to act in a certain way. Given this, it is easy to see that the criterion is a linguistic extension of 
this maxim, with the additional proviso that judgment is the minimal unit of responsibility.  
The reason for this stipulation is the shift from a Cartesian descriptive conception of 
intentionality centered on the certainty of representations, to a Kantian normative conception of 
intentionality centered on their necessity (MIE: 9-11). This Kantian intuition, as Brandom notes, 
was later elaborated by Frege and amounts to the claim that, if we start analyzing language in 
normative terms, we see right away that judgments are the smallest semantic units, to which 
pragmatic force can attach and to which a speaker can claim entitlement or be committed (RP: 34). 
Entitlement and commitment are two primitive notions which represent two forms of responsibility 
for a judgment and which Brandom’s theory treats as cases of what he calls a “normative status”. 
The normative status of a judgment or a claim reflects how its correctness actually stands, 
irrespective of what you or anyone else might think of it.  
Recall that, semantically speaking, simply conforming to a rule is not enough, we must 
also take ourselves to be acting upon it. Likewise, pragmatically speaking, what makes us act is 
not a commitment or entitlement per se, but our practical stance towards it. What matters is how 
we take it to be. This intervening act of taking something as a representation of something else, 
which Brandom considers as an expression of Kant’s constructivism and which, in his case, 
refers to a peculiar sapient sensitivity to rules and commitments, is certainly not in play in the 
relationship between natural objects and rules that govern them. In taking something as 
something else, we express a certain practical attitude towards our commitment or entitlement to 
this something. Practical attitudes come in three flavors: we can acknowledge a commitment, 
undertake it, or attribute it to someone else. As it has been mentioned in the previous section, 
relations between our practical attitudes are a pragmatic flipside of semantic inferential relations: in 
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making an assertion, we inevitably change the score of the game by setting a chain reaction of 
inferences and attitudes, both of which are kinds of scorekeeping actions11. Both semantically and 
pragmatically, what is shared by scorekeepers is not the contents they produce, but the practices in 
which they participate (MIE: 485).  
Now, the social dimension is constituted in its entirety by practical attitudes: in 
communicating with each other, all we have is interrelated practical attitudes/assessments made 
from a variety of different social perspectives. Our perspectives are held together in light of two 
facts. First, our scorekeeping practices are thick: we don’t use words in a vacuum; our uses are 
constituted by a situational interplay between language and environment, by their mutual 
arrangement. This arrangement constitutes a custom or a set of interrelated customs which come 
together as a form of life. Thus understood, the arrangement is implicit in the sense that it resides 
in practices we share, and our agreement about it cannot be expressed as a final set of explicitly 
formulated maxims. Second, our different perspectives are interlocked by what Brandom calls 
“anaphoric chains” and “substitutional commitments”. In chapter 9 of MIE Brandom provides a 
detailed discussion of anaphoric connections and the role they play in making expressions that 
involve demonstratives, indexicals, and proper names into repeatable linguistic structures. As a 
result, these structures, as Brandom puts it, “can express conceptual contents by being governed 
by indirectly inferential substitutional commitments” (MIE: 592). For instance, anaphoric uses of 
pronouns in phrases like “It is true of the inventor of lightning rod that he invented bifocals” 
initiate referential chains that tie different perspectives together and help us direct our intentions 
in understanding what we are talking about. Using these expressions also enables us to substitute 
one subsentential structure for another, making it clear, for instance, that by “the inventor of the 
                                                          
11 For more details on this aspect of scorekeeping, see Scharp 2012: 117-122. 
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lightning rod” we mean “Benjamin Franklin”, etc. (AR: 178-183). In doing all these things we, as 
scorekeepers, correlate our perspectives and unify the contents of what we say. This unification, 
though, is only a partial one, as it still allows for the uniqueness of our perspectives due to the 
differences in our background commitments. In other words, that contents are perspectival means 
that they can be defined only relative to a set of background commitments. 
Each scorekeeper keeps two sets of books, the first one containing commitments 
undertaken by other scorekeepers according to her, the second one containing those actually 
acknowledged by other scorekeepers (MIE: 646). In the former case, a scorekeeper accepts 
responsibility for the inferentially embedded collateral commitments which, according to her 
counterpart, she should acknowledge, but which she does not necessarily actually acknowledge. 
To take a well-known example of Brandom, senator McCarthy certainly believed that the specter 
of communism was haunting Europe, but most likely had no knowledge of the fact that this is 
exactly what the first sentence of the Communist Manifesto says. Consequently, had someone 
asked him whether he believed any of the claims of the manifesto, McCarthy would have denied 
it (MIE: 516). Meanwhile, McCarthy should have undertaken a commitment to this belief even 
though he had had no idea what the first sentence of the manifesto, in fact, says. Thus, keeping 
track of what a claim represents involves keeping track of how the claim shifts from perspective 
to perspective (Gibbard 1996: 703).  
In playing the game of giving and asking for reasons, we attribute and undertake 
commitments in a framework consisting of individual perspectives interconnected by 
substitutions and anaphoric chains. An important point is that attributing a commitment has 
priority over being entitled to undertake one, because undertaking may be understood in terms of 
being entitled to attribute, but not vice versa. In Brandom’s own terms, “an interlocutor can count 
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as having undertaken a commitment […] whenever others are entitled […] to attribute that 
commitment” (MIE: 596). What we have here, again, is taking someone as committed – a stance, 
which, as has been shown in section 1.2, stems from Brandom’s inferentialist reinterpretation of 
the Kantian distinction between the theoretical self of nature and the normative self of freedom, 
and which, according to Brandom, represents a fundamental feature of sapience as opposed to 
mere sentience. And it is the asymmetry this stance results in – the one between being entitled to 
attribute and undertaking – that allows Brandom to finally take account of the objectivity of 
discursive norms.  
The account is as follows. What is objectively correct is what is taken to be correct by a 
scorekeeper who is entitled to attribute a commitment – as opposed to what is acknowledged by 
the one to whom this commitment is attributed. And, as the game presupposes that attributions 
and undertakings are mutual, we can construe the difference between objective normative 
statuses and subjective practical attitudes as a social-perspectival distinction between practical 
attitudes (MIE: 597). In other words, the distinction between objectively correct applications and 
those that are only taken to be correct is, says Brandom, nothing but a structural feature of each 
individual practitioner’s perspective, a social-perspectival form of it. Due to the implicit 
agreement that individual attitudes create, they, as it were, project beyond the dispositions to apply 
them (MIE: 646). The objective outcome of communication is thus explicated in terms of 
individual practical attitudes only, which, in turn, leads to the collapse of external assessments into 
internal ones (MIE: 646). As Grönert (2005), in using one of Wittgenstein’s metaphors, claims, it 
might be said that Brandom’s phenomenalist approach to norms looks like “a ladder that needs to 
be thrown away after one has climbed up on it” (Grönert 2005: 166).  
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If this account is accurate, it reveals an interesting picture. Brandom is aware that, as all 
scorekeepers have different perspectives, there are always some possible circumstances in which 
any one actual application of a norm may in the future be discovered to be incorrect. At the same 
time, there is nothing whatsoever either about applications themselves, or about the way the game 
of giving and asking for reasons is generally played, that prevents some of our applications from 
being constantly reiterated in the future, and thus some of our beliefs supporting these 
applications from being final – even if they are wrong. I suggest that all these outcomes, taken 
together, put a Brandomean scorekeeper in a rather difficult situation. According to Brandom, a 
scorekeeper takes some of her applications to be correct knowing (1) that any application can be 
proven to be incorrect, (2) that about any norm applied all of us can go wrong, and (3) that we 
can hold on to some of our beliefs indefinitely long even though those beliefs are wrong. 
Naturally, in light of (1), (2), and (3) as they stand together, our acceptance of the distinction 
between correct and incorrect assessments does not amount to much. At best, we are only able to 
say that objectively correct conceptual contents are somewhere in the discourse. They are 
somewhere there in the sense that every detective story has a state of affairs with the discovery of 
which the suspense ends. But, according to Brandom, discourse has no Master (which is to say 
that there is no one who can read the story from cover to cover), and, therefore, no one knows 
whether the state of affairs is at all obtainable. It may seem that we at least may hope or aim for 
the correctness of our assessments, but if the fallibility of our current beliefs is not compensated 
by the possibility of our knowing, at some point in future, that some particular assessments are 
indeed correct, our hope for correctness is only the hope for the fact that our game of giving and 
asking for reasons is a structurally sustainable and a well-ordered one.  
It is important to have in mind that, on this account, the idea of the objectivity of norms as 
a social-perspectival form shared by all scorekeepers does not always help us distinguish between 
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correct and incorrect applications not because it offers a purely coherentist view on epistemic 
justification. To the contrary, Brandom lays stress on the fact that, due to anaphoric chains and 
substitutional commitments, our beliefs are, for the most part, about the world. But my 
suggestion is that anaphoric chains and substitutional commitments cannot do the job. Here is 
why. According to Brandom, our claims being inferentially interlocked with each other entails 
that making a claim is always followed by some commitments being scratched off/written in the 
two books each player uses to keep score both on others and herself. As has been discussed 
above, the idea of every scorekeeper having two books implies that every scorekeeper is 
responsible for certain consequences of what she claims even if she does not acknowledge her 
commitments to those consequences (i.e., even if the commitments are absent from the book of 
her acknowledged commitments). What allows us to take the commitments as objectively valid is 
their being present in the book containing commitments undertaken by the scorekeeper according 
to others. Meanwhile, as, by Brandom’s own admission, all other scorekeepers can go wrong, 
there is nothing at all that can prevent some of our mistaken opinions from being reiterated 
indefinitely long. Consequently, we have to admit that some facts about the world may never be 
discovered, or, in other words, that the Kantian idea of Ding an sich is viable. What is missing in 
this case, then, is an explanation of why this conclusion is inadmissible for Brandom’s Hegelian 
account. The fact that, due to anaphoric chains and substitutional commitments, we are in 
agreement with others as to what we are talking about cannot tell us whether what we are talking 
about is not wrong. Consequently, anaphoric chains and substitutional commitments only 
supplement our recognition-based rationality, but they cannot guarantee that our current mistaken 
beliefs will ever be corrected. 
We can try and support our distinction between correct and incorrect 
applications/assessments by the regulative notion of theoretically perfect intersubjective 
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agreement obtainable under ideal conditions – a notion similar to Peirce’s idea of a future 
community of inquirers. Peirce defines it in his 1868 “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities” 
as “a community without definite limits, and capable of indefinite increase of knowledge”, where 
“[the] two series of cognitions – the real and the unreal – consist of those which, at a time 
sufficiently future, the community will always continue to reaffirm; and of those which, under the 
same conditions, will ever after be denied” (W2: 239). The notion of such intersubjective 
agreement will be discussed in detail in chapter 3. I will only say here that what it might add to 
Brandom’s account is that it would serve as a form of communication, and, at the same time, 
would also tell something about the contents of our beliefs. This idea would serve as a form of 
communication, because every communicative move in the scorekeeping game would necessarily 
have to refer to it as a state of affairs which all our errors and corrections of this move should 
ultimately lead to12. And this idea would say something about the objective contents of our 
beliefs, because, whatever our knowledge at the present moment actually is, it would be capable 
of providing us with a warrant that true facts about the world are necessarily discoverable in the 
long run.  
On the one hand, according to Peirce, the future community, through pragmatic maxim, 
constitutes a set of principles that guide practical decisions of me and you as individual 
                                                          
12 It might seem that this same reference is available on Brandom’s account as well, in the sense that every 
move in the scorekeeping game would necessarily have to refer to that which is correct as opposed to 
that which is only taken to be correct. However, as I will show in chapter 3, in Peirce’s case, the 
reference in question is neither a lip service, nor a detail that can be detached from his theory without 
destroying its architecture, and attached to another theory to the same functional effect. As I will show in 
chapter 3, in Peirce’s case, the very difference between what we believe in at the moment (what we take 
to be correct) and what is correct, is incomprehensible without this reference, supported by the maxim of 
pragmatism – a rule of action that describes concepts we use in terms of consequences of our actions. 
Due to the maxim, the Peircean scorekeeper, unlike the Brandomean one, has a pretty clear idea of what 
to do in order to aim for correctness. According to Brandom, any assertion does have the difference 
between what is taken to be correct and what in fact is correct, built into it, but, as I will show later in 
this section, his scorekeeper has only the awareness of the norm as a certain possibility, but no guidance 
as to how to act. 
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scorekeepers. On the other hand, it is defined by Peirce as “that which, sooner or later, 
information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the 
vagaries of me and you” (W2: 239). Thus, this community is, by definition, not limited by a 
particular set of members, and therefore is in compliance with the requirements of Brandom’s 
theory in that it exceeds any such set in its reliance on future opportunities to correct the contents 
of our current beliefs. On this account, an objective deontic status could be seen as an attitude 
made fully explicit in terms of its inferential consequences. An individual attitude, although it 
may well happen to provide a correct assessment without such full explication, as fully explained 
and actually found to be correct may at any given moment of the game be only a projective 
possibility. But in this case, it would seem to be safe to say that even if everyone in a given 
community goes wrong, the practices, with all their consequential implications waiting to be 
realized, are still there, and so we keep score, accept commitments, and assign responsibilities in 
view of the fact that inferential habita may (and ultimately will) tell us where we went wrong. 
Brandom would obviously endorse (with some non-Peircean reservations) a link between 
the communal and the objective, but his normative pragmatics is certainly not quite compatible 
with the fact that the scorekeeping game is ultimately headed (as it is in Peirce’s case) to a 
predestined result. Brandom’s idea, in Steven Levine’s phrase, is to offer only “a hygienic notion 
of objectivity” that would contain no traces of foundationalism or representationalism of any kind 
(Levine 2010: 584). Meanwhile, whether the notion of objectivity will have any meaning after all 
the hygiene procedures are over is a question that remains open13. For Brandom, the ideas of 
extended community and of a conceptual content being ultimately correct, are not plausible ones. 
                                                          
13 As Levine (2010) points out, “in moving so far from how the ordinary concept of objectivity operates in 
our inquiries, by making objectivity something that we control, Brandom completely revises the concept 
rather than elucidates it. Of course this complete revision may be justified, but the burden is on Brandom 
to show that it is” (Levine 2010: 586). 
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However, in the absence of those two, it remains unclear what exactly the link is between our 
limited communal agreement “here and now”, on the one hand, and something objective that 
exceeds any such agreement, on the other hand. Given that Brandom’s account dismisses a 
possibility of any final objective opinion and, at the same time, allows for at least some of our 
incorrect opinions to be reinstated again and again for an infinitely long time, the idea of something 
that exceeds a limited communal agreement cannot amount to much. Provided that the resort to the 
Kantian unknowable is not an option, and keeping in mind that the discursive practices we are 
involved in are based on rational criticisms and mutual recognition of our responsibilities to each 
other, the idea of rational constraint on what scorekeepers think and say can be due to our 
discursive practices being self-corrective.  
Of course, the self-corrective character of discourse might, for instance, mean that it is 
arranged in such a way that correct claims are always discoverable. But, as has been 
demonstrated above, Brandom’s inferentialism doesn’t guarantee this. Perspectival objectivity is 
a form that makes us mindful to each other’s reasons and lays constraint on our navigating 
between different participants’ perspectives. If this is all there is to this idea, all we can safely 
conclude in light of it is the fact that each participant, as Grönert (2005) aptly puts it, “leaves 
room for an admission of objective deontic statuses” (Grönert 2005: 169). But again, does this 
necessarily require objectivity of any kind? As, for instance, Rorty (2000) points out, it is natural 
for a Wittgensteinian14 to answer the question “How do you know that this is red?” by simply 
saying “I know English”, or “I know how to use the phrase this is red” (Rorty 2000: 186). Given 
this, if we need to distinguish applications that are taken to be correct at the moment from those 
                                                          
14 At least for a Wittgensteinian who happen to disagree with Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein’s 
Investigations. 
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that are correct objectively, we need something more than the idea of objectivity as a structural 
feature of discourse. We need some additional criteria.  
One option, in the absence of such criteria, would be to acknowledge that a given 
conceptual content is applied correctly simply because, as William James would put it, it works 
for now. But in this case, the corresponding normative status might be taken to be objective only 
due to a set of social conventions and behavioral patterns we currently agree upon. On this view, 
what all members of a community here and now believe in, or deem to be correct, is 
indistinguishable from what is correct objectively, and what is said to be correct objectively is 
what, in Rorty’s terms, is represented by a useful vocabulary – until this vocabulary is out of use. 
If our conversation, like Adam Smith’s market, is governed by the invisible hand that rationalizes 
supply and demand of reasons and lays constraints on how we go about with our commitments 
and entitlements, then all we need to do is to learn how to play the game, until circumstances 
change the game or until we decide not to play it anymore. In other words, to say that our 
communication is perspectival in its form is simply to say that our rationality is inherently such 
that it organizes our reasons in an autonomous space, within which we can understand others and 
hold each other responsible for what we say and do. It remains unclear, therefore, how linking the 
rational constraint that the space of reasons imposes on our judgments to certain states of affairs 
being objective – if we want to disregard both causal impacts mute Kantian things in themselves 
exert on us and the vertical representational relation of mind to world – amounts to anything 
more than saying that intersubjective agreement between sapient creatures is not only the best 
evidence for accessibility of valid judgments, but also constitutive of their validity. But the 
question is: If changes in our conventions affect normative statuses, and if no normative status 
can hold once the appropriate behavioral patterns stop working, how can the norm it implies be 
projected beyond a set of individual dispositions, and thereby fulfill one of Brandom’s principal 
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requirements for objectivity (MIE: 646)? Let us suppose, though, the norm can be so projected, 
and let us also suppose we agree that, according to Brandom, what all members of a given 
community believe in at the moment really is indistinguishable from what is (or will be in the 
long run established as) correct objectively. Although these two facts do not show that there is no 
conceptual distinction between what everyone deems correct and what is correct according to the 
norms projected from our dispositions to acknowledge our commitments – as has been noted 
above, it only leaves room for the objectivity of norms, but it doesn’t show how this idea should 
necessarily be a part of the picture. Indeed, our practices include many things we do without 
recognizing these things as required. But whether simply recognizing the possibility of certain 
things we do as being thus required, is a sufficient condition for using the term “objectivity” in the 
way Brandom does, is a matter not yet entirely settled.  
To conclude this section, one more familiar worry about Brandom’s first attempt to deal 
with the objectivity problem in MIE is expressed in Loeffler (2005)15:  
If our system of acknowledged assertional commitments sets in general the standard […] of our 
semantic assessments of others, we can never regard others as having the better reasons. In the 
case of manifestly conflicting acknowledgements, we would always treat others as obliged to 
adjust to us. 
(Loeffler 2005: 40) 
On this account, there is nothing that seems to be able to give us the needed normative constraint 
to adopt a system of assessments that are different from our own. Indeed, we can do things 
without acknowledging these things as (objectively) required, but we cannot assess what is done 
by others without commitments that are actually acknowledged – by us and others according to 
                                                          
15 In his “Normative Phenomenalism: On Robert Brandom’s Practice-Based Explanation of Meaning” 
Ronald Loeffler does not support neither this claim, nor a response to it that Brandom himself might 
offer. Loeffler offers his own defence of normative phenomenalism irrespective of whether this defence 
is acceptable for Brandom or not. However, I take the position he uses to make his own point seriously, 
and I think the objection he presents is uncontested by Brandom’s own account. 
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us. This, of course, is not to say that we do not defer to others. We do. But the question is not 
how to reconcile the fact that we adopt systems of assessments that are different from our own, 
and the fact that what we have for the assessment of others amounts to what is actually 
acknowledged. Brandom’s idea of the recognitive structure that characterizes the game of giving 
and asking for reasons down to the most basic level of “I-Thou” relationship successfully 
addresses this worry: before I can make any sense, I recognize the value of the other. The point is 
to understand clearly that any system of acknowledged assertional commitments is a social and 
institutional system. Developing Loeffler’s formulation along this avenue, one might ask how the 
idea of unifying inferential roles of our judgments is correlated with the idea of often conflicting 
institutional roles we play as parents, citizens, etc. What is the status of the common language 
that supposedly allows us to come to terms with each other? Unless there’s some answer to these 
questions that would offer a story about social institutions.  
We might, for example, ask: Based on what story I, as someone’s brother, should 
necessarily come to terms with Thou being a judge? You and I can agree that what my brother 
has done is a felony. But, even so, both beliefs that constitute our inferential networks of 
collateral commitments and entitlements, and the way we will, given an occasion, act on those 
beliefs, might still be incompatible. From my perspective, the fact that I hold the de re belief of 
my brother that he committed a felony, does not necessarily presuppose the legal consequences it 
does from your perspective, if you identify yourself primarily as a judge in a similar situation. 
Brandom seems to imply that, due to the inferential ties between our uses of the term, together 
with anaphoric chains and substitutional commitments, the mismatch between our systems of 
collateral beliefs can never get big enough for the meaning of “felony” not to be shared by us as 
scorekeepers. In fact, however, you and I can keep using the term without even a slight trace of 
disagreement on a number of occasions when my particular attitude towards my relative is not 
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explicitly involved, i.e. if our uses do not involve the difference in our commitments that has just 
been described.  
True, I accept responsibility for the inferentially embedded commitments collateral to my 
belief of my brother that he committed a felony, because I should acknowledge them according to 
your ascriptions. Brandom, however, admits that I do not necessarily actually acknowledge what 
I thus take responsibility for (MIE: 646). That said, how might the fact that you count me as 
having undertaken a commitment because you are entitled to attribute it (MIE: 596) help if, due 
to my role-laden beliefs, I am not going to cooperate anyway? The problem here is not that my 
judgment is legally or morally unsound, but that the normative force that can (but not necessarily 
will) make me change my mind, will result not from my assessing my own beliefs in 
scorekeeping terms, but rather from my rethinking the meaning of an article of the criminal code 
– that is to say, from changing my perspective on a particular set of local – always local – 
institutional practices. Whether this change will become an adjustment to the overall recognitive 
structure of the game of giving and asking for reasons, or remain a conflicting characteristic for a 
particular form of life is an open question. And, as the result of my rethinking is uncertain, the 
relations between being a judge and being someone’s brother might be considerably less 
transparent than Brandom’s idea of scorekeeping game seems to represent. 
To summarize, as I have shown in this section, the purely formal character of perspectival 
objectivity doesn’t add anything substantial to us having a set of common conventions. Of 
course, thanks to Brandom’s account, we are much better off seeing those conventions not as 
finite sets of explicit rules, but as sets of practices, or games, in a Wittgensteinian fashion. But 
again, according to Wittgenstein, there’s not one singular feature – formal or substantial – that is 
common to all games. They are related in a variety of different ways creating what Wittgenstein 
calls “family resemblances” (PI: 65-67). Whether this Wittgensteinian picture presupposes 
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objectivity of any kind is a separate question, but the fact is that the very term is quite tellingly 
absent from the vocabulary of Philosophical Investigations. 
Brandom’s theory connects individuals through inferential ties subject to the all-pervasive 
perspectival form of communication which constrains everybody and says nothing about the 
meaning of any particular act of communication. However, this self-regulating free market of 
ideas, as our common project, itself cannot but represent a certain particular institutional culture, 
the “We” which our statements refer to. As DeMoor (2011) puts it, “the commonness of this project 
… cannot be accounted for simply in terms of the fact that I am doing it and Thou art doing it; it is 
something that we are embarking upon together” (DeMoor 2011: 413). Naturally, according to 
Brandom, this togetherness of the We should not be either the Orwellian Big Brother, completely 
separated from each and every one of us (because, by Brandom’s own admission, discourse has no 
Master), or a sum total of shared social conventions agreed upon by a limited group of self-
interested individuals (due to the recognitive character of discourse). However, what it should be 
Brandom’s MIE does not tell. 
 
 
1.4. “I-We”: Trust and Forgiveness 
In this section, I will discuss in some further detail the transition of Brandom’s normative theory 
from Kant’s critical philosophy to Hegel’s Phenomenology in an attempt to build the link 
between inferentialist semantics and normative pragmatics on Hegel’s idea of mutual recognition. 
This transition is accomplished by Brandom in two steps: the first step is made in MIE, where 
Brandom gives the second-personal (or the “I-Thou”) account of the recognitive structure of 
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discourse; the second step is made in his (yet unpublished) A Spirit of Trust16, where Brandom 
seems to have changed his mind in favor of the institutional (or the “I-We”) approach. It is highly 
important to understand that the difference between these two kinds of one’s relations to others is 
not simply in the number of people one is involved with. The shift from the “I-Thou” to the “I-
We” marks a crucial change of perspective on the link between the most fundamental recognitive 
structure of discourse, and the social character of it. In the former case, the structure of mutual 
recognition characteristic for the relation between two individual wills is immediately translated 
to the level of a community taken as a whole. Brandom’s burden in MIE is to justify his 
phenomenalism, or to show how individual practical attitudes institute objective normative 
statuses. The latter case might be described as the transition of Brandom’s philosophy from its 
Kantian to its Hegelian stage. Of course, Brandom employs Hegelian ideas already in MIE, but 
what becomes important at this second stage is that the translation of the individual into the social 
is mediated by a Hegelian institutional story. 
As has been discussed in the beginning of this chapter, in Kant’s 1st Critique objectivity is 
explained as originating from a set of a priori concepts which create the possibility for the formal 
unity of experience. These concepts, Kant says, introduce “order and regularity in the 
appearances” which “we could never find […] in appearances, had not we ourselves, or the 
nature of our mind, originally set them there” (KRV: A125). In other words, an outer object 
cannot be simply given in the intuition alone; it has to be synthesized in accordance with the 
categories and recognized in a concept. Kant’s central question here is, thus, how conditions of 
thought that are always subjective (or, in Brandom’s terms, practical attitudes that are always 
individual) can acquire objective value (KRV: A89/B122). This self-legislative power of pure 
                                                          
16 Henceforth ST. 
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reason, is then reinterpreted in Critique of Practical Reason as the autonomy thesis, which tells 
us that the norms that a community authorises are self-binding. The thesis stipulates that the hold 
of practical maxims on us depends exclusively on our own endorsement. Because of the very 
nature of consciousness, the principles of practical reason must arise from consciousness itself 
and consciousness must be able to will them as laws. In this way, practical reason determines 
which reasons to endorse and which actions to pursue.  
In The Critique of Judgment Kant claims that maxims of practical reason cannot be 
rendered efficient without a medium, but can be imagined as if they were rules which are capable 
of guiding conduct due to being symbolized in a twofold logic-aesthetic form. On the one hand, 
ethical behavior is discrete; it cannot be worked into continuous experience: no one can 
consistently and continuously adjust her behavior to an explicitly stated formal rule. However, 
we are able to think about the application of our maxims in a logically consistent way. On the 
other hand, the categorical imperative cannot acquire any particular practical meaning due to its 
formal character, but we can ascribe this meaning to our actions by appealing to the aesthetic idea 
of a general law, which is to obey without asking any “why.” Kant’s approach to the problem of 
normativity, as he himself insisted on many occasions, is architectonic; in order to solve the 
problem of the normative authority of practical reasons, it involves all three normative sciences: 
logic, ethics, and aesthetics.  
Brandom cannot follow this path and therefore builds the link between his inferentialist 
semantics and his normative pragmatics on Hegel’s idea of mutual recognition. He believes that it 
is this idea that provides a necessary justification for his social-perspectival account of the 
objective character of discursive norms. This approach makes the link between the objective and 
the social quite explicit, because it allows us to derive an account of the conditions of objectivity 
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not from the Kantian transcendental features of consciousness, but from the social character of 
discourse as suggested by Hegel. To accomplish the task, Brandom provides a Hegelian account 
of discursive practices within which we recognise each other as free agents capable of giving and 
asking for reasons. However, in MIE Brandom uses the idea of recognition in a somewhat narrower 
sense than Hegel does in his Phenomenology, and my claim is that this use, at least in part, is 
responsible for some of the unresolved issues with the notion of the objectivity of norms as 
discussed in sections 1.2-1.3 above. 
Recall that the asymmetry between undertaking and attributing a commitment, which 
allows Brandom to introduce the notion of objectivity, is grounded in his insistence on the 
primacy of the second-personal point of view, or what he calls the “I-Thou” relationship, as 
opposed to the “I-We” relationship. As Habermas sees it, Brandom “wants to grant priority to 
symmetric ‘I-you relations’ between first and second persons over asymmetric ‘I-we relations’ in 
which the individual is, so to speak, overwhelmed by the collectivity” (Habermas 2000: 344; 
emphasis added). One of Habermas’s dissatisfactions with this picture is that Brandom adheres to 
a somewhat idealized view of the social where the atomism of “I-Thou” communicative pairs 
contradicts Brandom’s semantic holism. What I want to emphasise here, however, is beside this 
point. The question I want to ask is whether Brandom’s second-personal point of view is 
compatible with the structure of recognition as it is developed by Hegel.  
As Michael DeMoor claims in his Brandom and Hegel on Objectivity, Subjectivity, and 
Sociality (2011), it is the “I-We” relationship that is fundamental for Hegel’s own account. On this 
account, I am self-conscious only as a part of a particular social culture. I can make sense of what I 
think and do only in the context of a particular set of social institutions as concrete forms of the 
“We”. DeMoor shows that there’s an analogy between Hegel’s Phenomenology and his Philosophy 
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of Right, where the former represents theoretical reason, which results in the “We” of Spirit, and the 
latter describes the development of practical reason, which finds its full expression in the common 
will of social contract. On this perspective, neither practical, nor theoretical synthesis is, as Kant 
defines it, “an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is 
hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze” (KRV, B 180). Hegel 
interprets Kantian syntheses not as a pure Selbst-Bestimmung, but as a process of continuous 
development. Moreover, he rejects any clear distinction between the two kinds of synthesis – and, 
by the same token, Kantian architectonics with aesthetics as the keystone of Kant’s system. 
According to DeMoor, for Hegel, “the subject that takes himself to be experiencing a unified 
diversity by determining it according to a concept is the same subject that places his will in a thing 
and thus makes it his” (DeMoor 2011: 201). Just like in Kant’s case, one of this subject’s key 
powers is imagination, but the Hegelian imagination is not separated from reason, and mediates the 
theoretical and the practical in such a way that the relationship between the two is dialectical. Part 
of the pragmatist essence of Hegel’s approach is that he considers the theoretical and the practical 
as two moments of the same narrative, whereas, according to Kant, they are two parallel stories 
mediated by the transcendental schematism and aesthetic judgment respectively.  
Up to this point, Brandom would agree. However, according to Hegel, recognition in the 
“I-Thou” master-slave dialectic is incomplete as long as it is expressed in a struggle between two 
independent wills in pursuit of their own individual projects. It should be mediated by Spirit, 
which is realized in a variety of social institutions that follow one another until turning into the 
Absolute “We” understood as the final shape of self-consciousness. And just as Phenomenology 
describes the journey from the unreflective sense-certainty to a particular thing to a rational self-
interested agent to a religious community, Philosophy of Right proceeds, through a variety of 
institutional stages, from the family where recognition is based on sentiment, to the civil society 
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in the form of the rationally organized State that provides the ultimate conditions for coexistence 
of rational free-willing individuals.  
From this point of view, what is lacking in the story that Brandom tells us in MIE is an 
account of why we, as free individuals, share the same practices that constitute the game of giving 
and asking for reasons, or, in Hegel’s own terms, why exactly being-for-another (how I take 
things to be) and being-in-itself (how things ought to be) tend to coincide. This issue caused by 
Brandom’s insistence on the primacy of the second-personal point of view is addressed in ST. 
Parts 1 and 5 of this text tell a story that is remarkably different from the one offered in MIE. The 
new interpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology that Brandom offers in ST represents an attempt to 
reconcile the reality of the We, or of the social order, and the “I-Thou” relationship, which 
Brandom previously took to be the most primitive structure of social communication. In ST this 
task is accomplished by means of an interpretation of the idea of objectivity through the ideas of 
trust and forgiveness.   
Brandom begins his analysis in part 5 of ST by introducing Hegel’s distinction between the 
notions of alienation (“Entfremdung”) and “moral life” (“Sittlichkeit”), which, on his interpretation, 
mirrors the distinction between the subjective and the objective. Brandom claims that 
[…] where the immediate Sittlichkeit Hegel takes to characterize traditional society practically 
construes the implicit normative structure of its practices in an one-sidedly objective way, the 
alienation he takes to characterize modern society practically construes the implicit normative 
structure of its practices in an one-sidedly subjective way. What makes them one-sided, and so 
ultimately inadequate, is in both cases the immediacy of their practical conceptions. More 
specifically, […] both understand normativity in terms of independence, rather than freedom. […] 
Hegel uses ‘independence’ (Unabhängigkeit) in two different ways, depending on whether its 
contextual contrary is ‘dependence’ or ‘freedom’.  In the first usage, what is independent exercises 
authority over what is dependent upon it, which is accordingly responsible to it. The second usage 
concerns a particular, defective, way of understanding those generic notions of independence and 
dependence, authority and responsibility.  What is defective about it is that it is atomistic and 
immediate, by contrast to the holistic, mediated conception of freedom.   
(ST5: 39-40) 
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At one extreme, authority is immediately exercised over what is totally dependent on it 
and responsible to it; at another extreme, the social is broken down into completely independent 
and self-reliant atoms. Both extremes are defective and are in need of some sort of mediation and 
change as to the conceptions of authority and responsibility (or, using Brandom’s earlier 
terminology, the objectivity of normative statuses and the subjectivity of individual practical 
attitudes). What mediates between the two is culture. It is culture that makes us who we are by 
initiating us into a set of particular customs, and it is we who create and support a particular 
culture by acknowledging, through our attitudes, the bindingness of its norms. In this case, there 
is no neutral, ontologically intact opposition between “I” and “Thou”, as Brandom seems to 
imply in MIE. As culture is always shaped within a particular community, the opposing extremes 
to be reconciled within it, in Brandom’s own words, are “the authority of the community and its 
norms over individuals (their dependence on it), and the authority of individuals over the 
community and its norms (its dependence on them), respectively” (ST5: 45).  
Within this new approach, Brandom reformulates his question about the possibility of the 
objectivity of discursive norms: “How can the responsibility of subjective normative attitudes 
(what is acknowledged as correct) to normative statuses (what really is correct) be reconciled 
with the authority of subjective normative attitudes over normative statuses?” (ST5: 46). This 
time around, in facing the objectivity problem, Brandom tells a full-fledged Hegelian institutional 
story. He presents an extensive reinterpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology, which culminates in 
the idea of language as the basic structure of mutual recognition and the principal framework for 
the scorekeeping game. Language, in turn, presupposes two recognitive relations which Hegel 
calls “trust” and “confession”.  
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According to Brandom, linguistic communication based on trust sublates the dichotomy 
between the formalism of the Enlightenment that cannot represent norms as both binding and 
contentful, and Faith that cannot tell us what role we play in instituting those norms. Knowledge 
alone is not enough to make us act, and faith alone is not enough to understand what it is that we 
do when we make the norms binding and contentful (ST5: 100). Brandom generalizes the 
disparity between the two views in the dichotomy between the modern view that sees attitudes as 
independent, and norms as dependent, and the traditional, premodern view that sees norms as 
independent and attitudes as dependent. In the second case, says Brandom, “the objective norms 
have authority over the subjective attitudes of individuals, which are supposed merely to reflect 
them, acknowledge their authority, apply them in deliberation and assessment, judgment and 
action” (ST5: 118). This realist, or Durkheimean, scenario, presupposes that the social has its 
own ontology over and above individual members of a given community. In the second, 
Weberian case, according to Brandom, the subjective attitudes of individuals institute norms17. 
Brandom’s exposition of a Hegelian reconciliation of the two extremes, and results in the idea of 
historically grounded, unalienated community of self-conscious individuals, where normativity 
and freedom are represented not as innate ideas of human mind, but as a social and a political 
achievement, or, in Hegel’s own words, “the unity of the different independent self-
consciousnesses […]: 'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I'.” [PG 177].  
Even a brief summary of almost 250 pages of ST5 would take too much space here. What 
is important for us here is that this new approach marks an important shift in Brandom’s theory 
and allows Brandom to abandon his idea of the “I-Thou” relationship as the ground for his social-
                                                          
17 On Weber-Durkheim controversy see section 1.1. 
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perspectival account of objectivity, in favor of the historically and socially grounded relationship 
between the “I” and the “We”, the two ideas that come together in the notion of community 
where self-conscious individuals identify themselves with the norms they endorse, and – through 
this identification – with other members of the community. On this view, it is important that one 
can follow rules and share commitments with the rest of a community only if one has an idea of 
how this community came to be. A genealogical explanation of the sort Brandom presents in ST5 
helps us understand how, through a set of consecutive steps, we get the ultimate institutional 
structure, within which the game of giving and asking for reasons is fully realized. It is only 
given the genealogical explanation of the sort Hegel presents in his Phenomenology, as we learn 
the story of how the game was formed, that we get a chance to finally answer the question of why 
we, as free individuals, share practices that constitute the game, and only in this case being-for-
another (how I take things to be) and being-in-itself (how things ought to be) tend to coincide. 
However, Brandom is aware that the new system of social communication based on trust 
also needs an idea that would explain its continuity, i.e. an idea that would show how this 
communicative system exists in time. The key role here is played by the idea of confession, 
which Brandom defines as  
An extension strategy, by which self-conscious individuals identify with actual goings-on over 
which they exert some real, but always only partial authority, identify themselves as the seats of 
responsibilities that outrun their own capacity to fulfill.  Confession of the need for forgiveness 
and trust that it will be forthcoming both acknowledge the sense in which others are in a 
distinctive way also responsible for what I have done.  For the eventual significance of my 
performance, the content of the commitment I have adopted, practically as intention or cognitively 
as belief, is now left in their care. 
(ST5: 223) 
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It is a piece of common sense that I am responsible for what I intend to do as well as for what I 
actually do. However, those with whom I am tied by the bonds of mutual recognition – those 
who, bound by my trust in them, will forgive my performance – are, in turn, responsible for 
finding a way to see my performance as a successful one (ibid.).  
The concepts of forgiveness and confession play a crucial part in ST5 where Brandom 
tells us a Hegelian “morality tale,” in which the judged and the judging consciousness are the two 
main characters. The one that is judged makes herself responsible by applying a concept 
(confesses), and the judging one takes her to be responsible for that application (forgives). On 
this account, forgiveness relies on a particular institutionalized tradition, and is a form of 
recollection, or reconstruction, of this tradition: “What one must do in order to forgive the 
confessor for what is confessed is to offer a rational reconstruction of a tradition to which the 
concept-application (theoretically in judgment or practically in intention) in question belongs” 
(ST5: 195). The judging consciousness is to decide whether or not, given the circumstances, the 
use of a concept is warranted based on a set of norms implicit in the tradition of past applications 
of the concept. Brandom’s example here is that of a common law judge, who confesses that his 
decisions are, in part, dictated 
…by attitudes of his that are extraneous to the facts at hand and the law he is applying, by features 
of his training, reading, or mood, by the cases he happens to have adjudicated recently, the 
political climate, and so on, [i.e.] by appeal […] to factors that are contingent in the sense that 
they are not acknowledgments of the necessity that is the normative force articulated by the actual 
content of the concept.  He confesses that one need not see his decision as suitably responsive to 
the content of the norm he is supposed to supply, which is what would justify the decision.  
(ST5: 196) 
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Meanwhile, the later judge forgives by performing what Brandom calls “reconstructive 
recollection”: 
For a later judge concretely to forgive the earlier judge is to incorporate the decision that was the 
subject of confession into a retrospective rational reconstruction of the tradition of applying the 
concept in question, as having precedential significance. Doing that is recharacterizing and re-
presenting the content of the concept (what it really is, what it is in itself) as gradually emerging 
into the daylight of explicitness through a sequence of applications of it to novel cases, each of 
which reveals some hitherto hidden feature of it, and exhibiting the forgiven judge’s decision as 
having played that role. 
(ST5: 197) 
The forgiven concept application shows up as a correct one, even though it will become a 
matter of confession to a still later judge. No forgiving recollective story is final, and any 
application leads to some (yet undiscovered) incompatible commitments. For Brandom’s 
community, therefore, “there is and can be no finally adequate set of determinate concepts” (ST5: 
204). There is no regulative belief in a final state of affairs, no force that would direct 
interpretation to one predestined result, and, one might add, also no incentive for any 
interpretation to move in any particular direction: correctness is a feature of the game of giving 
and asking for reasons as a whole, not of any set of circumstances or situations that constitute a 
particular region of it.  
As we will see in more detail in chapter 3, just like in Peirce’s case, on Brandom’s 
account, there are always disparities in discourse. But, due to the fact that what is confessed from 
one perspective, is forgiven from another, together with the fact that conceptual contents mean 
what they do only relative to one another, the disparities get grinded between the gears of the 
self-corrective machinery of the game of giving and asking for reasons. For this reason, even in 
the absence of the regulative belief, the disparity between what the content of a concept is for a 
particular player (what is confessed) and what it is in itself (what is forgiven) vanishes in the state 
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of Spirit, which is the state of reciprocal and symmetric mutual recognition of all players. The 
relations between the confessed and the forgiven in ST, just as the relations between the 
acknowledged and the ascribed in MIE, is what actually constitutes the structure of recognition.  
Now, on the one hand, confession that results in forgiveness is retrospective. The 
forgiving recollection holds together the past and the present in that it represents the recognitive 
process which reconciles the authority on the part of those in whom the confessor places her trust, 
and the reconstruction of what the confessor takes to be the objective content of the concepts she 
endorses while performing her confession (ST5: 225). On the other hand, the recollection of a 
confessor’s actions is itself an activity that changes the future consequences of those actions, 
[…] for the consequential specifications of a doing are not something simply given, available only 
for theoretical re-interpretation.  Concrete practical forgiveness involves doing things to change 
what the consequences of the act turn out to be.  […] Something I have done should not be treated 
as an error or a crime, […] because it is not yet settled what I have done.  Subsequent actions by 
others can affect its consequences, and hence the content of what I have done.  The hard-hearted 
judgment wrongly assumes that the action is a finished thing, sitting there, fully-formed, as a 
possible object of assessment independent of what is done later. 
(ST5: 225-226) 
This account stresses the notion of a community that secures the self-corrective character 
of the game of giving and asking for reasons: at no moment in the game what any particular 
move means is completely settled. This is so because, as Brandom notes, the relations between 
the confessed and the forgiven are not merely recollective: 
[The] responsibility of the present judge to the past – to the actual content of the concept in 
question – is administered by future judges, who will assess in turn the precedential authority of 
the present judge’s construal of precedent, in terms of its fidelity to the content they recollectively 
discern as having been all along implicitly setting the standards of correctness of applications and 
assessments of applications of the concept. So the recognitive authority of the present judge with 
respect to past judges is conditioned on its recognition in turn by future ones.”  
(ST5: 221) 
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From this, it follows that, in postulating the tradition of past applications, we also postulate that 
future judges will forgive the present one by means of recollection. Two pages later Brandom 
explains how this reference to the future enters the picture: 
Confession and forgiveness are both at base performances that express backward-looking 
attitudes. Hegel’s telling of his parable of recognition does not include an explicit term for the 
forward-looking attitude that is the recognitive petition for forgiveness, with its attendant 
institution of a corresponding recognitive obligation to forgive on the part of those to whom it is 
addressed. I propose to use the term “trust” for that purpose. 
(ST5: 223) 
In situating the content of a concept within the recognitive inferential network, a judge forgives 
the contingencies that defined past applications of the concept and trusts those who will forgive 
the contingencies of his own application in the future.  
If this reconstruction of Brandom’s view in ST5 is correct, it reveals a problem strikingly 
similar to the one that has been discussed in section 1.3 above in relation to the idea of 
perspectival objectivity as it is developed by Brandom in MIE. The problem is this. Naturally, my 
expectations about the future are interrelated with my recollections of the past. But it is not 
immediately clear how the acknowledgment of this interrelation helps me explain the fact that, in 
forgiving, future judges will necessarily interpret the present judge’s confession and not simply 
reiterate it. Although Brandom emphatically denies that the idea of a final opinion can be 
adjusted to his account, the existence of the link between the forgiven past and the trusted future 
by itself can by no means prevent some of our present performances from being repeated in the 
future without introducing any novelty whatsoever, and some of our beliefs supporting these 
performances from being final. Besides, the existence of such link by itself by no means prevents 
novel meanings, but does not entail that any novelty will actually ever occur. The question is how 
exactly unexpected contingencies (in terms of Brandom’s common law judges example, “what 
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the judge had for breakfast”) that accompany any new application actually enter the picture and 
produce novel interpretations. My suggestion here is that Brandom’s account might benefit from 
a model that would incorporate the conception of possible future outcomes, which, as I will show 
in chapter 3, presupposes an account of the novelty within the very structure of meaning.  
Brandom does acknowledge the fact that, in addition to the institutional 
conceptualization, following rules and sharing commitments requires one more thing: we need to 
explain how exactly our game of giving and asking for reasons accommodates for the emergence 
of new meanings, and how it manages to keep the balance between novelty of content and 
constraint on what can be said. On Brandom’s view, these issues can be clarified once we agree 
that both producing new meanings and constraining our linguistic performances are essential 
features of the basic structure of mutual recognition and the principal framework for the 
scorekeeping game. In other words, those, he says, are essential features of language itself. What 
is interesting is that, in claiming this, Brandom refers to Chomsky’s notion of generative 
grammar:  
Think […] about the astonishing empirical observation with which Chomsky inaugurated modern 
linguistics—the observation that almost every sentence uttered by an adult native speaker is a 
novel sentence.  It is new, not just in the sense that that speaker has never produced or heard 
exactly that string of words before, but in the much stronger sense that no one in the history of the 
world has ever heard exactly that string of words before. <…> So linguistic competence is the 
capacity to produce and understand an indefinite number of novel sentences.  
(ST5: 75-76) 
At the end of the day, however, Brandom’s Hegelian notion of community that embodies 
absolute knowing tells us only that the game of giving and asking for reasons is well-ordered, 
that it will go on, and that its structure secures the self-corrective character of the game. But how 
exactly does Brandom’s Hegelian story about the genesis of communal practices, based on a 
variety of irreducible social contexts, coexist with the Chomskean idea of a context-free universal 
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generative grammar? Brandom refers to this idea of Chomsky’s not only in his 2009 Reason in 
Philosophy and in ST, but also in MIE, as well as in his early 1979 paper “Reason and Constraint 
by Norms”. But, in spite of the recurrence of these references, Brandom does not give much 
detail as to under what conditions he endorses the idea.  
True, according to Kant, as Brandom admits in “Freedom and Constraint by Norms”, 
“one is free just insofar as he acts according to the dictates of norms or principles”, which 
presupposes the fundamental distinction “between the Realm of Nature, governed by causes, and 
the Realm of Freedom, governed by norms and principles” (Brandom 1979: 187). The 
distinction, he continues, is questioned by Hegel, who reformulates freedom as consisting not of 
following explicitly formulated rules, but of self-expression through acquiescence in the norms 
gradually developed by an evolving community.  
That said, Brandom combines the Hegelian idea of expressive freedom realised in 
communal discursive practices with the Chomskean idea that we humans possess the capacity for 
radical semantic novelty due to normative constraints: “[I]t is only by virtue of being constrained 
by the norms inherent in social practices that one can acquire the freedom of expression which 
the capacity to produce and understand novel utterances exhibits” (Brandom 1979: 194). The 
problem, though, is that, obviously, not every system of normative constraints entails linguistic 
creativity. Brandom claims, quite rightly, that atomistic causal explanation will lead us to infinite 
regress, whereas holistic, self-critical interpretation might actually result in proper understanding 
of what makes the web of our beliefs a complete, albeit ever-evolving whole (Brandom 1979: 
191). But the question, again, is not only why the novelty, but also how it exactly comes about.  
To summarise, I suggest that Brandom’s account in ST might benefit from a theory of 
how the game of giving and asking for reasons makes room for linguistic creativity, and how it 
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manages to keep the balance between the novelty of content and objective constraints on what 
can be claimed. Chomsky’s initial idea of the grammar implies that language has two levels of 
representation, where the deep, context-free structure is mapped onto the surface structure and is 
responsible for creating an infinite number of novel sentences through derivation trees. The 
linguistic capacity to generate novel utterances is acquired by the majority of human beings in a 
short period of time and is formed neither solely as a response to immediate environmental 
stimuli, nor as a result of what Brandom refers to as “discursive practices”. Given the fact that, as 
Chomsky’s theory has it, before the capacity is fully formed the stimuli are unstructured and 
impoverished, Chomsky claims that language acquisition and linguistic creativity should 
presuppose a hard-wired, or innate system of properties that are “universal”, i.e. shared by all 
natural languages. Thus, although the idea of a universal grammar underwent in Chomsky’s 
writings many significant changes over time, as follows from the above, in its classical early 
version it had important Cartesian implications which Brandom would most likely not want to 
take on board.  
A plausible alternative would be to side with Wittgenstein who shows that neither 
analysing grammar structures, nor appealing to past usages can tell us anything of substance 
about meaning. As Erneling (1993) points out, for the reason that, on Wittgenstein’s account of 
language acquisition, we cannot give an exact formula of how a particular rule is followed, we 
should accept the fact that learning and communicating, to be considered as learning and 
communicating, should always already be creative. Given this, instead of the Chomskean bottom-
up explanation of linguistic creativity, we might want to adopt a top-down approach that pays 
foremost attention to “what restricts actual language use and what prevents speaking and 
communication from breaking down into idiosyncratic usages” (Erneling 1993: 3).  However, 
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where exactly Brandom’s Chomsky meets with Brandom’s Wittgenstein is hard to decide, as 
Brandom does not provide sufficient details on his reading of the former.  
Brandom does make it clear that not just any system of social normative constraints 
necessarily entails the capacity to generate new social practices. But again, given the fact that, 
according to Chomsky’s model, any natural language, no matter what kind of social system 
makes use of it, necessarily entails the capacity of linguistic creativity due to its derivational 
relations to the deep universal grammar of the context-free language of thought, the question is 
how this universal linguistic creativity is related to creativity in terms of social practices, and, in 
particular, how it translates into creativity as an essential feature of the game of giving and asking 
for reasons. In other words, if general linguistic creativity underpins any social discourse, a 
totalitarian just as well as a liberal one, Brandom’s theory might still stand in need, if not of a 
full-blown theory, then at least of a link between the notion of a social community and the idea of 
linguistic creativity.  
 
1.5. Objectivity and Modality 
In this last section of the first chapter I will discuss the relationship between objectivity and 
modality in Brandom’s normative theory, and show how Brandom’s interpretation of this 
relationship is related to the version of idealism he espouses in ST.  
Referring to Sellars, Brandom calls the language of modality a “‘transposed’ language of 
norms” (BSD: 100). In MIE this claim receives two interrelated interpretations. The gist of 
Brandom’s modal thesis is that descriptive language is not an autonomous discursive practice; 
one’s ability to use this language means she has mastered the practical skills needed to 
understand modal talk. For the reason that, as has been discussed in section 1.2, our capacity to 
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apply concepts presupposes the mastery of every concept’s possible inferential relations to other 
concepts, inferentialist semantics requires that every time we apply a concept we must be able to 
sort out what would and what would not follow in case our application of the concept brought 
about such and such inferential consequences.  
One of Peirce’s examples, to which Brandom refers in his “Modality, Normativity, and 
Intentionality” (2001), can be used as an illustration. If we wish to understand what it means for a 
diamond to be “hard”, given that the diamond was crystalized in a bed of cotton-wool and then 
burned without ever being pressed by an edge or point, the question is “not what did happen, but 
<…> whether that diamond would resist an attempt to scratch it”, because pragmatism, Peirce 
continues, “makes the ultimate intellectual purport of what you please to consist in conceived 
conditional resolutions” (EP2: 354). What constitutes the pragmatic meaning of the concept of 
hardness, therefore, is the sum total of conditional propositions describing possible results of our 
conceived interaction with the object, to which the concept of hardness refers. According to both 
Peirce, modal claims constitute the ground level of thought and action by interpreting what we say 
in terms of possible outcomes of what we do.  
That said, according to Brandom, any descriptive use of an expression, modally speaking, 
also always precludes some other and licences some other uses of it. This, in Brandom’s own 
words, means that “no concept user can be in a position of being skeptical about the in-principle 
intelligibility of specifically normative concepts, without thereby being skeptical about the in-
principle intelligibility of concept use (and so meaning, content, and intentionality) generally” 
(Brandom 2001: 605). As Rosen points out, “Brandom’s main contention is that our best reasons 
for regarding the unreduced modal idiom as ‘clear enough’ are also good reasons for regarding 
the unreduced normative idiom as clear enough” (Rosen 2001: 612). 
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According to another example Brandom provides elsewhere, semantically speaking, “one 
has not grasped the concept ‘cat’ unless one knows that it would still be possible for the cat to be 
on the mat if the lighting had been slightly different, but not if all life on earth had been 
extinguished by an asteroid strike” (BSD: 97). Thus, the meaning of an expression is defined 
against the network of counterfactual claims describing conditions under which the expression is 
compatible (or incompatible) with a set of background beliefs of a scorekeeper as well as 
consequences of its application in appropriate circumstances. This appeal to modality supports 
Brandom’s inferentialist rebuttal of the empiricist claim that empirical descriptions can constitute 
an autonomous language independent from counterfactuals connecting each description to other 
descriptions (Brandom 2001: 606). From the empiricist point of view, the autonomous 
intelligibility of empirical predicates is guaranteed by the fact that experience is about what is the 
case, and not about what might or would be the case, because what we may report about our 
experience is constrained by what is simply given in it. Brandom’s major point here is that the 
constraint is provided exclusively by the mechanics of the scorekeeping game, and, consequently, 
we need a mastery of a vocabulary that could cash out multiple inferential interdependencies 
between various claims. Using this vocabulary, we may grasp the conceptual content of an 
expression by sorting material inferences in which that content is involved (RP: 54). 
Pragmatically speaking, using modal vocabulary is a way to talk explicitly about rule 
following in the scorekeeping game, which cannot receive a direct descriptive explanation 
without facing a paradox. If we agree to ascribe normativity to an expression only in view of the 
use of a distinctly normative term or only if it explicitly says how things ought to be, then we 
immediately face the Kripkean sceptic who shows that saying what the rule is does not help. Just 
as the Kantian moral agent, with her knowledge of the explicitly formulated rule, is there to act 
contrary to this knowledge, the Kripkean sceptic is always there to say that 68+57=5. Brandom’s 
modal thesis seems to resolve the problem by using counterfactual claims that cash out inferential 
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connections between statements and express dispositional commitments to “what would happen 
if”, in order to tie together discursive practices and norms that govern those practices. There is a 
relation between alethic modal vocabulary and what I must do in order to be able to use 
descriptive language. The relation is such that conceptual connections and commitments that are 
implicit in our factual descriptions, are licenced by modal expressions (BSD: 98). As a result, our 
agreement about factual statements can be tested only against underlying counterfactuals 
appropriately related to those statements. 
On the other hand, Brandom considers his modal thesis as a response to Hume’s scepticism 
about the possibility to deduce “ought” from “is,” which amounts to the claim that there is nothing 
in observable empirical facts that can yield an understanding of rules behind those facts. According 
to Brandom, in order to deal with the puzzling question of whether anything that happens actually 
has to happen, we should first acknowledge the fact that nothing is ever explicit simpliciter. To 
solve the problem, we need two things: (1) the notion of rules as implicit in practices and (2) a 
modal vocabulary that can make explicit what we need to do in order to count as saying something. 
What I am doing when I make an empirical statement is committing myself to a set of other 
statements and claiming my entitlement to a set of still other statements that are linked inferentially 
with the one I actually make. What I am saying, in order to specify what I do in so committing 
myself, is about what would follow, given that my making the statement brings about such-and-
such circumstances. This is how, I believe, one of Brandom’s principal metaphor of scorekeepers 
being caught “between saying and doing” should be unpacked.  
Now, according to Brandom’s Hegel, insofar as, in using conceptual contents in 
judgments, we preclude some other and licence some other uses, our uses always thereby involve 
two principal kinds of relations: the relation of incompatibility and the relation of consequence. 
Incompatibility is what makes conceptual contents determinate in that it contrasts them with other 
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contents, excludes other determinates, and defines what is impossible and what is necessary when 
those contents are used. In so contrasting, excluding, and defining, it induces inferential 
consequences that further determine the contents as to the functional role they play in the game of 
giving and asking for reasons. As realized in these two relations, conceptual contents can take 
two forms: subjective and objective. According to Brandom, normative vocabulary, as instituted 
by individual practical attitudes, constitutes the subjective form, whereas modal vocabulary 
represents the objective form of conceptual contents (ST1: 54-57). The question is how to 
coordinate the relations between the subjective and the objective conceptual articulation, i.e. how 
to grasp what Brandom refers to as the “amphibiousness of conceptual content between a 
subjective form articulated by deontic normative relations of incompatibility-and-consequence 
and an objective form articulated by alethic modal relations of incompatibility-and-consequence” 
(ST1: 59; emphasis added).   
The possibility of such coordination constitutes what Brandom takes to be the essence of 
objective idealism. Brandom does not explicitly make this connection in ST. However, in the first 
few pages of ST1, 2, VI (“The Two Sides of Conceptual Content are Representationally 
Related”) he formulates two theses that justify the connection. First, conceptual contentfulness is 
a characteristic shared by representings and representeds: the structure of the world and the 
structure of thought are isomorphic. In Brandom’s own terms,  
thought and being, representing and represented […] are essentially paired forms that conceptual 
content can take. […] Subjective practices and processes specifiable in deontic normative 
vocabulary and objective relations and facts specifiable in alethic modal vocabulary are two 
complementary aspects or dimensions of whatever is determinate, and hence intelligible. 
 (ST1: 59) 
Whatever representations and what they represent determine within the sphere of the conceptual, 
can be specified either in normative terms, which give expression to our subjective attitudes, or in 
modal terms, which describe the objective facticity of the world. Whereas representings and 
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representeds are paired forms of conceptual determination, normative and modal are two ways to 
express complimentary aspects of whatever is conceptually determinate. Second, normative 
vocabulary, according to Brandom, should be considered as a pragmatic meta-vocabulary, in the 
sense that it allows us to say what we must do in order to use modal vocabulary. In Brandom’s 
own terms, “one cannot understand alethic modal vocabulary, cannot deploy it with 
understanding, unless one has mastered the normatively governed practices made explicit by 
deontic vocabulary” (ST1: 57). The relationship between the two vocabularies is that of sense-
dependence. Brandom gives the following example: 
[I]f we define a planet or star as “supraterranean” just in case it has a mass more than twice that of 
the Earth, we are not thereby committing ourselves to denying that a planet could have that 
property in a possible world in which the Earth did not exist.  Depending on how they are 
specified, properties can be sense-dependent on other properties (as […] supraterranean is on “has 
at least twice the mass of the Earth”), without being reference-dependent on them. That is, 
something can exhibit a property P that is sense-dependent, but not reference-dependent, on a 
property P’ in a world in which nothing exhibits the property P’.  
(ST1: 58) 
“Supraterranean” describes the property of having at least twice the mass of the Earth, 
but by making this claim we do not commit ourselves to denying that the supraterranean planet 
could not have the property in case Earth didn’t exist. By analogy, what is described in modal 
terms is objective and has a predetermined intelligible form, irrespective of whether there are any 
intelligent concept-applying subjects. Modal language marks out conceptually structured 
objective relations and facts that are there whether or not any concept-applying subjects exist, but 
those relations and facts become fully available to such subjects within the network of norm-
governed discursive practices (ST1: 58). Supposing this is right, it might be said that the 
relationship between normative vocabulary (which constitutes the subjective form of conceptual 
content) and modal vocabulary (which constitutes the objective form of conceptual content) is 
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somewhat similar to the relationship between practical attitudes and normative statuses: just as 
there is no statuses before attitudes, no modal terms that specify objective relations and facts are 
actually available before mastering norm-governed practices. 
If this analogy is correct, then Brandom’s characterizing practical attitudes adopted by 
individual scorekeepers as recognitive, and the reference to the conceptual structure of the 
objective world as cognitive (ST5: 164) can be used in order to characterize the distinction 
between the normative and the modal. While the relations within the normative sphere are 
recognitive (we adopt practical attitudes towards each other and in so doing institute normative 
statuses), the relations expressed by modal talk are cognitive, as they reflect our attitudes 
towards the objective world. In building this link between modality and objectivity, Brandom 
tries to deal with the set of criticisms with regard to his idea of perspectival objectivity. As has 
been described in section 1.2, what is recognized as objectively correct is only taken to be 
correct by a scorekeeper attributing a commitment. And, as in the course of the scorekeeping 
game attributions and undertakings are mutual, the only way the difference between objective 
normative status and subjective normative attitude can be presented is as a social-perspectival 
distinction between normative attitudes. The modal thesis provides additional conceptual tools 
that enrich the idea of objectivity. Brandom uses the notion of reference independence to 
strengthen his case still further: whereas statuses are not reference-independent from attitudes 
(the latter institute the former), modality marks out the framework of objective conceptual norms 
that are reference-independent from those attitudes (ST5: 164)18.  
                                                          
18 In this case, Brandom does not talk about modality as the objective form of conceptual content, but 
uses the expression “objective conceptual norms” instead. 
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One may ask whether the property we take to be objective is in troth objective by 
Brandom’s own standards. It seems to be hard to decide whether having at least twice the mass 
of the Earth, described by a set of counterfactuals, is a matter of being objectively in the world 
or a matter of thinking about it/describing it in a certain way. Naturally, the objec tive idealist’s 
answer is that it is both (or, as Brandom puts it, those are “paired forms” of conceptual 
content), for otherwise we are trapped in the very set of dichotomies (between nature and 
freedom, mind and world, receptivity and spontaneity, saying and doing) the objective idealist 
aims to get rid of. In the opening sections of ST1 Brandom introduces the ideas of modal and 
conceptual realism that, he says, entail objective idealism. According to modal realism, some 
states of affairs make other necessary or impossible; according to conceptual realism, if we 
acknowledge necessity and impossibility as pertaining to the workings of natural laws, then we 
should acknowledge that the way the world objectively is is conceptually articulated. For 
something to be conceptually articulated is thus to stand to other things in relations of material 
incompatibility and consequence; and for something to be in those relations does not require 
anyone to think anything about it (ST1: 24).  
Let us stop for a moment and go back once again to Brandom’s supraterranean planet 
example. Suppose that, as a result of the next scientific revolution, the concept of mass is 
replaced by a new concept (or a set of new concepts), which provides an alternative explanation 
of the regularities previously associated with it – in the manner, say, in which Lavoisier’s 
theory of oxygen once replaced Becher’s idea of phlogiston. In the latter case, there are facts 
that stay the same (for instance, a loss of mass of copper carbonate when it burns – which, 
according to Becher, was the result of its losing phlogiston, and, according to Lavoisier, was 
the result of its giving out carbon dioxide gas). And there are those that lost their status as facts 
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(for instance, phlogiston being absorbed by air). Besides, a substantial part of the counterfactual 
statements relevant to the theory of phlogiston (or to a set of theories that allow to describe 
something as “having at least twice the mass of the Earth” in Brandom’s example) should be 
acknowledged as being out of use, while others as still holding. Consequently, with Brandom’s 
realism in mind, in both cases we need to decide (1) how big the part of counterfactuals that 
should be deemed irrelevant/false is, (2) whether we can still count ourselves epistemically 
responsible for the remaining part, and (3) whether the two theories in each example describe 
the same state of affairs. Based on Brandom’s account, in all three cases one guess is as good 
as another. As to (3) in particular, recall that, according to Brandom, there can be no finally 
settled opinions, or, as he prefers to put it, no “finally adequate set of determinate concepts” 
(ST5: 204)19. Now, if Brandom’s idealism entails that there are conceptually framed reals, but 
that, at the same time, every description of those reals, and every normative situation such 
description creates, will eventually be deemed irrelevant or corrected, then we end up admitting 
that there are conceptually framed objective states of affairs that might, but never will be 
known.  
This is an uncomfortable conclusion. For instance, Brandom says that, “if Newton’s laws 
are true, then they held before there were thinkers, and would hold even if there never were 
thinkers” (ST1: 24). But, in light of the above, this is just to say that if these laws are not true 
(which, according to Brandom, is ultimately the case for every law) then they didn’t hold before 
there were thinkers, and they wouldn’t hold if there never were thinkers. True statements are 
always true. Until they are false. Of course, it might be said that rational constraint guarantees 
                                                          
19 As discussed in sections 1.3 and 1.4. 
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that we are able to understand what it is for a state of affairs to appear as it is rather than as it is 
not. It is quite enough that what we think is correct is, in fact, correct by our best lights, and so 
the fallibility of our knowledge-claims might not constitute any threat to objectivity, as far as we 
are able to make reasonable assessment of our human epistemic predicament. Well and good. But 
at least we should be aware of the abovementioned side effect the unrestrained fallibilism has 
within the framework of Brandom’s idealism. 
There is one more aspect of the link between Brandom’s conceptual realism and his 
idealism that is important to mention. Brandom claims that discursive practices are “thick”20. As 
he puts it, the practices are “not the kind of thing that can be separated from the objects they 
involve” (Brandom 2008: 177). To use the familiar Peirce’s example once again, modally 
speaking, if we want to understand what the word “hard” means in relation to a diamond, we 
need to take into account what would happen if we made an attempt to scratch it by an edge or 
point sharp enough. The conditional resolutions that constitute the meaning of “hard” thus 
involve taking account of outcomes of our possible interactions with the object to which “hard” is 
ascribed.  But, apart from our interactions with this object, in using “hard”, we also get involved 
in a situational interplay between language and environment at large. A variety of configurations 
of this interplay constitute a set of interrelated practices that come together as a form of life 
within which our use of “hard” makes sense. The practices are “thick” – Brandom goes as far as 
calling them “solid” and “corporeal” (MIE: 332) – in the sense that they include not only what we 
say, but also what we do, meaning our interaction with objects as well as each other, events, and 
facts of the world.  
                                                          
20 As has been discussed in relation to Brandom’s idea of anaphora in the beginning of section 1.3. 
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If Brandom’s objectivity is the objectivity of norms implicit in discursive practices thus 
described, then his conceptual realism does support his objective idealism: incompatibilities and 
consequences implied in inferential structures are interwoven with the world of facts and are 
constrained by and answerable to the relations of impossibility and necessity implied by natural 
laws. Here is a problem, though. In various sections of ST5 Brandom writes that the embedding 
of the concept of objectivity within inferentialist semantics enriched by the modal thesis entails 
the existence of the objective world including not only objective norms, but also objective 
properties, facts, relations and laws (see, e.g., ST5: 10, 15, 55). But, given that objective 
norms, properties, facts, relations and laws, just like any subjective thinking about them, are 
always already in conceptual shape, the question is: Are there any norms, properties, facts, 
relations or laws that are objective not (or, at least, not only) because they at some point have 
been endorsed and acknowledged as such by scorekeepers? It seems that Brandom’s claim that 
the relations expressed by modal talk reflect our attitudes towards the objective world, suggests 
that the answer is “yes”. However, from one perspective, even taking into account that 
Brandom’s modal claim should always be considered together with his thesis about mind and 
world being conceptually shaped, at least on the face of it, it might well be said that talking 
about objective properties, facts, and, more generally, about objective world that would exist 
even if no thinkers were present, cannot help involving extralinguistic use of terms like “refers” 
– in the sense of our commitment to the existence of objects that we might actually succeed or 
fail in referring to (Pohl, Rosenhagen, Weber 2006: 95). And of course, Brandom’s deflationary 
stance towards truth and reference (RP: 156-176) makes it unlikely for him to adhere to this 
scenario. But, even more importantly, as DeMoor, in referring to Habermas’s Truth and 
Justification (2003), suggests, 
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[…] the conceptual relationships of the world, it appears, merely unfold discursively in our 
argumentations, thus finding expression in the conceptual structures of our knowledge of language 
and the world.” If this is the case, then the objective world itself guarantees the adequacy of our 
concepts and, correspondingly, the discursive community is relieved of “the burden of the 
constructive endeavor to develop its own concepts in terms of which it can interpret what happens 
in the world.” Without this burden, there is no fundamental need for discursive communities to 
expend the effort of reaching a common understanding, of constructing a shared conceptual 
framework for interpreting and coping with the world; the commonality of our concepts is 
guaranteed by the objective world, not by inter-subjective effort.  
(DeMoor 2011: 344) 
On this interpretation, Brandom’s conceptual realism makes his idea of constructive human 
endeavor rather weak. We institute and acknowledge the norms that govern our thought and 
behavior. But, at the same time, we always already have a warrant of adequacy from the world, 
which demotivates significantly every one of our constructive efforts.  
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2. REASONS, CONCEPTS, AND EXTERNAL CONSTRAINT: 
THE IDEA OF OBJECTIVITY IN MCDOWELL’S MIND AND WORLD 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
As McDowell points out in his introduction to Mind and World21, the aim of his book is to 
account, “in a diagnostic spirit”, for “some characteristic anxieties of modern philosophy” that 
arise when the relation between mind and world comes into focus (MW: xi). According to 
McDowell, for the most part, these anxieties result from the belief that the only way to describe 
the relation is to posit a chasm or a gap between the two, to be closed by some mediating 
phenomenal go-betweens (MW: 3-9; Gaynesford 2004: 29). McDowell’s task is to show that the 
existence of the gap between mind and world is an illusion that needs to be unmasked. The initial 
step of the unmasking is accomplished in the first three lectures of MW by defending three 
interconnected claims.  
The first claim is that mind and world share a conceptual nature. The most concise and, at 
the same time, the most salient explanation of this claim is given by McDowell in the second 
lecture: “That things are thus and so is the conceptual content of an experience, but if the subject 
of the experience is not misled, that very same thing, that things are thus and so, is also a 
perceptible fact, an aspect of the perceptible world” (MW: 26). In other words, what I perceive 
when I am not misled by my experience, is the world itself. As Tim Thornton puts it, “to be a 
                                                          
21 Henceforth MW. 
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world at all is to possess the kind of intelligible structure charted [by the conceptual] in the space 
of reasons” (Thornton 2004: 85)22. The second claim is that the sphere of the conceptual is 
unbounded. The same idea is expressed by McDowell when he says later in the second lecture 
that facts can be embraced by thought because the world itself does not lie outside the sphere of 
the conceptual, and there is nothing at all to be found outside the conceptual (MW: 28). The third 
claim is that the unboundedness of the conceptual can be reconciled with the fact that there is a 
rational external constraint on our empirical thinking about the world. According to McDowell, to 
justify this claim is to explain how the idea of rational constraint on our empirical thinking can be 
reconciled, on the one hand, with Kant’s thesis about the spontaneous character of this thinking 
and, on the other hand, with the absence of an outer boundary to the conceptual sphere, which 
creates the very possibility for the thinking to be about the world.  
The question of whether McDowell is successful in bringing the mind back into 
immediate contact with the world in view of these three claims has been discussed in the 
literature in the following three interconnected contexts: (1) McDowell’s acceptance of what he 
takes to be Kant’s idea of the conceptual character of sensible contents; (2) McDowell’s 
Hegelianism; (3) McDowell’s naturalism, which finds its support in his ideas of second nature 
and openness of the world. 
As I will show in the next section, (1) and (2) are related in the sense that McDowell’s 
interpretation of Kant may be seen as a radicalization of Kant’s philosophy23, which consists in 
                                                          
22 In describing or referring to the idea of the conceptual in MW, McDowell associates it with the notion of 
some sort of nature much more often than with the notion of something being constituted by a specific 
activity. For this reason, I do not think there is any possibility for a disagreement with Thornton in that, 
in McDowell’s case, there is a strong (but not full) synonymy between “to be conceptual” and “to have 
an intelligible structure.”  
23 See also McDowell 2009a: 68-69. 
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his accepting Kant’s constructivism (his claim that that there is no experiential intake without the 
contribution of our conceptual capacities), while rejecting Kant’s transcendental story that 
postulates a necessary connection between human freedom and independent noumenal reality. 
Just like Hegel, McDowell disagrees with Kant’s making room for both freedom and the non-
conceptual external constraint on our judgments and perception (Bird 1996; Koons 2004; Taggart 
2008). McDowell’s Kantian baseline is that he aims to reconcile rationalist and empiricist 
traditions by showing that our use of concepts is intimately linked with experience. However, he 
makes a further Hegelian step when he insists that both having experience and using concepts 
depend on our mastering the use of words and, hence, on our having a language (Gaynesford 
2004: 26) 24. The idea of having language, which is the principal subject of the last lecture of 
MW, in turn, provides the link to (3), i.e. to McDowell’s notions of second nature and openness 
of the world. As McDowell shows in lectures 4 and 5, the idea of the world’s not residing outside 
the sphere of the conceptual can be construed as fully compatible with the idea of the 
independence of the world from what we actually think and say about it, only if we appreciate the 
notion of second nature understood as a result of us humans being initiated into linguistic 
practices25.  
This plexus of ideas brings with it three major problems. First, in introducing the notion 
of second nature, McDowell combines Aristotle’s concept of ethical character, Hegel’s Bildung, 
                                                          
24 The step is Hegelian at least in the minimal sense that, whereas for the Kantian agent language does not 
constitute any serious problem (the possibility of reaching an agreement between us is predetermined by 
the very fact that we have the schematism of understanding in common), it plays a crucial part in a 
variety of recognitive relations between different consciousnesses in Hegel’s Phenomenology. 
25 The idea of language as a repository of tradition in the context of McDowell’s defence of his version of 
idealism will be discussed below in section 2.4. 
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and Wittgenstein’s idea of training as initiation into a custom, but he offers only a few very 
general remarks as to how these three communicate with each other within his own theoretical 
framework26. There are two issues related to this problem. One is that McDowell extends 
Aristotle’s idea of the formation of ethical character to give an account of initiation into 
conceptual capacities in general. As shown in Forman (2008), this makes McDowell’s 
interpretation of Aristotle inconsistent. Another issue is that, although some researchers present 
McDowell’s defence of the second nature thesis as fully compatible with a Wittgensteinian 
therapeutic approach (Virvidakis 2006), McDowell’s aiming at Wittgensteinian quietism may 
seem to be incompatible with his explicit engagement in a dialogue between different 
philosophical traditions, and, in particular, with his naturalistic reconstruction of reason 
(Friedman 1996).  
The second problem is twofold. First, in rejecting Kant’s transcendental idealism, 
McDowell follows the Hegelian reconstruction of Kant, which entails some substantial changes in 
the Kantian conception of experience (MW: 95), but in this reconstruction he offers neither a 
Hegelian institutional story, nor any discussion of the recognitive, or social elements of 
communication. In light of this, McDowell’s reconstruction can be called Hegelian only in a 
restricted sense, as it prevents him from accessing some of the important conceptual tools which 
Brandom uses in approaching the problem of the objectivity of norms. As Peschard notes, 
“McDowell’s project is to answer the [individual] perceiver’s worry as to the objectivity of her 
perceptual experience, not the worry of someone who could compare the perceiver’s content of 
experience to something else” (Peschard 2010: 154). The problem is not that according to 
                                                          
26 The compatibility of McDowell’s approach to Aristotle’s ethics with his interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
rule following problem is discussed in section 2.4 below.  
69 
 
McDowell objectivity cannot be accounted for from a sideways, or from a bird’s-eye perspective, 
but that McDowell’s perceiver is – at least for the most part in the text of MW – completely 
alone; communication with other minds never comes into focus. Second, McDowell’s rejection 
of Kant’s transcendental idealism (and, in particular, the idea of noumenal reality that, according 
to Kant, provides external constraint on our cognition) leads him to the idea of the 
unboundedness of the conceptual. As will be discussed in section 2.3 below, according 
McDowell, accepting this idea results in empirical reality being radically open to thinking. But if 
so, the principal question is how what is radically open to and available in thought can be 
independent of it (Taggart 2008: 162).  
Third, some researchers claim that McDowell’s conceptualist approach to perception is 
powerless against the sceptic’s attack because it fails to make sense of perceptual error 
(Echeverri 2011). Although the idea of openness to the world does tell us that in many cases, 
when our judgments about the world are correct, we do know things as they really are, it does not 
tell us under what conditions we succeed and under what conditions we fail. This objection 
results in attempts to interpret McDowell’s position as foundationalist, and his rejection of the 
empiricist idea of the Given as but a disguised conceptual recast of it (Wright 1996). At the same 
time, in spite of McDowell’s infallibilist position about perception, his idea of objectivity has 
been compared with Peirce’s fallibilism, and some researchers place both McDowell and Peirce 
between the horns of the dilemma of coherentism and the myth of the Given as two kinds of 
response to epistemological skepticism (Cooke 2011; Bernstein 2002). 
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2.2. Kant and the Seesaw: Spontaneity and Receptivity Revisited 
With all these criticisms in view, in this section I will begin distilling out what I take to be the 
pivotal issues underlying McDowell’s account of objectivity. My main concern in this and the 
next section will be confined to analysing the way McDowell’s notion of external constraint is 
related to his ideas of the unboundedness of the conceptual and openness of the world within his 
interpretation of Kant’s distinction between receptivity and spontaneity. In this section, I will 
show how McDowell’s reading of Sellars leads to the idea of reinterpreting the distinction. I will 
then provide a synopsis of both McDowell’s and Kant’s own perspectives as I see them, and will 
then show that McDowell’s reinterpretation of Kant in the first three lectures of MW provides a 
basis for introducing the ideas of Bildung and second nature in lecture four. 
McDowell’s central thesis in the first three lectures is (1) that mind and world, thinking 
and the thinkable share the same conceptual nature, which presupposes a rational relationship 
between the two, and (2) that within the relationship the world exerts constraint on what we think 
and say about it. The epistemic situation described by the two parts of this thesis taken together 
consists in a mutual directedness of mind and world, where a judgment’s or a belief’s being 
directed on the world entails their being answerable to how things really are; and how things really 
are being directed on our beliefs means affecting the contents of what we think and say (MW: xi-
xx)27. Given this, McDowell’s burden is to introduce constraint to the picture. In other words, he 
needs to explain how we can reconcile the answerability of our beliefs and judgments to reality that 
                                                          
27 I find it useful how Maximilian de Gaynesford describes this situation as the one in which “our experience, 
thought and language are directed on the world [and] the world, in turn, has a bearing on our experience, 
thought and language” (Gaynesford 2004: 5). 
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is independent from them, on the one hand, and independent reality affecting our beliefs and 
judgments not just causally, but in terms of their contents, on the other hand.  
Although it might not be obvious right away why this explanation might face any serious 
problems, in the very beginning of lecture one of MW McDowell admits that the idea of 
spontaneity that results from his reinterpretation of Kant makes it no easy task to show how the 
idea of rational constraint fits into the picture: “My main point in this lecture is to bring out how 
difficult it is to see that we can have both desiderata: both rational constraint from the world and 
spontaneity all the way out” MW: 8, n.7). But before it can become clear what exactly stands in 
the way of introducing the idea of rational constraint, one needs to understand why the 
reinterpretation of the Kantian relationship between receptivity and spontaneity is needed. 
According to McDowell, the answerability of judgments and beliefs to how things are 
should be understood in terms of placing the answerable in the logical space of reasons. Making 
use of this Sellarsian idea, McDowell gives a twofold definition of it very early in the book. He 
defines it (1) positively, as a space that includes a relation of one thing being warranted, or correct 
in the light of another, and (2) negatively, as contrasted with what he calls “the logical space of 
nature”, where the answerability is a matter of simple empirical description (MW: xv-xvi).  
While the positive definition of the space of reasons, which plays a central part in 
Brandom’s inferentialism, doesn’t do too much work in McDowell’s MW, the negative definition 
creates for the latter an important theoretical background.  In particular, the distinction between the 
logical space of reasons and the logical space of nature underpins McDowell’s interpretation of the 
Kantian distinction between spontaneity and receptivity as two capacities enabling a cooperation 
between understanding and sensibility. According to McDowell, although the structure of the 
logical space of reasons is sui generis, and the idea of experience, as organized by those reasons, is 
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the idea of something natural, we see the gap between the natural and the reasonable only in case 
we narrowly identify “the natural” with the practices of explanation pertaining to disenchanted 
secularized natural sciences as described by Weber28. Likewise, although thinking is characterized 
exclusively by spontaneity and freedom, sensibility is not something that is exclusively receptive 
and entirely passive. It is wrong, says McDowell, to see thought and sensibility as opposing 
extremes or distinctly different capacities (MW: 9-15), just like, as the last two lectures of MW 
demonstrate, it is wrong to contradistinguish the rational and the natural in general. However, 
before this parallel is clear, McDowell owes us an explanation of why exactly receptivity and 
spontaneity are often seen as opposites within certain theoretical frameworks and why exactly this 
is unacceptable. For the purpose of this explanation, McDowell uses the Sellarsian critique of the 
Given. 
Whereas in Brandom’s case the explicit use of this critique is limited to the task of 
explaining how the treatment of meanings in terms of inferential roles implies normativity, in 
McDowell’s case the idea of the Given reveals a more fundamental problem. From one 
perspective, it seems to offer an attractive epistemological tool. The myth that supports the idea 
of the Given explains external constraint on the spontaneous exercises as a result of brute impacts 
of bare presences. As McDowell puts it, “the idea of the Given is the idea that the space of 
reasons […] extends more than the conceptual sphere” (MW: 7). From the empiricist point of 
                                                          
28 It is important to understand that McDowell’s distinction between the two “spaces” (which will be dealt 
with in more detail in section 2.4) is meant not as a mere replacement of Kant’s dichotomy between 
nature and freedom, but rather as a distinction between two ways of explaining experience. Moreover, 
any belief associated with the notion of the space of nature should be understood, not as a position 
actually held by someone in particular, with whom McDowell is in disagreement, but rather as a 
historical epistemological position. After everything that was written during the period of over 100 years 
between Peirce (on the role of vagueness and error in mathematical statistics) and Bruno Latour (on the 
messy business of fabricating scientific facts), it is hard – in fact, nearly impossible – to find someone 
who would nowadays seriously think of supporting the scientistic view of nature as described by Weber 
in the end of the 19th century.   
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view, there are sensations that register what is simply there, and that are, therefore, outsiders to 
all our concepts. The myth tells us that these sensations are self-justified and explains the 
necessary external constraint to the spontaneous exercises of concepts in terms of brute impacts 
of the bare presences registered by those sensations. In this manner, by postulating the existence 
of such sensations, one may hope to obtain not only external constraint, but also the necessary 
conditions for knowledge in general: the myth tries to assure us that it is possible to reduce all 
meaningful statements to inferences from what is directly given. 
From another perspective, however attractive the idea of the Given might seem to be, in 
his Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind Sellars shows that it is inconsistent. From the Sellarsian 
perspective, if we believe that there is a gap between mind and world (representings and 
representeds, thoughts and objects, words and things, etc.), and try to do conceptual work to 
eliminate this gap, we encounter problems that are hard to solve. Namely, we either face the 
question of how to move from non-epistemic, non-cognitive bits of the Given to judgments that 
are supposed to be justified by these bits, or end up in the company of the sceptic who is eager to 
convince us that we have no good reasons to think that the world the judgments are supposed to 
be about is really there. The myth of the Given rests on the idea that the authority of our reports 
about certain states of affairs depends on the authority of self-authenticating non-verbal episodes 
which result in our immediate awareness of something being the case. In describing this 
immediate awareness, Sellars intentionally uses the language of the obviously nonsensical “flat 
earth mythology”, saying that the episodes of which we are allegedly immediately aware 
“constitute the tortoise on which stands the elephant on which rests the edifice of empirical 
knowledge” (Sellars 1997: 73). Meanwhile, whatever the inconsistencies of the myth are, we 
must admit that it does provide us with some sort of an idea of the necessary external constraint 
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on our thinking and, if we simply repudiate it, chances are that we move, by inertia, to another 
extreme and abandon the idea of external constraint altogether. In the latter case, all we are left 
with is the coherence of our beliefs that are subject to internal norms of consistency, but that 
cannot be said to have any bearing on external reality (MW: 24).  
The choice between the extremes of the Given and the frictionless spinning of our 
coherent beliefs in the void represents the second metaphor that plays a highly important role in 
McDowell’s MW: as long as we are trying to choose one or the other, we are riding a seesaw. 
This seesaw never stops because, as soon as it loses momentum at one extreme, it immediately 
recoils back to its opposite. What we have to do, says McDowell, is to dismount from the seesaw 
instead of riding it (MW: 9).  According to McDowell, dismounting from the seesaw should take 
the form of a reinterpretation of the cooperation between the spontaneity of thought and the 
receptivity of perception as this cooperation is described in Kant’s 1st Critique.  
It was Kant who, by using insights of British empiricists in order to reform the German 
idealist tradition without radically undermining it, first attempted to reconcile early modern 
empiricist sense-data theories and classical Cartesian rationalism. On the one hand, empiricists 
believed in sense-contents as the pre-theoretical empirical basis of knowledge and theory-
independent data immediately accessible to us in either outer or introspective sensation. On the 
other hand, rationalists relied on the pre-empirical innate knowledge that, due to its infallibility, 
could never betray the knower. In reconciling the two extremes, Kant treats knowledge as the 
result of category-constrained empirical observation: rational understanding reduces the 
synthesis of our empirical perceptions to concepts that provide knowledge. In this reduction, both 
thinking and experience presuppose unifying forms. The corresponding sections of 
“Transcendental Aesthetics” and “Transcendental Analytic” introduce time and space as two 
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pure forms of intuition, and the categories of the understanding as a set of a priori concepts which, 
applied in a judgment, represent intuitions as intelligible wholes. Neither of these forms can 
provide a basis for knowledge in separation from the other one. It is only the application of the 
two forms to one another that makes the process of knowledge possible: the only way any 
empirical judgment may be said to be true is if it corresponds to its empirical object in 
compliance with a set of a priori principles that structure all possible human experience.  
In reconciling empiricist and rationalist traditions, Kant adds another, third dimension to the 
dyadic relationship between our experience and the unifying principles of understanding: the 
possibility of bringing the forms of intuition and the categories together requires that there is 
something connecting categories, on the one hand, and experiential phenomena, on the other, i.e., 
something that shares both the intellectual and the phenomenal natures. It appears, then, that 
understanding provides the unity of the manifold of experience in space and time by appealing to 
some third, intermediate structure that reconciles sensibility and understanding as two principal and 
interdependent stems of knowledge. This intermediate structure Kant calls the “transcendental 
scheme,” which – and this is an extremely important point of the Critique of Pure Reason – is 
always a product of the imagination. It is neither a percept, nor a concept, but something that, 
according to Kant, interprets one into the other. It is homogeneous with a category of the 
understanding on the one hand, and with the appearance on the other hand. And it is this 
homogeneity that makes the application of the categories of the understanding to appearances 
possible. (KRV: B 177).  
Sensibility is characterized by receptivity; it apprehends that which is given in intuition, 
both pure and empirical. The understanding, on the contrary, is characterized by spontaneity; it 
provides concepts as instruments of thought and judgment. It is noteworthy that Kant, in claiming 
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that only the unity of receptivity and spontaneity may result in knowledge, does not give any 
preference to either of the two: “To neither of these powers may a preference be given over the 
other.  Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would 
be thought.  Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (KRV: 
A51/B75). In the transcendental deduction Kant makes a further distinction between two kinds of 
imagination: productive and reproductive. The reproductive imagination creates the possibility to 
imagine a phenomenon when it is actually absent; it never reaches the generality of a concept and 
to be connected with it always needs an image. The productive imagination, through the 
schematism of the understanding, creates a phenomenon itself. However, the problem is that Kant 
simply postulates the synthesis of impressions and doesn’t explain how it is accomplished, i.e. 
what are the consecutive steps of this accomplishment: “This schematism of our understanding, 
in its application to appearances and their mere form, is an art concealed in the depths of the 
human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and 
to have open to our gaze” (KRV: B 180). 
The fact of the logical unity between percepts and concepts, therefore, ultimately remains 
a mystery and thus leaves within the Critique of Pure Reason a gap which is filled by the notion 
of the transcendental scheme. A parallel gap appears in the Critique of Practical Reason as the 
ethical problem of discontinuity between rational understanding and practical manipulation.29 
The two gaps reflect the relationship between the two ways Kant’s constructivism figures in his 
1st and 2nd Critiques. Epistemologically speaking, whatever there is to know originates, in part, 
from a set of a priori concepts that secure the unity of experience (KRV: A125). Our practical 
                                                          
29 As has been discussed in section 1.1 in relation to Brandom’s normative pragmatism. 
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maxims also have their origins in the will of the transcendental subject who must be able to treat 
them as objective laws. However, the Kantian practical agent cannot make her own freedom an 
object of cognition – which leads us to the controversy between the 1st and the 2nd Critiques that 
forms the central point of Kant’s 3rd Critique: the idea of the mediating power of aesthetic 
judgment to reconcile the theoretical and the practical interpretations of Kant’s constructivist 
thesis.  
Just like Brandom, McDowell does not follow Kant’s architectonics, and sets the task of 
dismounting from the seesaw without appealing to any sort of mediators between the receptivity of 
perception and the spontaneity of thinking. In McDowell’s case, the reason is that, according to 
Kant, our command of concepts, being a result of the interplay between the two capacities, applies 
only to phenomena, leaving the sphere of things as they are in themselves unknowable – although, 
in a certain indeterminate manner, thinkable (KRV: B164). Objects as they are can only cause an 
appearance, but it cannot be known in the way something given in a concept is known. 
Meanwhile, according to McDowell, if the only connection between an object and perception is 
causal, we are unable to explain our conceptual grasp of the object, because, as the Sellarsian 
critique of the Given shows, we are unable to explain the move from non-epistemic, non-
cognitive bits of the Given to conceptual contents.  
Kant excludes the world as it is in itself from the sphere of possible human interest, 
leaving within the sphere of the transcendental subjectivity things as they appear to us caused by 
things as they are in themselves. On this account, as far as the transcendental subjectivity 
comprises both contents of all possible knowledge and the synthetic activity that brings this 
knowledge to us, the move from the non-epistemic to the conceptual becomes unnecessary. 
McDowell, however, poses a Hegelian requirement, insisting that the divide between how things 
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are in themselves and how they are for us is inadmissible. We can neither simply dismiss the 
corresponding part of the myth, because in this case all we are left with is frictionless coherence 
of our beliefs, nor simply restrict the scope of spontaneity in order to satisfy the need for external 
friction (MW: 11), because it would lay a constraint on our knowledge of the sort which 
McDowell is unwilling to accept.  
One way to introduce the notion of rational constraint, which would make way for the 
idea of objective conceptual contents, might be to use Kant’s autonomy thesis, or, as it has been 
defined in chapter 1, Kant’s constructivist thesis as it figures in his Critique of Practical Reason. 
Recall that, according to Kant, what is distinctive about us as practical agents, as opposed to 
brutes, is that we have the capacity to follow our representations of laws rather than conform to 
the laws of nature. We can select a norm and make it work as the basis of our will. In performing 
this self-legislative activity, we make ourselves responsible to the norm, and thereby subject 
ourselves to rational criticism in light of it. As a result, according to Kant, our thinking and 
willing are constrained, not from without, but from within themselves. On the face of it, this 
doesn’t seem to be an option for McDowell, however, the reason being that the regulative 
principles that give us the idea of freedom as a form for an outward action presuppose the idea of 
human being as a noumenon. Practical reason, i.e. our capacity for acting as moral agents, says 
Kant, makes no sense unless a noumenal world is postulated in which freedom abides. This is so 
because freedom, Kant claims, can only be given by means of a formal imperative abstracted from 
all subject-matter of the will in favor of the universal form (KPV: I, 1, §80). The categorical 
imperative expresses freedom by means of a specific requirement that lays constraint on our 
conduct. Human freedom, thus, is given through the idea of constraint, where a practical agent 
finds reasons for morally sound conduct within herself, but, as has already been discussed in 
sections 1.2 and 1.4, cannot make sense of her actions without symbolic reinterpretation of the 
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moral law in aesthetic judgment. It is for this reason that, for the practical agent, freedom as such 
expresses the noumenal part of her nature and cannot become an object of cognition. This 
obviously doesn’t fit into McDowell’s account, leaving thinking out of touch with the world as it 
really is. However, McDowell does insist that constraint is exerted from within the conceptual 
domain, but he needs to say something more in order to show how this idea fits into his 
reinterpretation of Kant. 
Contrary to Kant, McDowell claims that, in empirical thinking, our total freedom finds its 
expression30 (MW: 5). There’s no distance between the impact of external reality and conceptual 
contents that respond to it. As McDowell puts it, “when we enjoy experience, conceptual 
capacities are drawn on in receptivity, not exercised on some supposedly prior deliverances of 
receptivity” (MW: 10). McDowell’s thesis is that spontaneity is operational all the way out to the 
conceptual contents that (and here McDowell’s own phrasing is important for our purposes later 
on) “sit closest to the impacts of the world on our sensibility” (MW: 11; emphasis added). 
Judgments that register experience as it makes itself available are accepted or rejected and, in so 
far as acceptance or rejection is an activity, these judgments are active at least in this minimal 
                                                          
30 Curiously enough, from very early on in Mind and World McDowell conflates spontaneity and freedom and 
on some occasions uses the two terms interchangeably. Meanwhile, in Kant’s 1st Critique (and in 
“Analytic of Concepts” in particular) spontaneity refers only to the capacity of the mind to produce 
representations from itself, the capacity Kant calls “understanding”. McDowell does not provide any 
reason for this peculiar use of the Kantian concepts, and, when later on he introduces the idea of second 
nature that, as will be shown in section 1.3, justifies the freedom of our empirical thinking, he does so with 
the reference not to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, but to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (MW: 80-
81). Moreover, in his “Hegel’s Idealism as Radicalization of Kant” he claims that the fact that things are 
knowable to us under certain conditions (subjective a priori conditions, in Kant’s case) does not prevent 
us from knowing things as they are objectively. He calls this claim “a truism” (McDowell 2009a: 7). 
Given this, McDowell owes us at least some sort of a minimal explanation of his use of “freedom”. On 
the one hand, if we choose to follow Kant, as an outcome of Kant’s autonomy thesis, the term “freedom” 
necessarily presupposes that there’s a noumenal part to the nature of every moral agent. On the other 
hand, if we neglect one of the essentials in Kant’s theory (as McDowell certainly does), we lose our 
chance to use relevant terms in the way they are used in Kant’s original theory. 
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sense. According to McDowell, spontaneity is already there because, in order for us to be able to 
accept or reject those judgments, we must be able to use concepts in them. And, as Sellars’s 
critique of the Given has it, we would not be able to use the concepts in these judgments were we 
not able to use them in other contexts to express other judgeable contents. In a similar manner, 
McDowell also claims that even the most immediately observational concepts are defined as such 
in part by their role in what he (rather vaguely) defines as “something that is indeed appropriately 
conceived in terms of spontaneity” (MW: 13).  
To sum up, according to McDowell, we need to navigate between two strong but contrary 
intuitions. One of them is “frictionless” coherentism, which, in laying stress on the purely causal 
connection to the world, seems to leave the mind completely out of conceptual touch with it. 
Alternatively, we need to accept as a fact that justification for our beliefs is simply given in 
experience, and that, therefore, we have to subject ourselves to the mythologeme which alienates 
empirical data from cognition. Experience can neither be just a matter of causal impact, nor be 
reduced to the passive processing of the non-conceptual sensory given. In order to dismount from 
the seesaw, or avoid the oscillation between mere coherence of our beliefs and an appeal to the 
merely given, we need to recognize that experiences cannot be considered as deliverances of pure 
receptivity to which spontaneity makes no contribution, and that conceptual capacities that 
presuppose spontaneity are at work, not just in judgments based on those experiences, but in the 
experiences themselves.  
The relationship between receptivity and spontaneity, as presented by McDowell, is a 
dialectical one. The former cannot be conceived independently from the latter. As he puts it in 
one of his later works, 
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[w]hen we conceive the operations of sensory receptivity as prior to and independent of any 
involvement of conceptual capacities, we debar them from intelligibly standing in rational 
relations to cases of conceptual activity. We ensure that they could at best be triggers or 
promptings to bits of conceptual activity, not justifications of them. In thus excluding the 
supposed immediate gettings of the given from rational relatedness to a world view, we in fact 
make it impossible to understand them as cognitions at all. 
(McDowell 2009a: 93) 
The dialectics of receptivity and spontaneity reveals three important facts about the nature of 
perceptual experience. First, as there is no reality that is exterior to what is conceptual31, our 
experience does not need to involve private objects of any kind that mediate between the 
perceiver and the world: the former is open to the latter. Consequently, how the conceptual is tied 
down to an independent reality, and how its being so tied down results in any kind of knowledge 
of this reality, is not the kind of questions we should, according to McDowell, be even remotely 
interested in answering (Bernstein 2002: 13). Second, experience is constituted by conceptual 
capacities, and these capacities are not exercised on extraconceptual deliverances of receptivity, 
but are always already drawn on in receptivity. Third, experience does not just retrieve 
information from the world out there, but, due to the workings of spontaneity, enables the world 
to offer reasons for what we think and say (Gaynesford 2004: 89).  
The third fact, as it stands alone, might be read as a reiteration of Kant’s constructivist 
thesis. However, as has been mentioned, McDowell rejects Kant’s transcendental story as a part 
of this thesis and, consequently, taken with the other two facts, this thesis becomes a realist 
one32: on McDowell’s view, the space of reasons (and, by the same token, of norms and 
                                                          
31 As will be shown in the next section, this claim of McDowell’s is supported by his version of idealism, 
which entails neither that external physical objects and events are conceptual, nor that there is no reality 
outside our minds. On the contrary, it acknowledges that (and explains how exactly) reality is 
independent of our thinking. As will be shown, McDowell’s idealism only claims that how things are 
may be both a matter of fact and something available in an act of thinking. It does not claim that an act 
of thinking is identical with the fact that is available in the act. 
32 Some (see, e.g. Echeverri 2009) prefer to use the term “strong conceptualist” instead. 
82 
 
meanings) is autonomous and self-standing – in the sense of being independent of what you and I 
might actually think at any given moment of time. McDowell’s principal question here is how 
reality that shares its conceptual nature with an experience of it can be independent of this 
experience. The answer to this question is given by means of introducing the idea of second 
nature which helps us dissolve the dualism of the normative and the natural. McDowell believes 
that the introduction of this idea creates the ultimate condition for a successful defence of his 
realism33. But in order to set the stage for the defence, McDowell first has to justify the idea of 
rational constraint while dealing with two problems: he has to answer the challenge of the sceptic 
and to meet the charge of idealism. 
 
 
2.3. Openness to the World and Rational Constraint 
Although our experiential openness to the world is one of the central metaphors of MW34, 
McDowell does not give us too much detail on what the openness actually consists in. His overall 
strategy is to reject any sort of systematic theory of the relationship between mind, world, and 
conceptual content, and instead to propose a therapy capable of disavowing theories that are, for 
a variety of reasons, unsatisfactory (Brandom 2002: 104). However, McDowell does make it 
clear that the notion of openness is meant to defy the old vocabulary that described different ways 
of building a mediating screen between reality and the perceiver, and that this notion is conceived 
as fully compatible with the idea of external constraint on our thought about the world.  
                                                          
33 As I will show later, McDowell’s accepting both realism and idealism involves no contradiction. 
34 Sometimes referred to as “the Default” (see, e.g., Gaynesford 2004: 4-9). 
83 
 
McDowell’s using the idea of openness of the experiencing subject to the world may be 
traced as far back as his “Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge” (McDowell 1983: 455-479). 
This early paper already stresses the fact that, as Gaynesford aptly puts it, the openness “is not a 
stark responsibility, a helpless exposure to the bright obvious” (Gaynesford 2004: 5). Neither has 
it anything to do with us being attentive or inattentive to some particular happenings in the world 
out there. The openness has also very little to do with the fact that, apart from many things I have 
explicit knowledge about, there are many things and facts, of which I am not aware (faint noises, 
perceptions of my body, things knowledge of which forms contents of my background beliefs, 
etc., etc.). The idea of openness to the world amounts to the claim that it is the world itself that is 
transparently and directly open to us in veridical perception and, in its transparency, provides 
guidance for our thought. It also is a default situation in which we find ourselves as humans: 
whatever is there is warranted as available for our cognition.  
As has been shown in the previous section, the thesis about availability of the world as it 
is for empirical thought emerges directly from McDowell’s idea of the joint involvement of 
receptivity and spontaneity in perceptual experience: if we agree that experiences are always 
already equipped with conceptual content, we should conclude that in veridical experiences I 
know how things really are (MW: 25). When we see an object, what we perceive is the object 
itself, and not its intermediate mental proxy, as the myth of the Given seems to suggest. The 
notion of the openness to the world, in Brandom’s precise phrase, suggests that “when the 
perception is veridical, the content of perceptual experience just is the fact perceived” (Brandom 
2002: 94). McDowell is careful to stipulate that the identity between facts and contents, which 
expresses the gist of his direct realism, should not be understood in the sense that he does not 
care to distinguish between the fact that, say, I’m sitting on a chair now and my thinking or 
84 
 
perceiving that I’m sitting on a chair now. In this case, although the fact of the world really is 
also the content of my experience35, what is precisely not identical, even in veridical experience, 
is the fact of the world and my act of thinking, in which the fact is being revealed to me36 (MW: 
28).This stipulation, however, does not mean that our experience represents the world exactly as 
it is at every instance – which seems to be all that is needed for the skeptic to launch his attack.  
The very distinction between the facts and acts of thinking about those facts presupposes 
that there might be something wrong with the latter – hence the possibility of a mismatch 
between what one might take to be the content of her thinking and what really is the case. 
Openness to the world and McDowell’s direct realism do not tell us how exactly veridical and 
non-veridical kinds of perceptual awareness are to be distinguished. The only thing they tell us is 
what happens when our experience is, in fact, veridical (Butchvarov 1998: 24-29). In response to 
this claim, McDowell’s account seems to suggest two facts. First, in the case of the first-personal 
present experience an account of the possibility of mistake should not be expected, because, from 
this perspective, it seems to be enough to say that, what I reasonably take to be correct is, in fact, 
correct. It is hard to deny that a perceiver, in her first-personal present experience, does not seem 
                                                          
35 In claiming that facts are contents, McDowell does not imply that facts are cognizable because there is 
some sort of form of correspondence between facts and cognitions. He only says that how things are is 
open to us in experience, and that this openness establishes the rational responsiveness of experiences to 
how things are. What this does imply is that there is a constitutive relationship between how things are 
and our conceptual capacities, and that those capacities are characterized by the spontaneity that, in 
McDowell’s own terms, “extends all the way out to the conceptual contents that sit closest to the impacts 
of the world on our sensibility” (MW: 11). However, what the constitutive relationship between the how 
things are and our conceptual capacities (and with it, the full meaning of facts-contents equation) actually 
consists in is made clear only later in the text of MW when McDowell introduces the idea of second 
nature. 
36 It will be shown later in this section that the distinction between acts of thinking and thinkable contents is 
crucial for McDowell’s clarification of the idea of external constraint. 
85 
 
to need others to triangulate with in order to introduce the ideas of objectivity and constraint37. 
This, though, raises the question of whether first-personal present experience is enough for the 
two ideas to make any sense. Second, according to McDowell, our openness to the world does 
not in any way imply infallibility of our beliefs. In this case, the question is how, in light of this 
relationship between our openness to the world and infallibility of our beliefs, the fact that, in 
cases when our judgments about the world are correct, we do know things as they really are, 
helps us define under what conditions we succeed or fail.  
It might be asked, of course, whether any kind of full-blooded account of such conditions 
is at all needed. But, given that, according to McDowell, in veridical experiences one knows how 
things really are, it might be desirable to establish some sort of minimal criteria, which would 
ground at least our awareness of the possibility of being wrong, as well as our hope for being 
correct. For instance, in Brandom’s case, one might be aware of being wrong when someone else 
who is entitled to attribute a commitment to her does, in fact, attribute the commitment, 
irrespective of whether she acknowledges it or not. And, in Peirce’s case, we have a maxim that 
tells us what we need to do if we hope for arriving at true beliefs rather than at false ones. 
Although, in Brandom’s case, we still need an account of what “being entitled” means, and, in 
Peirce’s case, we need a more or less detailed definition of what the maxim actually requires, 
both Brandom and Peirce provide at least a minimal account of being mistaken. If such an 
account is not in place, we do not admit mistakes at all and, consequently, seem to end up having 
an unrealistic conception of experience (Christensen 2008: 184). If this is correct, McDowell’s 
idea of our openness to the world is unable to deal with scepticism about the possibility of 
knowledge, and we have no reason to hold on both to the idea of the openness to the world and to 
                                                          
37 Whether first-personal present experiences is actually all we need for the two ideas to make any sense is a 
separate question, which, for the time being, will be left unanswered. 
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the idea of perceptual content it entails. As Echeveri (2009) claims, we might simply refuse to 
accept McDowell’s metaphor of openness to the world and deny that there is a prejudgmental 
perceptual content somehow endowed with semantic properties, if we can make a good argument 
for the claim that only propositional states like judgments can actually represent the world 
(Echeverri 2009: 3).  
It is also interesting that, in the very beginning of lecture one of MW McDowell 
acknowledges that a perceiver can be misled into believing that she knows that things are thus 
and so when things are, in fact, not thus and so. However, a bit later he claims that “it does not 
matter much that one can be misled” (MW: 9). McDowell does not say much about why, in his 
opinion, an account of possibly misleading experiences is not important. He does claim though 
that both mistakes and veridical experiences form a part of the conceptual domain, but just how 
much it helps to resolve the problem also remains unclear. He repeats his point again towards the 
end of MW in lecture six: 
It is true that we could not establish that we are open to facts in any given case; at any rate not to 
the satisfaction of a determined sceptic, who can always insist on exploiting fallibility to give bite 
to the question how we know the present case is one of the non-misleading ones. But that is beside 
the point. It would matter if it showed that the very idea of openness to facts is unintelligible, and 
it does not show that. For my present purposes, the sheer intelligibility of the idea is enough. If the 
idea is intelligible, the sceptical questions lack a kind of urgency […] that derives from their 
seeming to point up an unnerving fact: that however good a subject’s cognitive position is, it 
cannot constitute her having a state of affairs directly manifest to her. There is no such fact.  
(MW: 113)  
This quietist argument says too much and too little at the same time. If anything, the sceptic’s 
task is to point at the lack of evidence in an argument rather than to seek the facts that would 
support her own position. We cannot explain how we know (or at least explain what gives us 
reasons to hope to know) the present case is non-misleading for the same reason we cannot 
explain how any case is non-misleading; namely, we have no criteria which would ground our 
87 
 
awareness of the possibility of being wrong, as well as our hope to be correct. Given this, it might 
be said that, by pointing at the sheer intelligibility of our openness to the world, McDowell 
simply tells the sceptic to get lost rather than resolves the problem.  
As pointed out in Echeveri (2009), to soothe the sceptic, by the very end of MW 
McDowell claims that, as far as we deal with the actualization of concepts on the level of 
perceptual content, the source of skepticism about the external world is essentially the same as 
the source of scepticism about the very possibility of content (Echeverri 2009: 4; MW: 14638). 
Now it might be claimed that this conclusion is no more than a truism which is fully elucidated 
by McDowell’s earlier disjunctivist account of perception (McDowell 1983; Dennis 2014). On 
this account, if I see such and such an object, either there is such an object, or there isn’t. If the 
object is, in fact, there, I am in a direct contact with the world, and the content of my experience 
is, in fact, the content of the world. If the object is not there, what I deal with is not a mental 
proxy (which, as the highest common factor assumption tells us, is the same in the case of a real 
experience and an illusion), but rather another content which differs from the veridical one. This 
line of argument does not dismiss just any doubt about the identity of perceptual contents and 
perceived facts, but it provides a theoretical framework in which, given that the idea of 
experience vis-à-vis some sort of inner space that stands independently of external reality is not a 
tenable option, the difference between “good” and “bad” disjuncts is there even if it cannot be 
distinguished by the subject of experience. McDowell does not pretend to provide a full-blooded 
proof of this fact, because, as he puts it, the idea of openness is nothing else but “a rejection of 
the traditional predicament, not an attempt to respond to it” (MW: 112). McDowell, therefore, 
                                                          
38 “I also assume that philosophical concerns about the possibility of knowledge express at root the same 
anxiety as philosophical concerns about how content is possible, an anxiety about a felt distance between 
mind and world”. 
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can only suggest his approach, but this suggestion, as it stands, cannot dismiss the fact that, even if 
we accept McDowell’s disjunctivism and the distinction between instances of mere appearances 
and instances where the subject perceives what the case is, the openness can by no means be 
conceived as a direct consequence of this distinction (Glendinning and Gaynesford 1998: 22).  
If the above is correct, McDowell leaves the sceptic at least somewhat unsatisfied. 
However, his response to the skeptic is closely related to his objection on the score of idealism. 
As I will show in the next section, this objection is actually completed only when McDowell 
introduces the idea of second nature and links this idea to language use – as a part of what 
Gaynesford describes as the thesis of “interdependence between experience and our capacities to 
conceive and use words” (Gaynesford 2004: 29). What is important for the present discussion is 
that this objection, even before language is defined in the last paragraph of lecture six, provides 
some additional support to McDowell’s anti-skeptical arguments by introducing the idea of 
rational constraint. 
As McDowell claims in the beginning of lecture two of MW, “we seem to need rational 
constraints on thinking and judging, from a reality external to them, if we are to make sense of 
them as bearing on a reality outside thought at all” (MW: 25). The principal question for 
McDowell is how the idea of constraint can be reconciled with the idea of openness to the world, 
or, to put it in different terms, how the rational relationship between mind and world can 
accommodate the idea of the independence of reality from what can be thought about it. 
McDowell’s goal is to offer a theory that does not locate reality outside the boundary that 
encloses the conceptual, but that, at the same time, does not neglect the independence of reality 
and, as McDowell puts it, “is not offensive to common sense” (MW: 44). As has been shown in 
section 2.2, the predicament is that the constraint can be neither merely causal (because, in this 
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case, as McDowell insists, we are likely to lose the world altogether39), nor purely 
extraconceptual (because, in this case, we lose immediate connection to the world and stand in 
need of introducing some sort of mediating screen of appearances). As McDowell himself admits, 
“it can seem that this refusal to locate perceptible reality outside the conceptual sphere must be a 
sort of idealism, in the sense in which to call a position ‘idealism’ is to protest that it does not 
genuinely acknowledge how reality is independent of our thinking” (MW: 26). 
When it comes to rational constraint, McDowell not so much argues for his position, as he 
tries to present it as a truism that cannot entail anything “metaphysically contentious” (MW: 27). 
There is nothing in the very idea of thought that might suggest that it is something distanced from 
the world. True, when Wittgenstein in §1 of his Tractatus tells us that “the world is everything 
that is the case” (T: 7), “all the point comes to is that one can think, for instance, that spring has 
begun, and that very same thing, that spring has begun, can be the case” (MW: 27). The phobia 
of idealism arises when, in unpacking this formula, one says that the world is made of the same 
                                                          
39 Although MW does not offer any elaborate criticism of Davidson’s coherentism, it might be safely 
concluded that, from McDowell’s point of view, by claiming that only a belief can justify another belief, 
Davidson denies any justificatory role to experience. For instance, Davidson’s triangulation argument 
shows that thoughts can be attributed and meanings of utterances fixed, only on the basis of a triangular 
structure that presupposes an interaction between at least two creatures and a set of external objects in 
the world which cause the interaction. This triangular structure helps us disambiguate external causes 
which, according to Davidson, both initiate intersubjective interaction and locate the causes in a public 
space, thus providing participants with the concept of objectivity. Although McDowell, to my best 
knowledge, never discussed Davidson’s triangulation argument in any of his papers, he must think that, 
as summarized above, it results only in our interaction having common external causes, but not in our 
meanings being fixed. And if the only role that experience can play in acquiring and fixing beliefs is a 
causal one, then, according to McDowell, we do not recognize the importance of an appeal to experience 
and, consequently, cannot explain how our thoughts have any content. According to Davidson, beliefs 
always already have content, and our task in each case is to determine them through interpretation. 
Therefore, the Kantian threat of beliefs being contentless, or empty (and, likewise, contents without 
beliefs being blind) for Davidson is no threat at all. (For McDowell’s arguments against Davidson’s 
approach to the scheme-content dualism, as well as for the discussion of those arguments see McDowell 
2009b: 115-133; Mármol 2007.) 
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stuff as the stuff one can think – which seems to lead directly to the conclusion that what one 
calls the world is “a shadow of our thinking” consisting of a mental stuff. But the phobia does not 
arise when one reads the formula the other way around and says that the sort of thing one can 
think is, in fact, the same sort of thing that can be the case. As it seems to be quite obvious that 
we have no particular need to look for a priority in either direction, the reason for the phobia 
resides in nothing but our established linguistic habits (MW: 28)40.  
The middle part of the second lecture is probably the richest and most intense part of the 
whole book. What follows after the discussion of the phobia of idealism comes thick and fast. 
McDowell is aware that, although priority in direction might not be an issue, “thinking” or 
“thought” are ambiguous in the way “fact” or “world” are not. To disambiguate the term, he uses 
the distinction between individual acts of thinking and particular contents that are thought – the 
very same distinction that invited the skeptical attack. And it is this disambiguation that finally 
yields the idea of rational constraint in the clearest form.  
The constraint, McDowell insists, is from outside any particular act of thinking, but it 
need not be from outside thinkable contents that our acts of thinking embrace. In order to 
understand how the constraint works, we need to go back in our reasoning far enough to reach the 
                                                          
40 A familiar historical example that, in this case, suggests itself right away is Berkeley’s conception of the 
material world, or Berkeley’s so-called “immaterialism”. Berkeley’s ideas were, especially in his time, 
often misunderstood. His esse est percipi, of course, entails not that matter does not exist at all, but that 
there cannot be any existence whatsoever that is not immediately perceptual. According to Berkeley, our 
immediate perception represents a unity of necessarily connected elements (following one of Peirce’s 
examples, we can imagine a man without a head, but not a sound without a pitch: these latter two things 
represent a necessary unity in perception). From this point of view, the world consists of tightly fitting 
interrelated parts that are organised in a sort of language to the use of which the perceiver is “open” in a 
sense similar to that which McDowell seems to attach to the term. As a number of commentators 
suggest, what Berkeley intended to offer in terms of his “immaterialism” was not a fanciful speculation 
of a skeptic, but, quite on the contrary, a form of radical empiricism, or even “downright hard-headed 
common-sense realism that any Irishmen could believe” (Pepper 1957: 10). This parallel with Berkeley 
is important because some researchers (see, e.g., Haddock 2008) claim that one of McDowell’s principal 
goals in Mind and World is to secure a coincidence between idealism and realism. 
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contents that are, as McDowell puts it, “ultimate in the order of justification” (MW: 29). He 
stresses that these are still thinkables, not something that is revealed by a mere pointing to a bit of 
the Given. Alluding to “Sense-certainty, or This and meaning”, the first chapter of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology, McDowell then adds that we should “reject the idea that tracing back the ground 
for a judgment can terminate in pointing to a bare presence” (MW: 39). The thinkables 
McDowell has in mind, in short, are contents of our experience to which we are open and which 
present manifest facts that impress themselves on our sensibility.  
At this point, McDowell links the notion of openness to the claim that every impression 
and every concept are understood only as forming a part in a larger networks: the claim which 
later on will lead him to introducing the ideas of second nature and initiation into a custom. 
Impressions always come in conceptual bundles (MW: 37). Just like Sellars and Brandom, 
McDowell claims that, for instance, a color concept cannot be grasped autonomously, without 
understanding how it fits in to a perceiver’s worldview which rationally links our capacities into 
a network. This sort of understanding always requires taking into account certain implications of 
a particular cognitive and social situation; and any judgment that endorses experiences framed by 
a concept becomes intelligible only in a variety of interrelated social and cognitive contexts.  
This, of course, is a familiar Sellarsian idea, which both Brandom and McDowell endorse, 
but McDowell’s novel point here is that he uses the inferentialist explanatory framework to 
elucidate the relationship between “inner” and “outer” experiences – the problem that, in 
Brandom’s own case, can never arise41. He intentionally preserves this Kantian distinction and 
uses it in order to strengthen his objection on the score of idealism. According to his example, a 
                                                          
41 McDowell ultimately urges the answerability of knowledge to experience, whereas Brandom keeps 
repeating, "experience is not one of my words," and insists that using this word implies succumbing to 
the Myth of the Given (MIE: 197; Levine 2012). 
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person cannot learn how to use the concept of pain as related to our inner experiences without 
any knowledge of larger circumstances; for instance, without knowledge of the more general case 
of someone’s being in pain (MW: 37). It is quite clear that the roles this concept might play in 
English language cannot be restricted to judgments of inner experience, or first-person accounts, 
because every role is a cluster of uses that refer to other clusters and relates to them through what 
Wittgenstein called “family resemblances”42. 
To sum up the results of the second lecture, we are open to the world as the sum total of 
thinkable contents; our acts of empirical thinking are answerable to and rationally constrained by 
these contents, which are available to us and, provided that the experiences are veridical, present 
things as they really are. As McDowell succinctly puts it, “we have to understand the 
experienceable world as a subject matter for active thinking, rationally constrained by what 
experience reveals” (MW: 32-33). What is thus revealed is not bits of the Given, but thinkable 
contents, no matter how far we trace our justifications back. What is within the constraint is 
particular acts of thinking, not thinkable contents. McDowell never tells us just how far we can 
trace our justifications, but, as has been pointed earlier, he does tell us that there are thinkables 
put into place in operations of receptivity, and that, in appealing to them, we establish rational 
constraint on thinking from a reality external to it (MW: 29).  
                                                          
42 There is an ambiguity here that is related to what Wittgenstein had to say about pain in Philosophical 
Investigations. On the one hand, it seems to be intuitively true that in the case of pain the 
appearance/reality distinction collapses: if a person seems to herself to be in pain, she must be so. On the 
other hand, given that “being in pain” is a linguistic description, the question is: Can a creature, if it 
doesn’t have the capacity of giving first-person reports in the inferentialist context McDowell has in 
mind, “be in pain”? It is not quite clear why McDowell uses this ambiguous example as an illustration of 
his point here, as, before the introduction of his anthropocentric idea of second nature, it creates some 
troubles for his rebuttal of “bad” idealism. However, those who are inclined to disregard this 
disquotational sophistication (as McDowell himself, I believe, certainly would), might simply admit that 
one can be in pain but fail to have the concept of pain. 
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Recall that, according to McDowell, thinkables form conceptual networks. In this way, 
McDowell tries to make sure that “ultimate contents” is not interpreted in the absolute sense, but 
only “in the order of justification”. The introduction of the idea of ultimate thinkables is followed 
almost immediately by the claim that the thinkables are linguistically available and constitute 
ultimate points of agreement regardless of possible differences in perception, cultural and social 
background, etc. He adds that “it may take work to make the conceptual contents of someone else’s 
engagements with the world available to us, … [but] the world she engages with is surely already 
within our view” (MW: 34).  
It is important to keep in mind that the agreement McDowell has in mind is about 
contents, not about the perspectival form, as in Brandom’s case. McDowell doesn’t offer any 
further justifications of this liberal hope for the ultimate agreement43. We are told only (1) that 
there are no extra-conceptual links between the medium within which we think and some extra-
conceptual elements out there, and (2) that the agreement is possible not because the dynamic 
system of our thinking is somehow adjusted to the world. Any experienced state of affairs is a 
part of a whole world, thinkable as it is, and the whole is, in some sense, independent of any 
particular experience. (MW: 36).  
There are three major theoretical backgrounds that may be used to support such 
agreement. The first one is exemplified by Davidson’s idea of radical interpretation, where we 
find ourselves in a situation in which we know neither the meanings of (empirical) claims made 
by an alien speaker that we need to interpret, nor which (empirical) beliefs the alien speaker 
holds. Conceived in this way, the process of interpretation is based on the technique of the 
                                                          
43 Of course, according to McDowell, we still live in the same world. Apart from the same physical objects 
we all stumble upon, the world we actually live is as humans is essentially defined by McDowell in 
terms of conceptual contents, and it is these contents, or linguistically available thinkables, not anything 
else, that constitute ultimate points of agreement. 
94 
 
Davidsonian optimizing agreement: we have to act on the assumption that the set of beliefs of the 
speaker we intend to interpret is, by and large, consistent and true according to our own 
standards” (Davidson 1984: 137). There will always remain a possibility for something Davidson 
refers to as “the trade-offs between the beliefs we attribute to a speaker and the interpretations we 
give his words” (Davidson 1984: 139), so that interpretation will not rely on any kind of ultimate 
contents and will always remain incomplete and indeterminate in the Quinian sense. As has been 
shown in section 2.2, this option is unpalatable for McDowell who believes that what he calls 
Davidsonian coherentism is the extreme point to which the seesaw takes us once we reject the 
myth of the Given. True, although McDowell rejects Davidson's insistence on the purely causal 
role of sensations, he cannot help accepting part of Davidson’s interpretation story. According to 
McDowell, every chunk of experience always forms a part of a larger conceptual network and, as 
expressed in a judgment, becomes intelligible only in a variety of interrelated social contexts. 
However, as has been mentioned above, McDowell points out that for the idea of an agreement 
between us to work we need a new, refurbished conception of experience, whereas Davidson 
doesn’t think any such conception is needed for the purpose. It is also important to be aware that 
each of the conceptual contents that, according to McDowell, constitute points of an agreement, 
is precisely what it is – a content, i.e. something that is always there as some particular “thus-and-
so-ness.” As the content of veridical experiences, it is a fact, something that is the case, i.e. a 
constituent of the world in a way meanings that result from the Davidsonian radical interpretation 
are most definitely not. 
The second theoretical background is exemplified by the familiar neo-Kantian approach 
to communication (e.g. Habermas’s theory of communicative action). According to this 
approach, rationality is a universal capacity inherent in language, and rational agreement is 
available to every language user through argumentation. The belief that supports this approach is 
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that there is a level of self-reflection and cooperation, at which public structures of argumentative 
speech are totally devoid of coercive force and lead to mutual understanding. The possibility of 
such understanding is based on our being capable of something that might be called “straight 
talk”, or an absolutely non-instrumental and non-manipulative use of speech, irrespective of 
social and cultural differences. On this approach, an individual agent’s own motives that express 
her self-interest, unlike her public reasons, are never fully and utterly transparent to her, and the 
transparency of her personal reasons is achievable only in specifically organized communication 
with others. This theory of communication, however, is based on shared competences, normative 
presuppositions, practices, and background resources for the consensual resolution of conflicts, 
rather than on shared conceptually framed thinkables, or the “world” in McDowell’s sense of the 
word. McDowell cannot make use of this account because shared competences, normative 
presuppositions, practices, and background resources are precisely more or less flexible 
situational adjustments to the environment, not something forming a part of the world thinkable 
as it is. 
The third background is exemplified by Peirce’s idea of a future community of inquirers 
as it has been described above in section 1.3 in relation to Brandom’s notion of perspectival 
objectivity. This idea pictures reality as the ultimate agreement in opinions of future inquirers and 
presupposes a method of fixing those opinions. In the end of lecture II of MW McDowell alludes 
to this idea when he writes: 
Ensuring that our empirical concepts and conceptions pass muster is ongoing and arduous work 
for the understanding. It requires patience and something like humility. There’s no guarantee that 
the world is completely within the reach of a system of concepts and conceptions as it stands at 
some particular moment in its historical development. 
 (MW: 40) 
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The next paragraph in the text actually mentions the regulative notion of the end of inquiry 
implied in Peirce’s idea of an extended future community as it is defined in his “How to Make 
Our Ideas Clear.” In a footnote to the paragraph, McDowell quotes Peirce on the convergence 
between truth and reality as one of the consequences on this notion: “The opinion which is fated 
to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by truth, and the object 
represented in this opinion is the real” (W3: 273). However, he does so only to reject the idea a 
moment later, stating that it is no part of the position he is recommends (MW: 40). Meanwhile, 
Peirce’s idea of a future community of inquirers, as will be shown below in chapter 3, secures 
constraint on our thinking and, as an integral part of Peirce’s theory of signs, provides 
justification for the generative aspect of language.  
With the three explanatory opportunities unused, there is no link between McDowell’s 
holistic stance, according to which any single state of affairs reveals itself in experience only as a 
part of the world as a whole, with this whole being independent of any particular experience of it, 
on the one hand, and the idea of contents, each of which is particular “thus-and-so”, on the other 
hand. In one of his later works, McDowell tries to create the link by claiming that every act of 
perception involves not just one, but necessarily multiple conceptual capacities that are active in 
experience together (McDowell 2009a: 7-11). To make his point, he refers to §16 of Empiricism 
and the Philosophy of Mind, where Sellars argues for an analogy between visual experiences and 
linguistic acts: in seeing something, I am having a conceptual episode that, in a non-overt form, 
contains a number of overt claims. Making claims is the primary way to actualize conceptual 
capacities, and these actualizations constitute an inferentially organized network. That said, 
McDowell still does not make it clear either what makes a conceptual content “ultimate” in the 
order of justification, or why is it at all possible for ultimate contents to be shared by 
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interlocutors. The only thing we know so far is that there’s an analogy between concepts and 
language. Recall that, while discussing the phobia of idealism, McDowell refers to §1 of 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and suggests that the fact that such-and-such is the case is the content of 
the thought that such-and-such is the case. One page earlier McDowell adds: “That things are 
thus and so is the content of the experience, and it can also be the content of a judgment” (MW: 
26), which seems to imply that every perceptual experience already has a propositional form. 
However, just like Brandom, McDowell enjoys keeping his readers in suspense as to the key 
issue of MW until the very end of the last lecture, and the resolution comes only after the link is 
built between the idea of second nature and the way language functions. 
 
 
2.4. Second Nature 
On the one hand, McDowell seems to believe that openness to the world is an outcome of a 
universal rational capacity inherent in language and available to every language user through 
argumentation. His important proviso to this view, however, is that it is perceptual experience 
that underpins any judgment or argument. It is perceptions, and not cultural and normative 
competences, that form the shared basis for understanding. On the other hand, McDowell places 
rational constraint within the sphere of the conceptual – which leads him to the conclusion that 
reality is independent of individual acts of thinking based on perceptual experience, but that our 
acknowledgment of the independence of reality does not come from outside of thinkable contents 
that veridical experience reveals.  
This rejection of a reality outside the sphere of the conceptual (and, therefore, of the 
sensible) is very much in line with Peirce’s version of what McDowell calls consistent idealism 
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(MW: 44) as opposed to the idealism that considers the world as only “a shadow of our thinking” 
consisting of a “mental stuff”. But having shown, in the first three lectures of MW, why 
conceptual capacities should be domesticated within nature and what this picture would entail, 
McDowell now needs to show how this domestication actually works. His approach is to start 
with the following principal question: What is the relationship between the thinkable, or the 
conceptual nature shared by our human empirical thinking and the world, on the one hand, and 
the features that we share with other natural creatures, such as dumb animals, on the other hand? 
Like other animal species, we are perceptually sensitive to our environment, and we obviously 
share similar sensory systems with many other natural species. We are undeniably natural in this 
respect. Given this, how is it possible that all the arguments in favor of the conceptual character 
of perceptual experience do not entail a familiar Kantian gap between dumb nature and freedom 
as a human achievement? According to McDowell, to answer this question, all we need to do is 
disambiguate the word “nature”. 
One way to understand the word is closely related to what McDowell calls “the realm of 
law”; namely, a scientistic conception of nature, which began to form with the rise of modern 
philosophy and which Weber described using the term “disenchantment.44” Initially aimed at 
purging our ideas about reality from prejudices based on previous appeals to mystery and 
magic, it ultimately gave birth to a mechanistic picture of nature entirely stripped of meaning 
and purpose.  
According to McDowell, it would be wrong to try and solve the problem by construing the 
space of reasons, within which human, conceptually framed sensibility is actualized, as strictly 
opposed to this natural world totally devoid of meaning and normativity. But it would be equally 
                                                          
44 See section 1.2. 
99 
 
wrong to construe the former as a mere addition to the latter. If we simply oppose the space of 
reasons to the realm of law, says McDowell, we will face the fact that the former is entirely 
separated from the world as pictured by the latter. As a result, reason appears to represent 
something entirely super-natural.  
McDowell calls this latter conception “rampant platonism”. He defines rampant platonism 
as a position that construes the space of reasons as an autonomous structure independent from 
anything specifically human, as far as what is specifically human is also considered as natural 
(MW: 77). On this construal, we preserve the autonomy of the space of reasons at the expense of 
losing the conceptual contact with the world. Alternatively, if we want to reconstruct the space of 
reasons using only the resources the realm of law provides us with, we end up with what McDowell 
calls “bald naturalism.” He defines it as a doctrine which tells us that we should attempt to 
reconstruct our conception of ourselves using only the conceptual equipment that is non-
problematically naturalistic (MW: 76). It tells us, in other words, that the only way to save the 
elements that are essential to our conception of ourselves is to ground our self-explanation in 
phenomena which science can observe and verify. This view immediately raises a question about 
the status of spontaneity: any attempt to derive it from something that is non-problematically 
natural from the “disenchanted” point of view would result in some sort of “human, all too 
human” residue which would always resist the ultimate reduction.  
McDowell’s idea is to render the space of reasons autonomous, but not separated from 
nature, i.e. not exhausted by the realm of law, on the one hand, and, at the same time, not 
something rampantly supernatural. What McDowell wants is naturalized platonism that would help 
us avoid riding the refurbished seesaw that used to take us from the extreme of coherentism to the 
extreme of the Given, and that now takes us from the extreme of bald naturalism emphasising brute 
external world, to the extreme of rampant platonism laying stress on the autonomous rationality of 
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mind. As Crispin Wright puts it rather succinctly, in MW McDowell aims at “‘humanized’ or 
‘naturalized’ platonism […] without reductive hankerings” (Wright 2002: 152). What McDowell 
needs in order to accomplish his task is to have conceptual capacities fully integrated into the 
natural world in a notion that is not reducible to any elements of nature intelligible apart from 
conceptual capacities and spontaneity; a notion that would accommodate the autonomy of the 
conceptual and the idea of rational constraint on our empirical thinking, i.e., incorporate reason 
into nature and salvage Kant’s autonomy thesis.  
With all the preliminary work of reconciling receptivity and spontaneity done in the first 
three lectures of MW, in lecture four McDowell introduces the notion of “second nature”. In 
essence, the second nature argument has two objectives: to put the discussion about the 
relationship between receptivity and spontaneity into a wider focus, and to provide some 
additional support to his arguments against scepticism and “bad” idealism.  
McDowell first derives the notion from Aristotle’s account of moral character, and then 
extrapolates it to his own theoretical account of initiation into custom and, more broadly, into 
human conceptual capacities in general, including responsiveness to rational demands beyond 
those of ethics (Bernstein 2002: 17). In brief, the idea of second nature is that we are not born 
with conceptualized perceptual capacities and that we have to learn to see and hear the world by 
mastering the use of words and participating in social discursive practices. However, having 
learned to see and hear the world by mastering the use of words, says McDowell, what we see 
and hear is precisely this: the world (MW: 27).  
McDowell’s central thesis here is that our learning history, which constitutes our second 
nature, is not the history of building a mediating screen of appearances between us and the world, 
or some sort of conceptual scheme that provides us with access to the world by means of 
organizing sense data. The openness of the world for us as partaking in this nature is unmediated, 
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and so there’s no ontological chasm between world and thought, because second nature, which is 
acquired in our upbringing, does not add anything to our first one, but simply – in the distinctly 
Hegelian sense – sublates it. As a Wittgensteinian, McDowell certainly believes that, just as a 
practice cannot be reduced to a set of explicitly formulated rules, but is a habituated modus 
operandi which matches a type of response to an appropriate type of circumstances, what 
language acquisition results in is not just a finite set of particular skills, but a new, second nature 
that “discovers” the world as it really is and predetermines possible outcomes of our actions and 
perceptions.  
By sublating first nature, second nature provides us with the possibility of rational 
response and, therefore, with the very possibility of outer experience. As McDowell puts it, 
We cannot construe [mere animals] as continually reshaping the world-view in rational response 
to the deliverances of experience; not if the idea of rational response requires subjects who are in 
charge of their thinking, standing ready to reassess what is a reason for what, and to change their 
responsive propensities accordingly. It follows that mere animals cannot enjoy “outer experience”, 
on the conception of “outer experience” I have recommended. 
 (MW: 114) 
Referring to Gadamer’s Truth and Method, McDowell writes that brutes cannot transcend beyond 
their immediate needs, that their existence is restricted by immediate biological imperatives 
which always predetermine particular successions of problems, and that, as he puts it, “the life 
structured in that way is led not in the world, but only in an environment” (MW: 115; emphasis 
added). There isn’t much out there for a creature that lives, as it were, within itself, affected only 
by the immediate challenges, by “here and now” of the environment. The outer as a description 
of experience, in turn, refers to the reflective stance specific to human consciousness, which 
expresses our sapience that cannot be derived from mere first-natural sentience. This stance 
makes us capable of deliberating and choosing between different incentives and, therefore, of 
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having reasons to act one way rather than another. The sense of externality here is the sense of a 
reflective distance that allows us to live, not in an immediate environment, but in the world. But 
although, in light of the above, there is a strong connection between being out there in the world 
and having reasons45, the world is entirely open to us, because it contains nothing 
extraconceptual. At the same time, the world lays constraints on our empirical thinking. The 
constraints are due to the fact that what we reflect on is our second-natural experience, and this 
experience is through and through conceptual and propositionally contentful, i.e. it is always an 
experience that things are thus and so, independently of what a particular reflective creature 
might make of it. On this interpretation, the ideas of second nature and Bildung can help 
McDowell deal with bad idealism. By means of associating the world as it really is with what 
becomes available through habituation and initiation into human customs, we meet with the 
world and with ourselves as a proper second-natural part of it.  Unlike other animals, we are out 
there in the world itself, and we can access the facts in making judgments. As, thanks to second 
nature, we find ourselves in the world that is open to us as it really is, the idea of second nature 
seems to be an extended recapitulation of the idea of perceptual contents of our experience as 
identical with the facts of the world.  
For many researchers, the main worry about McDowell’s account of second nature, 
briefly summarised above, is that it doesn’t offer any developed theory of second nature. All it 
does is remind us that the idea of second nature is available to us in principle and that, if 
sufficiently developed, it can be helpful in dealing with a variety of philosophical anxieties 
(Forman 2008: 567; See also Price 1997; Wright 1996). Forman (2008) also shows that, in 
                                                          
45 Although MW contains no explicit reference to Heidegger’s Being and Time, it is tempting to suppose 
that, in building this connection – which is obviously used to strengthen the Sellarsian metaphor of the 
space of reasons – McDowell draws on Heidegger’s idea of Dasein (literally “being there”) and his 
interpretation of Greek ἀλήθεια as “disclosure,” or ἀ-λήθεια, something that is radically open, not hidden 
in any way. 
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explicating the idea of second nature, McDowell’s use of Aristotle might not do justice to 
Aristotle’s own account. Forman’s objection, although a little short-sighted, is useful in that it 
does a great job in helping us better grasp the development of McDowell’s argument in support 
of second nature. 
Forman’s worry about McDowell’s interpretation of Aristotle is that he uses the formation 
of ethical character as a model for initiation into conceptual capacities in general. Aristotle makes 
an explicit point that our perceptions and irrational impulses form a part of human nature just as 
much as our reasoning does. The passionate/perceptive part is transformed by deliberation into 
choices, and so both the rational and the passionate/perceptive parts of the soul together take part 
in the formation of moral character through acquiring habits. And acquiring good habits in the 
course of normal human upbringing, says Aristotle, is the right way to ethical virtue. Forman’s 
claim is that, due to an intricate dialectics between potentiality, or capacity to do something 
habitually, and activity, which Aristotle develops in Nicomachean Ethics, the way consecutive 
steps of habituation are described by Aristotle cannot serve as a model for a broader theory of 
how our basic conceptual abilities are acquired (Forman 2008: 575). According to Aristotle, 
habituation that results in acquiring a virtuous skill (playing the lyre, or building a house) begins 
by things we actually repeatedly do in order to build a house or play the lyre, whereas in the case 
of sensual perception, we first acquire the capacity to see or hear, and only then exhibit the 
activity. The unwelcome result, according to Forman, is that, “if we possess the conceptual 
ability before we have the habit, then the habit cannot itself be what distinguishes a conceptually 
informed perception from a merely natural response to the environment” (Forman 2008: 575). So 
it appears that, for Forman’s Aristotle, an attempt to model perceptual habits on habits that 
constitute virtuous behavior lead to an impasse: we seem to need to have conceptual capacities 
before habituation can result in acquiring them. Our first and second natures, therefore, work 
quite differently and the second one is actually a “nature” by weak analogy only. Besides, 
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McDowell, who, in the first three lectures of MW treats perceptual judgment as a model for all 
judgments, upon the introduction of the idea of second nature changes his strategy and begins to 
treat Aristotelian moral judgments as a model for perceptual judgments. No explanation for this 
change in priorities is provided.  
However, some sort of a justification for this change may be found in McDowell’s earlier 
works; in particular, in his early article “Virtue and Reason” (McDowell 1979), where McDowell 
lays stress on Aristotle’s holistic approach to virtues: “We do not fully understand a virtuous 
person’s actions – we do not see the consistency in them – unless we can supplement the core 
explanations with a grasp of his conception of how to live” (McDowell 1979: 346). According to 
Aristotle, virtues are interconnected, and no single virtue can be enacted unless a person 
possesses all of them. A virtuous person has an overall conception of how to live, and this 
conception can be reduced neither to separate virtues, nor to a particular set of explicit rules of 
conduct. It seems obvious that this early text of McDowell’s provides a link that is actually 
missing in MW; namely, the link between McDowell’s Aristotle and Wittgenstein’s thesis that 
we gradually acquire understanding of language as a whole rather than acquiring a complete and 
clear understanding of certain parts of it, or particular situations a language game may put us in.  
For example, in “On Certainty” Wittgenstein says: “When we first begin to believe 
anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light 
dawns gradually over the whole)” (OC: §141). Thus, Aristotle’s notions of habituation and 
human upbringing appear to be interwoven with Wittgenstein’s idea of initiation into a custom. 
According to Aristotle, I cannot express how to live in a maxim, but I have habits and a capacity 
to get involved in certain practices. Likewise, according to Wittgenstein, following a rule is a 
public practice and, in following this practice, I simply act as I have been trained to. The middle 
course between a performance understood as a blind reaction to a situation, on the one hand, and 
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interpreting a rule by an explicitly stated formula, on the other hand, is initiation into a certain 
custom, or institution. Given this, the discrepancy between virtues and perceptual experience in 
McDowell’s Aristotle, as pointed out in Forman (2008), seems to be dissolved by McDowell’s 
Wittgenstein. Even if we agree with Forman in that McDowell’s reading of Aristotle leads to 
inconsistencies in terms of the relationship between conceptual capacities and the process of 
habituation, Wittgenstein’s idea of initiation into a custom resolves all the difficulties: not only 
having virtues, but also having perceptual experience – which is indissolubly related to having 
the capacity to use correctly appropriate linguistic expressions – is a matter of habituation. Just 
like learning to play the lyre presupposes the transition from a complex activity that involves 
thinking about particular notes and choosing which string to pluck, having the concept of green and 
knowing what it is for something to be green, in Wilfrid Sellars’s phrase, “involve[s] a long history 
of acquiring piecemeal habits of response to various objects in various circumstances” (Sellars 
1997: 44-45). 
In lecture 5 of MW McDowell finally introduces the concept of Bildung – the concept 
which I take to express the result of fusing together the ideas of proper human upbringing and 
initiation into a custom, and which thus is the keystone in McDowell’s overall reinterpretation of 
the idea of nature. Whereas Aristotle’s idea of proper ethical upbringing describes to us an 
autonomous space of ethical reasons, and Wittgenstein’s idea of initiation into a custom allows us 
to understand perception within the framework of language games, Bildung reveals the 
autonomous space of reasons in the most general sense.  
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Characteristically, McDowell keeps his readers in the dark as to what particular part of the 
rather long history of the notion he refers to46. Besides, McDowell’s ideas of second nature and 
Bildung are seen by some researchers as undetailed and ambiguous. As Wright (2002) notes, 
The root idea seems merely to be that we can free ourselves of the temptations of (bald) 
naturalistic reconstruction of the subject matters and epistemology of normative discourses and of 
a contrasting platonistic mythologizing of them if only we remind ourselves often enough, with 
the appropriate Aristotelian and German texts open, that these express forms of thought into 
which it comes naturally to us to be educable. But it is simply not explained how that is supposed 
to help. 
 (Wright 2002: 154) 
True, McDowell successfully uses the two ideas to support the non-contradictory 
relationship between his version of idealism and his direct realism. Merely having the ideas of 
Bildung and second nature in view, however vaguely defined, helps us refute bad idealism by 
showing that the world is not a mere shadow of our thinking. The world presupposes human 
practices and licenses a strong link between the capacity to have reasons and the sense of 
externality, of being out there in the world. However, Wright’s criticism is justified at least by the 
fact that, unlike Hegel in his Phenomenology (as well as Humboldt in his Bildungstheorie and 
Brandom in his A Spirit of Trust), McDowell doesn’t tell us any story which would show 
Bildung, not as a fact that is simply postulated, in a Kantian fashion, but as a product of a certain 
institutional change. In the case of Hegel, we walk the concrete path from sense-certainty to the 
master-slave dialectics to the Christian community. Brandom’s A Spirit of Trust shows us the 
                                                          
46  The term was first applied in a systematic way by Jacob Böhme and Leibniz, who meant by it the 
realization of potentialities inborn in an organism. Later, in the works of Johann Gottfried Herder, the 
term referred to some of the fundamental ideas about the dependence of thought on language – the ideas 
that are taken for granted by the majority of philosophers today. This, in turn, inspired the works by 
Wilhelm von Humboldt. In using the term, Humboldt went beyond the sense of individual formation to 
the formation of peoples and cultures, and the works in which he used it are nowadays widely viewed as 
the foundation of modern linguistics.  
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development from his earlier idea of atomistic “I-Thou” relationship to the holistic “I-We” 
relationship through a variety of institutional forms based on trust and forgiveness. In the case of 
Humboldt’s romanticist reinterpretation of Kant, the fact that Bildung primarily referred to the 
idea of general knowledge (Allgemeinbildung) was supported by a concrete program of holistic 
liberal education that presupposed certain institutional reforms. And in McDowell’s case, as 
Wright points out, Bildung and second nature represent a cluster of ideas that are only vaguely 
defined, and initiation into a custom sounds more like a magical transformation of sorts.  
McDowell only tells us that Bildung signifies the transformation of human beings, who are born 
mere animals, into “thinkers and intentional agents in the course of coming to maturity”, adding 
that Bildung also represents “a central element in the normal maturation of human beings”, of 
which practices of language acquisition are the most important part (MW: 125). In this context, 
Bildung, as a result of education, becomes a lifelong process of human development broadly 
understood, rather than mere training and gaining a particular external knowledge or a skill. In 
contrast to the latter, McDowell presumably understands Bildung as a set of educational 
techniques wherein an individual’s perceptual and cultural sensitivity, as well as personal and 
social skills are in the process of continual expansion and growth.  
 
2.5. Objectivity 
Recall that, according to McDowell, mind and world partake in the sphere of the conceptual, and 
that, although the conceptual is unbounded or, as McDowell puts it, has no outer boundary (MW: 
44), the world exerts rational constraint on what we think and say about it. These two facts 
together bring about an interesting twist to the very idea of constraint: reality, says McDowell, is 
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independent from our acts of thinking, but not from thinkable contents, which themselves are 
also external to the acts and of which we cannot say that there is something external to them: the 
fact that Descartes is sitting in a chair in front of his fireplace differs from Descartes’ act of 
thinking in which the fact of his sitting in the chair is revealed. This conclusion later on leads 
McDowell to introducing the idea of contents “ultimate in the order of justification”: in order to 
appreciate the way the constraint actually works, we have to go as far back in our reasoning as is 
necessary to reach those contents: 
When we trace justifications back, the last thing we come to is still thinkable content; not 
something more ultimate than that, a bare pointing to a bit of the Given. The thinkable contents 
that are ultimate in the order of justification are contents of experiences, and in enjoying an 
experience one is open to manifest facts. 
 (MW: 29; emphasis added) 
According to Maher (2012), what McDowell is trying to do in this passage is not to stop the 
regress of knowledge, which supposedly can be terminated only by something that is simply 
given, but rather to undermine the basic assumption that leads to the regress (and that the myth of 
the Given prevents us to disclose). This is the assumption that no intentional state can put a 
perceiver directly in contact with reality (Maher 2012: 100). But even if this is correct, does it 
really help McDowell to dispel the myth of the given?  
According to McDowell, in tracing our justifications back, what we have at every step in 
the order of those justifications is a set of contents as some particular thus-and-so-nesses. Those 
are nothing like Brandomean conceptual contents that are nods in inferential networks defined 
entirely in terms of material incompatibilities and consequences of judgments in which they are 
used. They are something we are open to – in the way one cannot be open to Brandomean 
inferential networks. The reason is that what particular instances of using an expression reveal 
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within such networks is based on the interplay between the explicit and the implicit. We can go 
back and forth changing the configuration of our commitments and entitlements, but we cannot 
play it all back to the contents that, as McDowell has it, can “sit closest to the impacts of the 
world on our sensibility” (MW: 11). On Brandom’s account, there is absolutely nothing that can 
sit to the impacts of the world in this way47. The McDowellian conceptual content opens us to 
something that is stated, something that is factual, qualitative, and has certain haecceity. At the 
same time, it is also something that comes in bundles and is always organized in networks of 
reasons, something we perpetually reflect upon and change our minds about (MW: 40) – 
although it is important that what is changed in this reflection is changed not by an interplay 
between a variety of perspectives grounded in interrelated individual practical attitudes, as it is in 
Brandom’s case, but by something far less dynamic and situational, something more 
fundamental, namely, by what McDowell calls tradition. 
Each of these two ways to characterize content – the one that stresses matters of fact, and 
the other that emphasises historical change – has a corresponding idea of language. On the one 
hand, as has been discussed in section 2.3, McDowell insists that there is a strong structural 
analogy between language and experience. Perceptions, just like judgments, are always already 
shaped by meaning (MW: 95), which implies that there is a structure shared by experiences and 
                                                          
47 Brandom is quite explicit about his disagreement with McDowell on this score. In spite of the analogy 
between experience and language, he says, there is a rather clear difference between the two: 
“No one, I suppose, denies that non-inferentially elicited perceptual judgments are the first tribunal 
rendering verdicts on our empirical thought – verdicts, to be sure, that can be appealed to a higher court, 
perhaps ultimately the court of overall explanatory power of our total belief system. But McDowell’s 
view is more specific and more contentious. He thinks we need a notion of conscious experience that is 
prejudgmental, but nonetheless through and through conceptually contentful, and so capable not merely 
of prompting perceptual judgments, but actually of pronouncing on them” (Brandom 1995: 242). 
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judgments, and that, therefore, every perceptual experience already has a propositional form. Due 
to this, perceptions may trick us in just the same way judgments may trick us. And when we have 
veridical experiences and make corresponding correct judgments, we have knowledge about what 
is the case. To rephrase slightly one of McDowell’s examples already mentioned, I may think that 
spring has begun, and report that spring has begun, and it also may be that spring has begun.  
On the other hand, in the very last paragraph of MW McDowell offers a historical 
reconceptualization of this outcome of his theory when he describes the principal function of 
language as “a repository of tradition, a store of historically accumulated wisdom about what is a 
reason for what” (MW: 126). He also adds later that during each generation that inherits the 
tradition the tradition, as a sum total of conceptual material, undergoes reflective modification 
and that “a standing obligation to engage in critical reflection is itself part of the inheritance” 
(ibid.). On this interpretation, given the aforementioned link between the ideas of second nature 
and the conceptual realm, it seems that that things are thus and so, at least to some extent, is due 
to the way it is related to other contents/facts and stored by our tradition-preserving language. If 
this were not so, we would have to conclude that our human, second-natural way of having the 
world as it really is in view would be independent from what we do in maintaining and 
modifying our tradition. Meanwhile, on this account, we cannot get to be open to the world 
without being initiated into a tradition, as well as without maintaining and modifying it. Keeping 
in mind that being initiated into a tradition, as well as maintaining and modifying it amounts to 
participating in a set of practices, the claim that we are capable of having the world in view 
independently of what we do as second-natural, tradition-driven creatures doesn’t seem to fit into 
the picture. 
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Now the question is whether these two ways to link language and experience – essentialist 
and historical – can coexist within the framework of one theory. It might seem that they can. 
McDowell postulates a strong connection between the sphere of the conceptual and second 
nature: the former, as expressed in conceptual contents, becomes available through human 
upbringing as prerequisite for partaking in the latter. The sum total of contents (which are always 
already conceptualized, and which represent the second nature), as distinct from acts of thinking, 
are open to our gaze and, by being revised by tradition, allow us to establish rational constraint 
on thinking from a reality external to it (MW: 29). But it might be worth to have a closer look. 
From the factual perspective, the ideas of openness to the world and conceptual contents 
that are ultimate in the order of justification, together with the aforementioned analogy between 
experiences and judgments, support McDowell’s attempt to integrate the normative and the 
factual. Naturally, there are facts, as well as norms for making claims about those facts, which 
are independent of what any finite number of people might think about them. To use one of the 
examples McDowell brings forth in his debate with Rorty over the idea of objectivity, there 
undoubtedly are norms for using the expression “cold fusion has not occurred” (McDowell 2000: 
118). This characteristically scientific example rightfully implies that there are facts available in 
veridical experience that represent something more than a mere consensus between members of a 
given community. Whatever I, you, or even all of us might think, there is a hard fact cold fusion 
has not yet occurred. There is a difference, says McDowell, between having the world in view 
and “merely aspiring to vocalise in step with one another” (McDowell 2000: 119). Referring to 
Putnam’s idea that any use of expressions like “truth” and “reference” should be internal to our 
worldview, he then clarifies his position: 
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Putnam's insight is that we must not succumb to the illusion that we need to climb outside our 
own minds, the illusion that though we aim our thought and speech at the world from a standpoint 
constituted by our present practices and competences, we must be able to conceive the conformity 
of our thought and speech to the world from outside any such standpoint. But to unmask that as an 
illusion is not to say, with Rorty, that the norms that govern claim-making can only be norms of 
consensus, norms that would be fully met by earning the endorsement of our peers for our claims. 
We must indeed avoid the illusion of transcendence that Putnam's insight rejects, but we do not 
put our capacity to do so at risk if we insist that in claim-making we make ourselves answerable 
not just to the verdicts of our fellows but to the facts themselves. That is, if you like, to say that 
norms of inquiry transcend consensus. 
(ibid.) 
This brings us to the historical perspective on the link between language and experience. What 
McDowell claims here is that the idea of constraint makes sense only from the human standpoint, 
and that Rorty’s appeal to consensus doesn’t do the job in terms of supporting this claim against 
the illusion of transcendence. McDowell’s objection represents a misunderstanding of Rorty’s 
position, and it is this misunderstanding that we need to have a closer look at in order to see a 
mismatch between the two perspectives as they are described in MW.  
According to Rorty, it is precisely for the reason that we cannot climb outside our minds, 
that it is not immediately clear how a person, as Rorty puts it in response to McDowell, “can tell 
a world constituted by linguistic practices from a world constituted by facts – facts which 
somehow (despite the sentence-like appearance) are not themselves ‘constituted’ by any such 
practices” (Rorty 2000: 126; emphasis added). McDowell is right that the fact that cold fusion 
has not yet occurred is distinct from any and all individual acts of thinking about it. But although 
independent from what any and all of us think about it at any particular moment, this fact is 
certainly not independent from the language we use and the practices we are involved in. To say 
that the fact that cold fusion has not yet occurred does not in any way depend on practices related 
to electrochemistry and nanoscale nuclear reactions in general, and experiments involving 
electrolysis of heavy water in particular, is to say that it does not depend on the tradition 
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constituted by those practices – which is not what McDowell wants to claim. Rorty’s point 
criticized by McDowell in the passage above is certainly not that sheer consensus-based linguistic 
exchange is all that matters. What he means is that it makes little sense to look for a clear-cut 
divide between what we take to be the independent fact that cold fusion has not occurred, on the 
one hand, and how what happens when we learn about the fact, and what we are prepared to do 
when we use the expression “cold fusion” is integrated into other practices and conceptual 
frameworks. One might object that cold fusion is simply not there, whatever language one might 
use in order to tell someone else about it. It is independent as a fact, as something that happens as 
a result of our practices. But Rorty’s point is that, in any case, the human standpoint requires at 
least some language and some set of practices, as, without any of those, the fact that XYZ is no 
fact at all. When we subtract everything that is related to what the fact is for us, it becomes 
simply something, devoid of any determinations, of which, after Kant, we can only tell that, in 
some indeterminate sense, it is48. Conversely, as long as we are capable of using our language to 
describe what has not occurred, as well as of taking note of related matters and doing what our 
knowledge about the fact might require, as a fact, it remains attached to the system of concepts 
currently in use within our community. It is simply wrong – especially in view of McDowell’s 
analogy between experiences and language (or between facts and judgments) – to see the relation 
                                                          
48 I believe, Rorty’s argument in this case might go as follows. “Cold fusion” refers to a lot of things, 
including our general knowledge of nuclear reaction, practical skills that we needed in order to conduct 
experiments involving electrolysis of heavy water, our expectations of its possible uses and of how cold 
fusion, were it to occur, might change our very idea of matter and the laws of thermodynamics. If we 
take our time peeling off whatever “cold fusion” might mean for us in terms of all those things, and if we 
are thorough and honest in this undertaking, we will see before very long that, unless we want to hold on 
to the idea of something out there that cannot be described in terms of our expectations, our practices, 
and our know-hows, there is nothing left. Rorty’s point here (on which he is often misunderstood) is 
neither that the world consists of our practices, nor that “mere” consensus of opinions can replace the 
objectivity of facts. 
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between “being constituted by practices” and “being constituted by facts” as a matter of choice 
between two different things.  
From this point of view, what is properly external to individual acts of empirical thinking 
is not a collection of objective facts or contents, but the social understood as the interrelation 
between communal practices and environment. There is no social practice or language game that 
is “mere words” in this sense. As every object and fact of the world is linked to potential human 
action and loaded with, and in many ways constituted by, human values, we almost never merely 
say something. When I, for instance, act irresponsibly, make a mistake, lie, or report a result of a 
research which has already proven to be wrong, I neither perform brute acts, nor make up a 
convention that has nothing to do with my immediate environment and my real practical goals. I 
thereby take responsibility, but not before facts or contents, but before the way my community, 
which will correct me if I am wrong, defines those facts and contents as such. In light of this, it 
seems to be simply wrong to say, as McDowell does in his debate with Rorty, that there are sheer 
conventions different from customs and practices, where rational constraint based on the 
distinction between acts of thinking and conceptual contents is at work (McDowell 2000: 109-
122). From this perspective, As Barry Allen points out, Rorty is much closer to Wittgenstein’s 
later thought than McDowell, because, just like Wittgenstein, he claims that any “epistemic 
constraint” or “normative friction” is a matter of answerability to a way of life rather than to facts 
or contents (Allen 2005: 21-22). 
It might still be objected that, given that we speak different languages and come from 
different cultures, there should be some sort of guarantee that our linguistic practices store the 
same contents, or that in our critical reassessments of the stored contents we are open to the same 
regions of the conceptual. True, one of McDowell’s central theses is that we live in the same 
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world, and – since he believes in the possibility of an agreement regardless of possible differences 
in perception and cultural background49 – what the repository of tradition contains is available in 
any language. But since, as has already been pointed out, the human standpoint requires that there 
is at least some language (and let us suppose that the aforementioned analogy between language 
and experience holds), to use Richard Gaskin’s metaphor, the world, in this case, should be able 
to speak its own language (Gaskin 2006). Again, McDowell’s claim seems to be that we are 
ultimately capable of achieving an agreement between each other based on shared contents. It’s 
not enough to share either a form of communication, or normative presuppositions, social 
practices, or a charitable disposition toward others. And if every natural language is attuned to the 
standpoint that reveals the way the world really is, or the ultimate inferential conceptual structure 
whose every element can be retrieved from the repository by going sufficiently far back in an 
appropriate line of reasoning, then there should, in principle, be one universal language, in which 
the sphere of the conceptual finds its ultimate expression.  
To summarize, on the one hand, we have contents, which always come in conceptual 
bundles, but which are something more than simply nods in inferential networks. They are 
grounded in experience and are not defined exclusively in terms of the roles they play in defining 
what is a reason for what. They allow us to travel back and forth along the order of justification 
and ground our agreement in the way our social practices, interlocked individual perspectives, 
charitable attitudes, and shared competences are unable to ground it. Whereas both in Hegel’s and 
in Brandom’s case any agreement between different consciousnesses/scorekeepers is clearly 
formed in a recognitive and communal context, McDowell’s concern, according to Brandom, is 
mind, whose “cooperation with its fellow minds is simply not in the picture” (Brandom 1995: 256). 
                                                          
49 Although what the basis of this agreement is remains unclear, as none of the three theoretical 
backgrounds discussed in section 2.3 seems to fit McDowell’s purposes.   
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On the other hand, we have what McDowell calls “tradition”. On this account, our openness to 
the world is an outcome of the coherence of different stories of personal upbringing and initiation 
into customs, as well as of the history, throughout which tradition as a whole is developed and 
critically reassessed. But, whereas Hegel’s self-consciousness and Brandom’s trust are each 
formed by a distinct institutional story, McDowell (just like Brandom before he introduced his 
new approach in ST) doesn’t provide any details on how tradition actually comes about. Besides, 
from this historical perspective, McDowell’s understanding of the role of the social is also rather 
restrictive. In lecture five of MW McDowell makes a rather clear distinction between the 
objective and the social. He acknowledges that the social as a category is important, and that the 
very idea of Bildung would make little sense if that were not so. But he stipulates right away that 
“the point is not that the social constitutes the framework for a construction of the very idea of 
meaning” (MW: 95). It appears, then, that, while second nature opens us to the world, communal 
practices, by virtue of which tradition preserves our second-natural view, are not constitutive of 
how we mean what we mean50. 
As a result, what we have is two new extremes. On the one hand, it is what might be 
characterized as experience-based foundationalism without the Given (Williams 1999: 197), 
where conceptual contents play the role of unexplained explainers. On the other hand, it is a sort 
of coherentism, where some constraining friction with the world is secured by the self-corrective 
                                                          
50 Characteristically, in his debate with Dreyfus, McDowell claims that there is a level at which our skillful, 
but unreflective bodily practices that are performed “in flow” and easily interrupted by reflection (the 
ones we are involved in when playing chess, driving a car, etc.), are not part of our rational nature. In 
making this claim, McDowell doesn’t take into account the social background of these bodily skills, and 
misses the intimate connection between learning, coping with environment, unreflective implicit social 
norms, and conceptuality, which is emphasised greatly in the works of some of the classical American 
pragmatists (see, e.g., Levine 2015). 
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discourse of tradition, within which conceptual resources are stored and reassessed. In light of 
this, it seems like, instead of dismounting from the seesaw, we are still riding it, experiencing 
oscillations of somewhat reduced amplitude. 
To conclude, it might indeed seem that, whatever counterarguments we might offer, 
intuitively we are still going to need the world of hard facts as something distinct from mere 
words – at least every time things our current social practices force us to affirm are proven wrong 
(imagine, for instance, that, while I was writing this, cold fusion actually did occur). Meanwhile, 
as I will show in the next chapter, there is an option available that, on the one hand, allows us to 
salvage the idea of experience-based objectivity and, on the other hand, enables us to take a 
proper account of the social character of knowledge without falling prey to Rorty’s cultural 
relativism. In choosing this option, we will try and relate the notion of objectivity, not to the idea 
of the world that lays constraints on what we may learn from experience, but to a somewhat 
extended notion of a community. This notion would give way for an account of language not only 
as a repository of past experience and as a critical reassessment of the past, but also as a creative 
adaptational device capable of generating new meanings in the future. It will be shown that by 
appealing, not to perceptual experience, but to increasingly more and more elaborate and self-
critical, even if ever fallible, human practices, we can manage to keep the idea of objectivity 
intact and preserve every bit of the epistemological friction between thought and world that 
McDowell might deem necessary.  
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3. THE SOCIAL AND THE REAL: 
THE IDEAS OF REALITY AND OBJECTIVITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEIRCE’S SEMIOTICS AND HIS PRAGMATISM 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
According to Kant, what experience delivers is always a product not only of the world, but also 
of certain features of human constitution. The subject’s sensibility is affected by the world. As a 
result, by using fundamental in-built cognitive principles, or categories, the subject organizes 
experience and produces knowledge as an outcome of the category-constrained observation. 
Kant’s account of the nature of moral normativity is also based only on the features of the 
subject’s own rational agency. Reasons for being morally sound are rooted in the subject’s nature 
as a rational agent; they can neither be purely instrumental, nor originate from the subject’s 
egotistical interests, sympathies, or desires. 
Just like Brandom, Peirce, although he praised Kant on numerous occasions for the 
decisive emphasis he laid on the idea of architectonics (Nordmann 2006; Parker 1998: 2-59), 
does not follow Kant step by step, but aims to prove that each of the two theses, which represent 
the theoretical and the practical sides of Kant’s architectonics, can be consistently interpreted in 
terms of another without the resort to aesthetic mediation51. In Peirce’s case, this interpretation 
                                                          
51 In the period of time between the reformulation of his maxim of pragmatism in 1903 and the proof of 
pragmatism in MS 318 (1907), Peirce had actually proposed a view on aesthetics and made an attempt to 
build it in the framework of his own architectonics. In his attempt to incorporate aesthetics, Peirce aimed 
to connect his normative theory with his evolutionary metaphysics and his doctrine of categories (Potter 
1967, 3-71). However, this late view of Peirce’s on aesthetics is sketchy, undeveloped, and has no 
bearing on arguments in MS 318. 
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takes the form of an explanation of the relationship between his pragmatism and his semiotics or, 
more precisely, between his pragmatic maxim and his definition of a sign – an explanation Peirce 
himself saw as one of the ways to prove his version of pragmatism. The hints about how the 
relationship between pragmatism and semiotics works are scattered in various definitions Peirce 
gives of the pragmatic maxim through the 1900s, and in MS 318, which represents one of 
Peirce’s famous proofs of pragmatism, in particular52. Hookway (2005) lays special stress on the 
following three of Peirce’s formulations of the maxim: 
1. The initial formulation in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878): “Consider what 
effects that might conceivably have practical bearings we conceive the object of our conception 
to have. Then our conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object” (W3: 
266). 
2. The formulation from “Issues of Pragmaticism” (1905): “The entire intellectual purport 
of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which, conditionally 
upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the 
symbol” (1905, EP2: 346). 
3. The formulation from the first of Peirce’s Harvard Lectures (1903): “Pragmatism is the 
principle that every theoretical judgment expressible in a sentence in the indicative mood is a 
confused form of thought whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a 
                                                          
52 MS 318 (EP2: 398-433). For my present purposes I will also neglect the attempt to prove the pragmatist 
doctrine presented by Peirce in his 1903 Harvard Lectures (see Turrisi 1992; McCarthy 1990). Besides, 
by claiming that in his attempt to integrate his pragmatism with his semiotics, Peirce was inspired by 
Kant’s analysis of the relationship between logic and ethics, I, of course, do not mean to imply that one 
should treat semiotics as a logical side of Peirce’s theory, and pragmatism as an ethical side of it. I only 
mean to imply that there is a strong similarity between the two relationships. In what follows, this 
similarity will help us see the structural analogy between two arguments of Peirce’s in favor of his idea 
of a future community, on the one hand, and Brandom and McDowell’s ways to defend their notions of 
objectivity, on the other hand. 
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corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence having its apodosis in the 
imperative mood” (CP 5: 18; EP2: 354). 
The first formulation gives a pragmatist explanation of the meaning of a concept in terms 
of possible consequences of our actions involving an object to which the concept applies. 
According to this formulation, the meaning of a concept depends on our capacity to predict 
practical outcomes of our interaction with the object – which is to say that what concepts mean is 
relative to what we do with their objects. Meanings do not lie in what either rationalists or 
empiricists called “ideas”, but they are grounded solely in outcomes of a purposeful human 
behavior. Our interactions with the object of a concept result in certain effects; these latter have 
practical bearings on us, and our account of them is the principal ingredient of the meaning of the 
appropriate concept. For example, our knowledge of certain properties of a vinegar amounts to 
our knowledge of what to expect when we perform a variety of actions involving a portion of it. 
Were we, say, to dip a piece of litmus paper into it, the paper would turn red; were we to put 
foods into it, these foods would eventually get pickled; were we to decide to make more vinegar, 
we would have to initiate the fermentation of ethanol by acetic acid bacteria; etc. 
The second formulation uses a semiotic vocabulary in explaining meaning. It tells us that 
the meaning of what Peirce calls a “symbol” consists in our conditional resolutions to act in case 
we believe that what the symbol conveys is true. Believing that “vinegar is an acidic liquid” is 
true amounts to acquiring a habit of action, i.e. being prepared, given the appropriate 
circumstances, to use a litmus paper, to pickle foods, to perform the fermentation of ethanol by 
acetic acid bacteria, etc. The third formulation reconciles the other two by saying that, if we 
endorsed the expression “vinegar is an acidic liquid”, we would acquire a habit of using a variety 
of conditionals the expression entails, each of which would be a maxim of action that entails 
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practical consequences if acted upon: “Were you to dip a piece of litmus paper into this liquid, 
the paper would turn red”; “Were you to put foods into it, these foods would eventually get 
pickled”; “Were you to decide to make more vinegar, you would have to initiate the fermentation 
of ethanol by acetic acid bacteria”; etc.53 
In this chapter, I will deal with the relationship between pragmatism and semiotics 
implied in the three versions of the maxim quoted above. I will not follow the way Peirce 
explains this relationship in his proof of pragmatism in MS 318, but I will simply show that the 
idea of this relationship may be traced back to Peirce’s early writings and that it is grounded in 
Peirce’s early Hegelian reinterpretation of Kant’s constructivism. My claim is that once we 
unpack this relationship, we will see that the notion of future community of inquirers that will 
emerge will be able to provide all the necessary justification for the idea of objectivity. 
 
 
3.2. Peirce’s transcendental deduction: “On a New List of Categories” and beyond 
“On a New List of Categories”54 is an early paper presented by Peirce to the American Academy 
of Arts and Sciences in 1867. In this paper, Peirce brings himself into a dialogue with Kant and 
responds to issues scrutinized in Kant's 1st Critique. In spite of its small size, the paper represents 
                                                          
53 To rephrase those conditionals more in the spirit of the third formulation, which requires apodoses to be 
in the imperative mood, “If a piece of litmus paper is to turn red, dip it into this liquid,” “If more vinegar 
is to be produced, initiate the fermentation of ethanol by acetic acid bacteria,” etc. All these formulations 
vary in wording, but not in essence. All of them lay stress on the fact that the meanings of descriptions 
consist of sets of conditional propositions appropriately indicating what to expect from interactions with 
objects to which these descriptions apply. All of them suggest that to mean something is to think over 
possible practical effects of what we do in order to adapt to our environment and to pursue our goals in a 
variety of relevant hypothetical situations.   
54 Henceforth NL. 
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a highly significant achievement for Peirce, who confessed that the text was his “one contribution 
to philosophy” (CP 8.213), although “perhaps the least unsatisfactory, from a logical point of 
view, that I ever succeeded in producing; and for a long time most of the modifications I 
attempted of it only led me further wrong” (CP 2.340). As Murray Murphey claims, “certainly of 
all Peirce's published papers there is none which is so cryptic in its statement of essentials, so 
ambiguous in its definition of terms, so obscure in its formulation of the central doctrine, or so 
important in its content.” (Murphey 1961: 66). Short (2007) suggests that Peirce’s main goal in 
the paper was to demonstrate the necessity of his categories a priori – the project that was later 
abandoned by Peirce and that “has, indeed, been a stumbling block to those who have tried to 
understand his later thought in its terms.” (Short 2007: 32). But whatever the approaches to and 
opinions about NL are, this paper is the first published statement of Peirce’s ideas that allowed 
him to amplify De Morgan’s logic of relations (Kremer-Marietti 1994), and later helped him 
develop his ontological doctrine of categories, which he called firstness, secondness, and 
thirdness, and thus reinvent Kant’s transcendental philosophy in a pragmatic context (Gava 2014: 
154). It is the categories that provide the underlying unity to Peirce's thought and embody the 
triadic structure, which, at least in Peirce’s early works, exemplifies a Hegelian dialectic – the 
fact that Esposito (1980) takes to be the key to Peirce’s entire system. 
Peirce’s line of argument in NL is as follows. In dealing with sensuous experience, in 
Kantian terms, all that we have is a manifold of impressions which cannot be gathered into an 
immediately perceived totality. This manifold is given in a pure sensible intuition which is based 
on the receptivity of consciousness, but, according to Kant, “the combination of a manifold in 
general can never come to us through the senses, and cannot, therefore, be already contained in 
the pure form of sensible intuition” (KRV: B 130). The combination is only possible due to a set 
of universal concepts that help us make the sensual manifold into unity, so that the unity could be 
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expressed in a propositional form55. These universal concepts have to be deduced – in the sense 
that Peirce, just like Kant, wants to show that the universal concepts, or categories, are necessary, 
and that there can be neither experience, nor understanding without the application of the 
categories to the manifold of experience. However, for Kant, without the application of the 
categories, as a priori elements necessary for the unity of understanding, there could also be no 
self-identical subject of knowledge. As we will see, Peirce’s deduction has radically different 
implications in this respect.  
Although the effort Peirce makes in NL is based on the acceptance of Kant's method of 
deduction, he is obviously not convinced by the results of the deduction. Kant’s own table 
consists of four triads: Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality. As Buzzelli (1972) notes, 
“Peirce discovered that each of these triads was intrinsically related to some other part of the 
table. In other words, the four classes of categories were not independent of one another, but 
rather depended on some more fundamental structure that Kant had not observed” (Buzzelli 
1972: 64). Peirce, therefore, sets to deduce a new list of conceptions that would be both 
elementary and universal – in the sense of being inevitably involved in any experience, whether 
actual or possible. Just as, in Kant’s case, these universal concepts are used in order to reduce the 
manifold of sensuous impressions to a unity expressible in a propositional form, in Peirce’s case, 
they are used in order to bring substance (what is, in the most general sense, present) to the unity 
of being. It is important to note that Peirce’s list represents a logical continuity between the 
manifold of impressions and concepts, and that concepts, therefore, are not self-standing abstract 
                                                          
55 Or, as Peirce prefers to put it, make a sensual manifold into the unity of a proposition: “The unity to 
which the understanding reduces impressions is the unity of a proposition. This unity consists in the 
connection of the predicate with the subject; and, therefore, that which is implied in the copula, or the 
conception of being, is that which completes the work of conceptions of reducing the manifold to unity” 
(W2: 49).  
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entities independent from the sensuous manifold provided by experience. By the end of NL three 
elementary conceptions are deduced – quality, relation, and representation – in addition to being 
and substance, which are not derived but are simply postulated in NL as marking the beginning 
and end of Peirce’s deduction. The text makes it clear that the deduction works both ways (from 
being to substance and vice versa). The results of the deduction are ordered in the following 
manner (W 2: 54-55): 
BEING (What is) 
Quality 
Relation 
Representation  
SUBSTANCE (it) 
As has been noted, substance and being are not derived. They simply mark the beginning and the 
end of the analysis and in Peirce’s later works are dropped altogether. In §3 of NL Peirce 
introduces the concept of substance: 
That universal conception which is nearest to sense is that of the present, in general. This is a 
conception, because it is universal. But as the act of attention has no connotation at all, but is the 
pure denotative power of the mind, that is to say, the power which directs the mind to an object, in 
contradistinction to the power of thinking any predicate of that object, – so the conception of what 
is present in general, which is nothing but the general recognition of what is contained in 
attention, has no connotation, and therefore no proper unity. This conception of the present in 
general, of IT in general, is rendered in philosophical language by the word "substance" in one of 
its meanings. Before any comparison or discrimination can be made between what is present, 
what is present must have been recognized as such, as it, and subsequently the metaphysical parts 
which are recognized by abstraction are attributed to this it, but the it cannot itself be made a 
predicate. This it is thus neither predicated of a subject, nor in a subject, and accordingly is 
identical with the conception of substance. 
(W2: 49) 
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Substance marks the beginning of the deduction. It is the conception of that which is “nearest to 
sense” – or, as McDowell puts it, the contents which “sit closest to the impacts of the world on 
our sensibility” (MW: 11). It refers to “the present, in general,” to that which is merely 
recognized as some indeterminate contents of an act of attention, an “it”, or “this”. Peirce’s 
“substance” is, no doubt, reminiscent of Hegel’s “sense-certainty”, the chapter on which ends up 
with the unity of consciousness and its object being reduced to a set of universals referring to an 
inexpressible manifold of “this”. §4 of NL introduces the concept of being: 
The unity to which the understanding reduces impressions is the unity of a proposition. This unity 
consist in the connection of the predicate with the subject; and, therefore, that which is implied in 
the copula, or the conception of being, is that which completes the work of conceptions of 
reducing the manifold to unity.  
(ibid.) 
With the concept of being obtained the deduction of the manifold to unity is complete and the 
transcendental apperception, which signifies the unity of consciousness, is achieved (KRV: 
A106). The first conception that mediates between the two is that of Quality:  
A proposition always has, besides a term to express the substance, another to express the quality 
of that substance; and the function of the conception of being is to unite the quality to the 
substance. Quality, therefore, in its very widest sense, is the first conception in order in passing 
from being to substance. 
(W2: 52) 
In the proposition “this stove is black” “this stove” is a more immediate concept (that of 
substance), and “black” is a more mediate one (that of a quality). Since the proposition asserts the 
applicability of the latter to the former, “the more mediate conception is clearly regarded 
independently of this circumstance, for otherwise the two conceptions would not be 
distinguished, but one would be thought through the other, without this latter being an object of 
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thought, at all” (W2: 52). In other words, in bringing some one thing into correlation with some 
other thing, we can comprehend the correlation (say, a contrast or an agreement) as a correlation 
of two things in some respect. We need to draw upon a qualitative aspect (e.g. “blackness”) 
which should first be considered, not as applied to an object, but as it is in itself. As considered in 
this way, it can be nothing but an abstraction, a universal, or “ground”. Quality, therefore, is 
something only possible, or potential, i.e. it is something we think about only in abstracto: 
blackness as such is not something that can be actualized in an object, but a concrete 
manifestation of it. 
Reference to a ground cannot do all the work necessary to bring the manifold of sense-
impressions to unity, because we can predicate a quality only by means of contrasting it with (or 
recognizing its analogy to) something else, its correlate. Reference to a correlate (or relation of 
some one thing to some other) is in place on some concrete occasion of reference to a ground. By 
actually claiming that “this stove is black”, we recognize the fact that a quality is actually 
integrated into the constitution of an object. Thus formulated, it reminds us of Brandom’s 
inferentialist stance in semantics: whenever we comprehend some one thing, we comprehend its 
relation to some other thing. For example, whenever we think about a murderer, we think of him 
in relation to a murdered person, and whenever we think of an equivalent of “man” in French, we 
find “homme” appropriate – with all further implications involving likenesses and contrasts 
presupposed by those correlates. Whereas quality is something potential and abstract, relation is 
always about some actual matter of fact. Relation is a conception that accounts for externality, it 
refers to something other, i.e., something external to a quality taken as such. 
In addition to quality and relation, on every occasion of reference to a correlate we also 
conceive a third element that mediates between the other two. Looking for the word “homme” in 
a French dictionary, for instance, will lead us to the word “man” “which, so placed, represents 
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homme as representing the same two-legged creature which man itself represents” (W2: 53). 
Peirce calls this mediating representation an interpretant, “because it fulfills the office of an 
interpreter, who says that a foreigner says the same thing which he himself says” (W2: 54). Just 
like an interpreter is a middle-man, who says something (for instance, “this stove is black”) and, 
in doing so, also says that he says the same thing as does a foreigner, Peirce’s interpretant is 
defined as “a mediating representation which represents the relate to be a representation of the 
same correlate which this mediating representation itself represents” (W2: 53).  
The example with an interpreter of a foreigner is an interesting one. On the face of it, it is 
not intuitively clear why interpreting one sign into another should represent a paradigm case 
here. Can a dictionary entry, as representing a relationship between two signs, be considered as 
belonging to a general class, which includes the case of one sign in its relation to what it 
designates? Although the answer to this question is not in the text of “On a New List”, it can be 
found in “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities56,” a paper which Peirce published less than a 
year after NL, in 1868, and which contains Peirce’s outline of the anti-Cartesian project he 
actively pursued throughout 1860s. In SC Peirce rejects Kant’s reference to human “capacities” 
in explanation of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge, and proposes his own list of four 
in-capacities that he considered as four necessary constituents of human condition57. According 
to Peirce, we are incapable of 1) introspection, 2) intuition, 3) thinking without signs, and 4) 
making any use of the idea of the absolutely incognizable. All these incapacities are related to 
                                                          
56 Henceforth SC. 
57 Interestingly enough, 18 years after Peirce’s publication similar terminological critique was used by 
Nietzsche. In his Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche ridicules the Kantian explanation of the possibility of 
synthetic judgments a priori by the reference to “capacities”, or “faculties” (Vermögen), when he 
famously quotes the doctor from Moliere’s The Imaginary Invalid: “How does opium induce sleep?” “By 
means of virtus dormitiva, or its capacity to do so” (Nietzsche 2008: I, 11). 
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each other, but the central part of the project is the denial of intuitions, which Peirce takes to be a 
key assumption of Cartesian philosophy. Peirce defines intuition as “a cognition not determined 
by a previous cognition of the same object” (W2. 193). If we accept the second incapacity, 
according to which our cognition does not presuppose anything simply given in intuition, then, 
since, according to the third incapacity, all cognition is in signs, the object Peirce mentions in the 
quote above itself should be (or should be capable of functioning as) a sign. If we do not accept 
it, we should acknowledge that the object is not an object of cognition, which contradicts the 
fourth incapacity. Finally, since every sign, even if it is not actually interpreted, should be 
capable of being interpreted (should be interpret-able), it should have its interpretant, so that the 
interpretant could address it to some interpretation in the future. Now the question above can 
receive its answer: As cognition is always a relation between signs, a relation of one sign to what 
it designates is always, in the end, a relation between many signs. 
The last step of Peirce’s deduction may be best presented by the comparison between the 
following well-known paragraphs from Kant’s “Transcendental Analytic” and NL: 
(Kant): For the empirical consciousness which accompanies different representations is in 
itself diverse and without relation to the identity of the subject. That relation comes about, 
not simply through my accompanying each representation with consciousness, but only in 
so far as I conjoin one representation with another, and am conscious of the synthesis of 
them. Only in so far, therefore, as I can unite a manifold of given representations in one 
consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to myself the identity of the consciousness 
in these representations. In other words, the analytic unity of apperception is possible only 
under the presupposition of a certain synthetic unity. The thought that the representations 
given in intuition one and all belong to me, is therefore equivalent to the thought that I unite 
them in one self-consciousness, or can at least so unite them; and although this thought is 
not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of the representations, it presupposes the 
possibility of that synthesis. In other words, only in so far as I can grasp the manifold of the 
representations in one consciousness, do I call them one and all mine. For otherwise I 
should have as many-colored and diverse a self as I have representations of which I am 
conscious to myself. 
(KRV: B133) 
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(Peirce): If we had but one impression, it would not require to be reduced to unity, and 
would therefore not need to be thought of as referred to an interpretant, and the conception 
of reference to an interpretant would not arise. But since there is a manifold of impressions, 
we have a feeling of complication or confusion, which leads us to differentiate this 
impression from that, and then, having been differentiated, they require to be brought to 
unity. Now they are not brought to unity until we conceive them together as being ours, that 
is, until we refer them to a conception as their interpretant. Thus, the reference to an 
interpretant arises upon the holding together of diverse impressions, and therefore it does 
not join a conception to the substance, as the other two references do, but unites directly the 
manifold of the substance itself. It is, therefore, the last conception in order in passing from 
being to substance. 
 (W2: 54) 
As the first passage from Kant’s “Analytic of Concepts” indicates, for Kant self-
consciousness implies that the notion “I think” must accompany all other notions for them to be 
comprehensible. What I need, according to Kant, is a thought of some special kind which, 
although it does not amount to the consciousness of the synthesis itself, should be there for 
the synthesis to be possible: I need to be able to grasp the manifold of impressions as mine. 
The second passage describes Peirce’s interpretant, which, unlike the Kantian self-
consciousness, preserves “as many-colored and diverse a self” as there are representations. If we 
combine what Peirce says in the passage with his comparison of an interpretant with an 
interpreter, we will arrive at the following conclusion. An interpretant unites the manifold of 
impressions not in one consciousness identified by the Kantian “I think”, but in a general idea of 
interpretation by correlating those impressions to each other in such a way as to give rise to 
something the correlation of which to something else is the only guarantee of its comprehen-
siveness. And it is in so correlating various parts of the manifold to each other that the 
impressions are grasped as ours. By allowing us to so grasp the impressions, the interpretant 
replaces the Kantian synthesis of apperception in a single self-consciousness with the idea of an 
intersubjective synthesis of meaning addressed to future interpretation. As Apel (1980) puts it, 
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Peirce re-describes the conditions of the possibility of knowledge by shifting attention from the 
domain of the Kantian pure consciousness to the domain of the consciousness that is 
linguistically and intersubjectively constituted (Apel 1980: Ch. 3). Like Brandom, Peirce tries to 
get rid of any kind of subjectivist approach to understanding and interpretation. 
To sum up, there are two points that are important to keep in mind as to the idea of 
interpretant. First, NL describes the synthesis of impressions not as an “art concealed in the 
depths of the human soul” (KRV, B 180), but as a continuous act of correlation. In reinterpreting 
Kant, Peirce, just like Hegel, makes the possibility of knowledge depend on the synthesis taken as 
a process of continuous development. According to Peirce, the synthesis acquires cognitive value 
through a set of modes of reference – quality, relation, and representation – which constitute three 
consecutive steps to cover what might be called “a logical distance” between the manifold of 
impressions and their conceptual unity. The last mediating reference, which is embodied in an 
interpretant, Peirce claims, “does not join a conception to the substance, as the other two 
references do, but unites directly the manifold of the substance itself” in the recognition of this 
unity as ours (W2: 54).  
Second, the fact that Peirce, contrary to Kant, insists that we should consider 
understanding not as the capacity to grasp the manifold of impressions in one consciousness, but as 
a result of the correlation to something else, entails that understanding is a function of the 
reference to the future. What is important is not that I grasp the impressions as mine, but that 
representations resulting from the synthesis of those impressions are, in principle, interpretable 
by others. As the process of interpretation, conceived in this manner, is necessarily an open-
ended one, the “We,” the proper subject of the synthesis, cannot be limited to any finite 
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community existing at some particular moment of time. It can only be a future community, a 
community “without definite limits, and capable of definite increase in knowledge” (W2: 239). In 
Kant’s case, for any set of representations to mean something to me, the “I think” must be able to 
accompany all these representations (KRV B131-32) so that I could grasp them all as mine. In 
Peirce’s case, for any set of representations to mean something to me, an interpretant addressing 
future interpretations of those representations must be able to accompany them in order for them 
to be interpretable by others. 
The way Peirce defines a future community in SC is closely related to the idea of reality:  
And what do we mean by the real? It is a conception which we must first have had when we 
discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion; that is, when we first corrected ourselves. Now 
the distinction for which alone this fact logically called, was between an ens relative to private 
inward determinations, to the negations belonging to idiosyncrasy, and an ens such as would stand 
in the long run. The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would 
finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very 
origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a 
community, without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of knowledge. And so those 
two series of cognition – the real and the unreal – consist of those which, at a time sufficiently 
future, the community will always continue to re-affirm; and of those which, under the same 
conditions, will ever after be denied. Now, a proposition whose falsity can never be discovered, 
and the error of which therefore is absolutely incognizable, contains, upon our principle, 
absolutely no error. Consequently, that which is thought in these cognitions is the real, as it really 
is. There is nothing, then, to prevent our knowing outward things as they really are, and it is most 
likely that we do thus know them in numberless cases, although we can never be absolutely 
certain of doing so in any special case.  
 (W2: 239) 
There is a lot packed into this passage. As Peirce suggests here, reality initially gives itself 
through the discovery of the fact that some of our beliefs are erroneous or have objects that are 
illusory, unreal. But errors made by individuals are distinguished from, and corrected by, a 
communal inquiry which is destined to result, sooner or later, in the state of complete 
information, the latter being the final goal towards which every inquiry should be ultimately 
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directed58. In correcting errors, the inquiry results in two sets of beliefs: ones that it will reaffirm 
and ones that it will deny until sometime sufficiently far into the future. Another important 
implication of the passage is that the notion of an extended community guarantees that we will 
have knowledge about things as they really are in the long run, and that it does not prevent us 
from having such knowledge on numerous occasions at any given moment of time – whereas, for 
instance, according to Brandom, we have no guarantee that we will ever be capable of having a 
full grip on what is ultimately the case. Moreover, it is highly important for Brandom to 
acknowledge that what is ultimately the case is plainly and clearly out of our expressive reach, 
being only implicit in our discursive practices. Of course, having objective normative statuses 
implicit in discourse, just as having the future community in view, affects our current decisions. 
That much is true in both cases. But, in Brandom’s case, in the absence of the method that could 
tell us how our beliefs are to be fixed, all we can hope for is perspectival objectivity understood 
as some sort of interpretative equilibrium – an equilibrium which Brandom defines as the 
situation in which “external interpretation collapses into internal scorekeeping” (MIE: 644)59. 
Meanwhile, in Peirce’s case, although the reference to the future community cannot make us 
absolutely certain about actually having objective knowledge on any particular occasion, given 
that we follow the maxim (i.e., if we approach the meaning of every concept we use as a sum 
total of outcomes of our possible interactions with the objects to which the concept applies), it 
                                                          
58 On implications of this idea with regard to Peirce’s notion of final causation see Short 2007: 117-150. 
59 As discussed in section 1.3. 
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makes us justified in holding our beliefs and treat them as true in terms of their contents, not just 
their perspectival form60.  
As Peirce indicates further in the text of NL, his list of the universal concepts, or 
categories, which constitute his account of the most basic structure of experience, leads directly 
to his first classification of signs, or, as he puts it in NL, “modes of representation”. Thus, 
Peirce’s reinterpreting Kant’s idea of the synthesis of impressions is, at the same time, an 
introduction to a rudimentary idea of a sign. The classification in NL is the least developed one 
and comprises what Peirce calls likenesses, indices, and symbols – the three elements each of 
which receives in NL only a brief sentence-long definition, likenesses being “those whose 
relation to their objects is a mere community in some quality”, indices – “those whose relation to 
their objects consists in a correspondence in fact” and symbols, or general signs – “those the 
ground of whose relation to their objects is an imputed character” (W2: 56). 
It is to be remembered that NL is an early paper that treats the categories as a set of basic 
concepts that help us make the sensual manifold into the unity of a proposition. In other words, 
Peirce first approaches his new list from a logical, or nominalist, not an ontological, or realist 
point of view. However, an overwhelming consensus among Peirce scholars is that there is an 
                                                          
60 It is also noteworthy that Peirce defines reality, on the one hand, as that which is thought in cognitions, 
and, on the other hand, as that which is independent from what you or I might think about it. This 
definition, on the face of it, seems to be similar to that of McDowell. According to McDowell, on the one 
hand, reality is located within the boundary of the conceptual (i.e. it is not independent from thinkable 
contents – simply because there is nothing at all utterly external to them), and, on the other hand, it is 
independent from our acts of thinking (MW: 28). However, as I will show in the next section, Peirce’s 
pragmatism, which approaches the ideas of reality and objective knowledge in terms of habitual action, 
combines McDowell’s realism about conceptual content and Brandom’s phenomenalism about 
interpretive practices, and thus eschews the above-discussed problems both of these approaches face with 
regard to the idea of objectivity. 
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unbroken continuity in the development of Peirce’s thought61. Besides, for instance, Lane (2004) 
provides an elaborate account showing that Peirce’s thought reveals some strong realist intuitions 
as early as 1868, the year SC was published in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy. In any 
case, the development of Peirce’s theory of signs over time is a vast research area that is far 
beyond the scope of the present account. All that matters for the present case is that Peirce’s 
thought is continuous and that its connection with Kant at any given point of its development, by 
Peirce’s own admission, should not be questioned. Peirce did divert gradually from the strictly 
Kantian way, but, in his late recollections, he noted that, in the years following NL, his “Kantism 
got whittled down to small dimensions. It was little more than a wire, – an iron wire, however.” 
(MS 317). 
 With all this in mind, we can use some of the elements of Peirce’s late semiotics in order 
to describe how exactly the results of Peirce’s early interpretation of Kant’s transcendental 
deduction of categories lead to the basic ideas of his theory of signs and, in particular, how 
Peirce’s early notion of interpretant as the unity of impressions in recognition of those 
impressions as being “ours” is related to Peirce’s seeking to ground the objectivity of knowledge 
in the social nature of inquiry and thus emphasising the role played by the future community of 
inquirers. That said, Peirce’s early trichotomy of categories (quality, relation, and representation) 
may be restated in more general terms as comprising abstractions, experiences, and signs, or, in 
different terms, firstness, secondness, and thirdness. 
1) An abstraction, or a universal is a quality that is a one predicable of many. It equals 
itself, refers to nothing but itself, and is never present in experience in its entirety (to say “this 
                                                          
61 But see Goudge 1950. 
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stove is black” is not to say that blackness itself is in the stove). A universal, or a quality is not an 
actual object; it is an absolute “here and now”. Like in the case of Hegel’s sense-certainty, we are 
incapable of actually saying what in this sense-certainty we really mean due to the immediacy by 
which it is characterised. In his later writings Peirce calls this immediacy “firstness”. According 
to his own description, 
[…] there are certain qualities of feeling, such as the color of magenta, the odor of attar, the sound 
of a railway whistle, the taste of quinine, the quality of the emotion upon contemplating a fine 
mathematical demonstration, the quality of feeling of love, etc. I do not mean the sense of actually 
experiencing these feelings, whether primarily or in any memory or imagination. That is 
something that involves these qualities as an element of it. But I mean the qualities themselves 
which, in themselves, are mere may-bes, not necessarily realized. 
(CP 1.304) 
2) A thing or a matter of fact is something the existence of which follows from 
experience. It never equals itself, because, unlike a quality, it cannot be simply given. The 
existence of a thing or a matter of fact is always known only through one’s acquaintance with 
some other thing or fact with which the former is causally connected. In other words, the 
existence of a thing or a matter of fact can become an object of knowledge only in view of its 
relation to some other thing or fact. Thus, for instance, a weathervane is causally connected with 
the direction of the wind, or the mercury stem in a thermometer is causally connected with the 
temperature). Peirce calls this kind of mutual relatedness “secondness”. According to Peirce, 
[There is a category] which the rough and tumble of life renders most familiarly prominent. We 
are continually bumping up against hard fact. […] You get this kind of consciousness in some 
approach to purity when you put your shoulder against a door and try to force it open. You have a 
sense of resistance and at the same time a sense of effort. […] It is a double consciousness. We 
become aware of our self in becoming aware of the not-self.  
CP 1.324 
Whenever we have a perception of something, there is secondness at play. In a muscular effort, in 
an act of attention, in hearing the sound of a train whistle, in having one memory interrupted 
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another, etc. – in all those cases we experience a kind of forcefulness characteristic of the double 
consciousness Peirce called secondness. Secondness is not something extraneous to firstness: as a 
possibility is an element of actuality, and actuality is a possibility actualized, secondness 
incorporates firstness. 
3)  A sign is something that connects abstractions and experience and shares the 
characteristics of both. Like a quality, it is a one predicable of many, and, like a thing, it never 
equals itself because it always stands for something that it itself isn’t. A sign’s identity, in other 
words, is in its reference to something else: whenever there is a sign, there is a reference to some 
other quality, thing, or fact. However, unlike something that is “merely” a thing as defined in 2), 
it refers to its object not through causal connection (an outcome that McDowell regarded as a 
highly unwelcome one), but through a connection by means of habits. Thus, a phrase, an 
expression of sentiment, or a theatre ticket are all examples of a sign. Each of these is a concrete 
occurrence, (a fact, or an object) which is characterised by some quality (a loud phrase, a joyful 
expression, a paper ticket), refers to something it itself is not (a norm prescribing how to 
understand the phrase, react to the expression, use the ticket) by means of expected habitual 
behavior, and in virtue of this provides some ground for its future interpretation by someone: I 
use “How are you doing?” to greet a friend, a ticket ensures my access to a theatre performance, 
and I express joy when I win a lottery. In these examples, a sign brings together (or, in Kant’s 
terms, performs a synthesis of) the concept of a thing, the concept of a quality that grounds the 
relation of this thing to something else, and a concept of behavioral outcomes that the use of this 
sign implies for an interpreter. This relational structure mediating between things, thoughts about 
those things, and habits of action entailed by those thoughts Peirce calls “thirdness”. 
137 
 
In his later writings Peirce often stressed the dependence of logic on phenomenology62, 
which “ascertains and studies the kinds of elements universally present in the phenomenon”, 
where the phenomenon is defined as “whatever is present at any time to the mind in any way” 
(CP 2.186; emphasis added). Consequently, in Peirce’s late semiotics, firstness, secondness, and 
thirdness do not just describe what is required to achieve the unity of a proposition, but become 
the three indispensable general characteristics, or elements that can be found in experience of all 
kinds by observation. However, besides phenomenological interpretation, Peirce also suggests an 
ontological one, which, in turn, is closely related to the modal understanding of the three 
categories as possibility, actuality, and necessity63. If, phenomenologically speaking, the 
categories are what is observed by the mind, from the ontological standpoint, they are also modes 
of being. Here is Peirce’s descriptions of the first two modes of being: 
Firstness is the mode of being which consists in its subject’s being positively such as it is 
regardless of anything else. That can only be a possibility. For as long as things do not act upon 
one another, there is no sense or meaning in saying that they have any being, unless it be that they 
are such in themselves that they may perhaps come into relation with others. The mode of being a 
redness, before anything in the universe was yet red, was nevertheless a positive qualitative 
possibility.  
(CP 1.25) 
If I ask you what the actuality of an event consists in, you will tell me that it consists in its 
happening then and there. The specifications then and there involve all its relations to other 
existents. The actuality of the event seems to lie in its relations to the universe of existents. A 
court may issue injunctions and judgments against me and I not care a snap of my finger for them. 
I may think them idle vapor. But when I feel the sheriff’s hand on my shoulder, I shall begin to 
have a sense of actuality. Actuality is something brute. There is no reason in it. […] On the whole, 
I think we have here a mode of being of one thing which consists in how a second object is.  
(CP 1.24) 
                                                          
62 See, e.g. CP 1.191, 2.120, 5.39, 8.297. 
63 See Short 2007: 60-90. 
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But the most important is the ontological interpretation of the third category. To begin 
with, Peirce makes a rather clear distinction between actuality as a characteristic of secondness, 
which pertains to the universe of facts and things that exist here and now, and reality as a 
characteristic of thirdness, which pertains to would-bes always expressed in a set of conditional 
expectations. Reality is also something that consists in laws and regularities, where the laws 
being real means appropriate counterfactuals being true. This realist understanding of the nature 
of laws Peirce contradistinguishes with the nominalist interpretation of laws as mere words: 
If the prediction has a tendency to be fulfilled, it must be that future events have a tendency to 
conform to a general rule. “Oh,” but say the nominalists, “this general rule is nothing but a mere 
word or couple of words!” I reply, “Nobody ever dreamed of denying that what is general is of the 
nature of a general sign; but the question is whether future events will conform to it or not. If they 
will, your adjective ‘mere’ seems to be ill-placed.” A rule to which future events have a tendency 
to conform is ipso facto an important thing, an important element in the happening of those 
events. This mode of being which consists […] in the fact that future facts of Secondness will take 
on a determinate general character, I call Thirdness.  
(CP 1.26) 
Whereas actual objects, facts, or events, as concrete realizations of would-bes, belong to 
the second category and their relation to each other is characterized by the brute causal force, 
would-bes and would-dos are “thirdnesses” and are real as far as they lay constraint on our 
thought and conduct64. Moreover, would-bes represent law-like regularities and therefore, 
according to Peirce, cannot be reduced to any finite collection of facts or events: “No collection 
of facts can constitute a law; for the law goes beyond any accomplished facts and determines how 
facts that may be, but all of which never can have happened, shall be characterized” (CP 1.420)65. 
Reality, which characterizes general objects, cannot be exhausted by actuality – any more than 
                                                          
64 See also Hausman 1993: 167-168. 
65 Elsewhere, Peirce also makes the following statement: “No agglomeration of actual happenings can ever 
completely fill the meaning of a ‘would-be’” (CP 5.467). 
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the Greek language, when we talk or think about it, can be reduced to such Greek words as we 
happen to use at the time we do so (CP 5.504). A law is, of course, always present in the way 
actual events interact in appropriate circumstances, but it cannot be exhausted by all events that 
did, or ever will, exemplify it. If reality could be exhausted by actuality, no normativity would be 
even remotely possible: we would be able to talk only about what there is, and would not be able 
to tell anything at all about what there ought to be.  
There is nothing either mysterious or excessively metaphysical about this kind of realism. 
First, taking the possible future thought into consideration (i.e. conceptualizing possible 
outcomes of actions one is prepared to perform) obviously affects what one does here and now. It 
is real in this respect. It does so not simply causally (in the way actual objects affect each other), 
but in terms of conforming to or correcting one’s habits – not just actions, but modes of conduct. 
Thus, the possible future in affecting and correcting our habits, introduces an element of self-
control both to our thought and to our conduct. For instance, if our study of the relationship of 
temperature and pressure of an ideal gas heated in a closed container showed that the ideal 
equation pV = nRT doesn’t hold, we would have to seek what might have introduced an error. 
This would entail making changes to the initial setting, checking the equipment, revaluating some 
of our basic assumptions about residual properties, and then repeating the experiment.  
From this, ontological perspective, categories are not just Kantian basic a priori concepts 
that, applied to the forms of intuition, allow us to form judgments about the phenomenal world. 
They are essential features of the world itself. To be, therefore, is to partake in the nature of the 
categories and, ultimately, to be is to be a sign. As Max Fisch notes, at this point “Peirce's general 
theory of signs [becomes] so general as to entail that, whatever else anything may be, it is also a 
sign” (Fisch 1986: 357).  
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By a “sign” in his late writings Peirce broadly means anything (a thought, an emotion, a 
fantasy, an existent physical object, a natural kind, an instrument, the word “instrument,” a 
legislative representative, a musical concerto, an action, a game rule, a law of nature – anything 
at all) capable of standing for something else in some respect to something or someone which or 
who can interpret it. Thus, “Santiago” in “Charles Santiago Sanders Peirce” stands for “Saint 
James” to a scholar who can interpret it further as an expression of Peirce’s gratitude to his friend 
William James; “Rg6+ Rg7” stands for the inevitability of checkmate in game six of the 1972 
Spassky-Fischer World Chess Championship, to Spassky who, while thinking over his next 
move, was prepared to resign; Malevich’s “Black Square” stands for an application of the rules 
explaining the basic relations between form and color in suprematism to an art critic who is 
planning to use it in the book on the theory of avant-garde he is writing; “Porgy and Bess” stands 
for the commercial failure which made George Gershwin move to Hollywood; a law of nature 
stands for a matter of dispute between the Humeans and the necessitarians; “10” stands for 
“impossible to be scratched by a piece of corundum” when taken as a description of diamond’s 
hardness according to Mohs’ scale; etc., etc. There is thus an irreducibly triadic relation among a 
sign, its object, and an interpretant. Now since everything there is is a sign, and every sign, as an 
outcome of an intelligent synthesizing activity (as described in Kant’s “Analytic of Principles” 
and in Peirce’s NL) is an object of cognition, there is nothing beyond signs as objects that are in 
principle cognizable – or, as McDowell would put it, the world is open to us, and the sphere of 
the conceptual has no outer boundary66.  
                                                          
66 In Peirce’s case, this openness necessarily presupposes fallibilism about knowledge, which, as I will 
show in the next section, helps Peirce make sense of the idea of objectivity. 
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As it might seem, given that everything is a sign, and that every sign is addressed to his 
future interpretation, any future interpretation cannot result in anything but the creation of a new 
sign, which inevitably leads to the creation of another new sign, etc. ad infinitum. But this is not 
quite so. On the one hand, any and every interpretation has a long-term goal defined by its 
reference to the idea of extended community. According to the passage from “Some 
Consequences” quoted above, no matter where different members of a community may begin, as 
long as they follow the method, the results of their research should eventually converge toward 
the same outcome. On the other hand, any and every interpretation has a short-term goal. As has 
been pointed out above, according to Peirce, believing a proposition (say, “vinegar is an acidic 
liquid”) is true amounts to being prepared to habitually act on this belief when the occasion 
presents itself (say, being prepared to use a litmus paper, to pickle foods, to perform the 
fermentation of ethanol by acetic acid bacteria, etc.). Besides, the maxim of pragmatism tells us 
that the meaning of whatever we say (or, more broadly, the meaning of any sign we use) consists 
in practical effects of such habitual actions in the form of experiences to be expected (a piece of 
litmus turning red, the foods acquiring a sour taste, glucose being converted into ethanol, etc.). 
Now given the fact that believing something consists in being prepared to act on the belief 
according to a habit, together with the fact that meaning something by using a sign amounts to 
the sum total of practical effects of conduct based on the habit, we may, after Peirce, conclude 
that the short-term goal of every new sign is the formation of a habit of action. Signs bring habits 
about and, at the same time, they are also catalysts that cause those habits to be reinforced or 
changed. This presupposes that, although semiosis is – theoretically – unlimited, it is, according 
to Peirce, short-circuited by our practices of habitually using signs.  
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3.3. Fixation of belief and the method of science 
In 1877–1878 Peirce published his second series of articles, known as Illustrations of the Logic of 
Science in Appleton’s Popular Science Monthly. The first two of them, “The Fixation of Belief” 
and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” 67 are commonly taken to be based upon a nameless paper 
read by Peirce before the Metaphysical Club in November 1872, just about the time Peirce’s 
Kantism “got whittled down to small dimensions” (MS 317). FB, apart from the fact that it 
includes preliminary notes to what in the next article of the series would appear as the maxim of 
pragmatism, is also very remarkable on account of its composition. Namely, it presents the 
argument that seems to give a consistent pragmatic reinterpretation of the logical steps made by 
Peirce in NL.  
As has been shown in 3.2, Peirce’s NL rests on the Hegelian assumption that there’s a 
logical distance between being and substance. This distance is covered by a set of consecutive 
media – quality, relation, and representation – that are needed to get the process of interpretation 
started. An interpretant, the last general term in the sequence, makes us conceive the impressions 
together as being ours and thereby allows us to grasp the manifold of impressions in a 
propositional form. Furthermore, in allowing us to so grasp the manifold, it addresses any given 
expression to its further interpretation. These early semiotic intuitions inspired by Kant’s table of 
categories proved to be of crucial importance in the developments of Peirce’s theory which 
followed NL. In particular, the conceptual amalgam brought forth by the notion of an interpretant 
already contained the germ of Peirce’s idea of a community of inquirers, the regulative future us 
which any interpretation guided by the appropriate method is inevitably aimed at. 
                                                          
67 Henceforth FB and HMIC. 
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It is my hypothesis that there is an analogy between NL and FB, where the latter may be 
understood as resting on the assumption that there is a practical distance between doubt, which 
Peirce defines as “an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves” and 
belief described as “a calm and satisfactory state which we do not wish to avoid, or to change to a 
belief in anything else” (W3: 247). The passage from a doubt that irritates us and initiates a 
struggle to cease it, to a belief or a set of beliefs that “guide our desires and shape our actions” 
Peirce calls “inquiry” (ibid.). Doubt is an immediate cause of inquiry and its starting point, 
whereas settling doubt and fixing belief is its sole purpose. Just as the passage from being to 
substance is accomplished by means of a logical synthesis that brings the manifold of 
impressions to unity, the passage from doubt to belief might be understood as accomplished by a 
practical synthesis that results in a certain mode of action. The practical distance between doubt 
and belief can only be passed by fixing our beliefs in one way or another, and the role of 
consecutive media here is played by four different methods of fixing beliefs, those of tenacity, 
authority, a priori, and practical science. That said, a brief summary of the four methods is in 
order to justify the hypothesis about the structural concordance between NL and FB. 
The method of tenacity is applied when a man holds a self-satisfied opinion so that “the 
pleasure he derives from his calm faith overbalances any inconveniencies resulting from its 
deceptive character” (W3: 249). In terms of NL, at this first step, any belief is nothing more than 
a quality in itself. For, like a self-satisfied and self-contained opinion held by an individual, a 
quality, which Peirce himself compared with the Kantian “manifold in intuition,” or, with 
reservations, with Hegelian “sense-certainty” (Stern 2005: 67) is, 
…an instance of that kind of consciousness which involves no analysis, comparison or 
any process whatsoever, nor consists in whole or in part of any act by which one stretch 
of consciousness is distinguished from another, which has its own positive quality which 
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consists in nothing else, and which is of itself all that it is, however it may have been 
brought about; so that if this feeling is present during a lapse of time, it is wholly and 
equally present at every moment of that time. To reduce this description to a simple 
definition, I will say that by a feeling I mean an instance of that sort of element of 
consciousness which is all that it is positively, in itself, regardless of anything else. 
(CP 1.306) 
Tenacity, intellectual inelasticity is a feature of any individual mind as far as it equals itself, is 
considered as it is in itself “regardless of anything else” and presupposes no distinction or 
comparison. In this case, an individual mind is confined to an immediate experience of a self-
satisfactory feeling of assurance, a kind of Hegelian sinnliche Gewißheit, a naïve and immediate 
unity of subject and object, an abstraction of “here and now”68.  
The second method represents an opinion enforced by certain authority, be it an 
individual or some sort of political or religious institution. Here, a belief is in the form of action-
reaction or, in Hegelian terms, “negative unity,” and is therefore of relational character: 
This conception, that another man’s thought or sentiment may be equivalent to one’s own, 
is a distinctly new step, and a highly important one. It arises from an impulse too strong in 
man to be suppressed, without danger of destroying the human species. Unless we make 
ourselves hermits, we shall necessarily influence each other’s opinions. 
(W3: 1872-1878, 250) 
So it appears that the collision between the social and a blind tenacity in following some belief 
gives rise to a first objectified form of rationality for an individual: an idea of the existence of the 
other, or an idea of a law as a general expression for a set of opinions held by a certain social 
group “here and now”. In this case, an opinion cannot be considered simply in itself anymore and 
                                                          
68 By comparing the method of tenacity with the category of quality as a first step in Peirce’s deduction, I 
am aware that what I ascribe to the method is true of tenacity itself. A tenacious belief, however, has a 
content which is something structured and which, therefore, is something more than a mere quality in the 
Peircean sense. But I do insist on the analogy between the role the method of tenacity plays in what 
might be called Peirce’s “practical” deduction in FB, and the role of the concept of quality in what might be 
called Peirce’s “theoretical” deduction in NL. 
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is confronted by another opinion with which it enters in a certain relation. The immediacy of 
tenacity is replaced by a direct experience of the other.  
However, sooner or later in any given society, Peirce says, “some individuals will be 
found who […] possess a wider sort of social feeling” (W3: 252; emphasis added). This wider 
social feeling allows those individuals to see most of the laws of a certain cultural, political, or 
religious tradition as historical accidents and products of public opinion manipulation. The 
individuals then propose the new a priori method of fixing beliefs which excludes the possibility 
for a belief to depend on the idiosyncratic whim of an individual or a law-like power of society. 
This method predetermines the choice of opinion by bringing it, as philosophers of the a priori 
themselves believe, into harmony with natural causes. Peirce claims that “this method is far more 
intellectual and respectable from the point of view of reason than either of the others which we 
have noticed” but that the principal downside of it is that  
…it makes of inquiry something similar to the development of taste; but taste, unfortunately, is 
always more or less a matter of fashion, and accordingly metaphysicians have never come to any 
fixed agreement, but the pendulum has swung backward and forward between a more material and 
a more spiritual philosophy, from the earliest times to the latest. 
 (W3: 253) 
Indeed, every person, says Peirce, is a truth-seeker by nature. All we need is to acquire a 
method that would put this natural disposition to work in the most effective way. And it is 
science, according to Peirce, that is the source of the next and final method of fixing beliefs, 
because science, in its pragmatist understanding, is nothing but a more logically complex and 
sophisticated expression of our natural disposition to seek the truth. Only scientific method is 
capable of fixing our beliefs in such a way that they are “determined by nothing human, but by 
some external permanency – by something upon which our thinking has no effect” (W3: 253; 
emphasis added). A bit later in the text Peirce adds that “our external permanency would not be 
external, in our sense, if it was restricted in its influence to one individual. It must be something 
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which affects, or might affect, every man” (W3: 253-254). Still later Peirce also refers to “real 
things whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them” (W3: 254), but the 
text of FB does not provide any clear arguments as to whether those things shall be considered as 
anything different from Kantian-like things-in-themselves (Short 2007, 46-4869). The meaning of 
the term “external” as applied to reality is clarified only in HMIC, the next paper in the series: 
Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation 
carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion. This activity of 
thought by which we are carried, not where we wish, but to a foreordained goal, is like the 
operation of destiny. […] The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who 
investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real70. 
(W3: 273; emphasis added) 
If the object of the final opinion is the real, the truth of a belief, as described in HMIC, just like 
the unity of substance in NL, is defined as the ultimate agreement of the community of “all who 
                                                          
69 Peirce’s notion of external permanency as “something upon which our thinking has no effect” may also 
be read as a terminological allusion to the concept of “something permanent” (etwas Beharrliches) which 
occurs at the end of Kant’s “Analytic of Principles”. Kant needs it for the refutation of Descartes’ 
problematic idealism according to which the reality of things outside me is ultimately indemonstrable, 
the only ultimately irrevocable claim being that “I am”. Kant uses this concept to show that, as far as 
there’s nothing permanent in self-perception (I always think of myself as a subject, while I can 
experience myself only as an immanent object) the very continuity of experience, as well as my inner 
experience as such are necessarily bound up with the existence of some sort of external permanency 
(KRV, B 275-276). 
70 There is nothing mystical in the mechanism of “destiny” and “foreordained goal” Peirce mentions in the 
passage. What underlies those ideas is the character of statistical reasoning. As Peirce explains, “judging 
of the statistical composition of a whole lot from a sample is judging by a method which will be right on 
the average in the long run” (CP 1.93). So if we are persistent enough in following the maxim of 
pragmatism as a method of reasoning and acting, our results will present a distribution of statistical 
errors. These errors will converge to an approximation which we will be able to use for our further 
purposes. The implied statistical reasoning here is understood as a way to deal with the fact that, 
although the world displays order, it would be a mistake to treat this order deterministically. Among 
other things, this reasoning, for instance, opens us to the fact that there is a large spectrum between law-
like behavior of large objects, predictable with high probability, and almost complete spontaneity on the 
quantum level. The idea of the agreement achievable in the long run helps us navigate between the 
degrees of lawfulness and obtain results which can tell us how particular regularities work. 
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investigate”.  And it is this ultimate agreement that, according to Peirce, marks the external 
permanency upon which individual thinking has no effect.  
Referring to the method of science, Peirce supplements the notion of external permanency 
by the metaphor of force operating outside individual minds71. Right after the quoted passage he 
explains how the idea of such force is to be brought into compliance with his earlier definition of 
reality as independent from what is thought of about it: 
… reality is independent, not necessarily of thought in general, but only of what you or I or any 
finite number of men may think about it; and […] though the object of the final opinion depends 
on what that opinion is, yet what that opinion is does not depend on what you or I or any man 
thinks. […] Our perversity and that of others may indefinitely postpone the settlement of opinion. 
[…] Yet even that would not change the nature of the belief, which alone could be the result of 
investigation carried sufficiently far.  
(W3: 273) 
Reality, towards which individual opinions are forced, or even, as Peirce puts it, destined 
to converge, is independent of what any finite number of individuals might believe about it. But it 
is not independent of “thought in general”. The challenge here is to understand what “thought in 
general” is, given that Peirce was most certainly not a realist of the Platonic stripe and held that 
beliefs fixed by an appropriate method are always shared by a finite number of individuals. A 
related puzzling fact is that there’s no direct indication of the distinction between having a belief 
and having a true belief in the text of either FB or HMIC. On the contrary, in the very beginning 
                                                          
71 The choice of the term here is hardly a random one. Peirce, whose early works were in many ways 
inspired by Hegel, undoubtedly knew that in Hegel’s Phenomenology the notion of force represents an 
important point of transition from consciousness to self-consciousness. Besides, the term “force” marks 
the distinction between the nominalist and the realist readings of the maxim pf pragmatism. If we choose 
a nominalist reading, then the accent will be on the “force,” which constrains our opinions and shapes 
them towards the “foreordained goal.” If we construe the maxim realistically, then the accent is on the 
object of the final opinion. 
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of FB, before setting about to describe the four methods, Peirce stipulates that fixing beliefs does 
not presuppose any epistemologically legitimate difference between the two: 
With the doubt, therefore, the struggle begins, and with the cessation of doubt it ends. Hence, the 
sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion. We may fancy that this is not enough for us, 
and that we seek, not merely an opinion, but a true opinion. But put this fancy to the test, and it 
proves groundless; for as soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the 
belief be true or false. […] The most that can be maintained is, that we seek for a belief that we 
shall think to be true. But we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere 
tautology to say so. 
 (W3: 1872-1878, 247-248) 
As far as there are different sorts of social practices that yield appropriate methods of reaching 
firm beliefs, one may choose the method which would bring the satisfaction. But even though, as 
far as a belief is firm, we are satisfied no matter what method of fixing beliefs we follow, it is the 
scientific method that Peirce characterizes by the end of FB as “the only one of the four methods 
which presents a distinction of a right and a wrong way” (W3: 1872-1878, 254; emphasis added). 
There must be, then, a solid criterion which would help us understand why only scientific method 
is capable of fixing our beliefs in such a way that they are determined by external reality. 
Naturally, anybody may accept false premises and come to false conclusions. Science, as 
Peirce sees it, does not offer a way to get rid of this problem in any given “here and now,” but 
offers a mode of action, a method which ascribes practical meaning to our natural inclination 
towards making right decisions in the long run. In HMIC Peirce gives the following formulation 
of the method of science as the fourth and final method of fixing beliefs: “Consider what effects 
that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the object of your conception to have. 
Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object” (W3: 266). 
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As has already been discussed in 3.1, according to this formula, what makes a conception 
contentful is neither a mental proxy of its object, nor a conception of the object’s qualities 
directly perceived, but a set of conceivable effects which our experiments with the object may 
bring about. It is crucial to interpret the maxim as saying not that our conception of an object 
actually consists in a set of particular effects our experimentation with the object may bring 
about, but that it consists in our conception of those effects. Just like Brandom, who makes it the 
starting point of his inferentialist semantics, Peirce acknowledges that the normative finds its 
expression in our capacity of acting according to a conception of a rule as opposed to the capacity 
of acting according to a rule72. It follows, then, that meanings of our ideas about the world 
depend on our capacity to predict practical outcomes of our using the objects which these ideas 
are about. To put it differently, ideas mean something to us humans only relative to a purposeful 
human behavior. The conception of “practical bearings” is expressed in a set of conditional 
expectations, or conditional statements about what would happen, given that such-and-such 
reasonable experimental conditions are in place. In Christopher Hookway’s wording, the meaning 
of a concept or proposition “spells out how acceptance of the proposition would affect conduct, 
and indicates what circumstances are relevant to evaluating an assertion of the proposition” 
(Hookway 1985: 240).  
Summing up, the method of science is seen by Peirce as an extension and a correction of 
the a priori method by applying it to experience, so the two methods together may be taken to 
form the third and last step in the practical synthesis, as analogous to the logical one described in 
NL. In the use of scientific method, reality is no longer determined by individual will, social 
                                                          
72 See section 1.2. 
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contract, or any a priori rules, but only by a maxim that guarantees its cognizability. In NL, the 
three categories are necessary steps in the process of reducing the manifold of impressions to 
unity, which is accomplished by the reference to an interpretant. Likewise, in FB, each method of 
fixing beliefs is a necessary step in understanding the advantages of scientific inquiry. It is only 
the reference to the scientific method that shows the way to formation of general opinions we are 
fated to obtain in the long run – provided our investigation according to this method is carried 
sufficiently far. While in the case of the first three methods the dependence of what the beliefs 
are on things beliefs are about on is taken uncritically, it is only the proper use of the fourth 
method of fixing beliefs that makes this dependence to be a matter of fact, thus representing truth 
and reality as coordinate concepts – with their practical synthesis gradually achieved in the 
process of inquiry. An interpretant unites my diverse impressions not by joining any other 
concept to the diversity, but by appealing to its further interpretation by another interpretant. 
Likewise, in Peirce’s maxim certain conceivable practical results of actions and perceptions are 
united into a concept, where “the test of whether I am truly following the method is not an 
immediate appeal to my feelings and purposes, but, on the contrary, itself involves the 
application of the method” (W3: 255). Give all these analogies between NL and FB, as it has 
already been suggested, what we allegedly have in FB is a practical synthesis analogous to the 
logical one displayed in NL.  
Peirce thus deliberately preserves the structure of Kantian argumentation which shows the 
structural unity of logical and practical problems. From 1867, the year of Peirce first presented 
NL to the Academy of Arts and Sciences, to 1877, the year his Illustrations were published by 
Appleton, Peirce makes an important move similar to that which Kant made from the 1st Critique 
to the 2nd. In making this conclusion, I by no means wish to suggest that FB contains any sort of 
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ethical doctrine. On the contrary, in concluding paragraphs of it Peirce concedes that the first 
three methods of fixing beliefs have their merits and advantages and he is careful enough not to 
claim unquestionable ethical superiority of scientific method over them: practical consequences 
are not necessarily moral ones  (W3: 255-257). However, it is perfectly justifiable to say that it is 
this paper that displays Peirce’s decisive move from questions of logical representation to those 
of practical agency. And it is quite remarkable that this move was marked by the compositional 
symmetry between the two papers in question, which symmetry has its analogy in Kant’s critical 
arguments. 
As has been discussed in section 1.2, throughout his three Critiques, Kant lays decisive 
emphasis on the fact that the world of nature is something only possible, which becomes real 
through human action. Peirce takes this Kantian claim seriously and represents the idea of reality 
as the idea of practically significant outcomes of our interaction with the environment. In the 
example above, all our predictions of such practically significant outcomes are not external to our 
conception of an ideal gas, but, on the contrary, are essential constituents of it. Moreover, the fact 
that future experiments may change it, as well as any other conception we happen to form and act 
upon, entails that any idea, rule, or law, unlike Plato’s unchanged and eternal “forms,” is a 
general object that is subject to constant change and growth (Hausman 1993; Pihlström 2010: 
55).  
I will conclude this section with a clarification as to one more important way in which the 
idea of rules and laws as reals that are capable of growth and development is intimately related to 
the notion of the final opinion. It seems reasonable to suppose that, if rules and laws cannot be 
exhausted by their instances, then inquiry cannot terminate in an ideal state of complete 
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information. On the one hand, it appears, then, that the notion of a future community refers to 
something that is positively impossible to achieve. On the other hand, though, Peirce formulates 
what might be called the principle of an intellectual hope: 
[L]ogic forbids us to assume in regard to any given fact of that sort that it is of its own nature 
absolutely inexplicable. This is what Kant calls a regulative principle, that is to say, an intellectual 
hope. The sole immediate purpose of thinking is to render things intelligible; and to think and yet 
in that very act to think a thing unintelligible is a self-stultification. It is as though a man furnished 
with a pistol to defend himself against an enemy were, on finding that enemy very redoubtable, to 
use his pistol to blow his own brains out to escape being killed by his enemy. Despair is insanity. 
True, there may be facts that will never get explained; but that any given fact is of the number, is 
what experience can never give us reason to think. 
 (CP 1.405) 
 
According to this principle, although any particular achievement in science is fallible, and 
an inquiry can undermine any of them in the course of time, it cannot undermine all of them at 
once. The application of the method of science presupposes converging to a limit (and, therefore, 
presupposes the idea of such limit), and yet at any point in time in the process of actual inquiry 
we always find ourselves only in a provisional stage of knowledge, being unable to ascertain how 
far off we actually are from the limit. We need the idea of the end of inquiry, however, in order to 
go on, because reference to the future (which as NL demonstrates, is Peirce’s intersubjective 
interpretation of the Kantian idea of the synthesis of impressions in one consciousness) is 
necessary for any proposition to be comprehensible. As Pihlström (2012) notes, the final opinion, 
thus, “is an ideal, regulative, normative notion, providing a reason – an irreducibly normative 
reason – for continuing inquiry (Pihlström 2012: 243). Cognizability of reality, understood as a 
set of opinions which a community will arrive at as a result of investigation carried sufficiently 
far, is a condition of the possibility of human knowledge, whereas the fallibility and 
incompleteness of this knowledge is the price human reason pays for its ambition to have it.  
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
 
4.1. Brandom: the social 
My approach to Brandom was to interpret the relationship between his inferentialist semantics 
and his normative pragmatics against the background of Kant’s architectonics. It is this approach, 
in my view, that helps elucidate the problem of the objectivity of discursive norms in Brandom’s 
MIE. For Kant of the Critique of Pure Reason, human knowledge has two principal sources: the 
experiential manifold and a set of a priori concepts, which have their origins in the subject and 
secure the unity of experience. For Kant of the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical 
Reason, human agents are capable of introducing practical maxims and will them as if they were 
objective laws. As has been discussed in section 1.2, according to Brandom, each of these theses 
represents the emphatically human capacity of taking something as a representation of something 
else. The paradigmatic example Brandom uses to illustrate this capacity is the fact that, in thought 
and action, we do not just conform to a rule but have to acknowledge it first: in order to think the 
rule and act upon it, we must take ourselves to do so (MIE: 31; GMM: 31). Defining the capacity 
in this way, Brandom cashes out his aversion to making any strong ontological claims. His idea 
of objectivity is a “hygienic” one (Levine 2010: 584) and is based on his phenomenalist approach 
to normativity: the objective outcomes of saying and doing (what ought to be the case) are fully 
explained in terms of what someone takes to be the case. 
As I show in section 1.3, the semantic interpretation of the capacity of taking something 
as an expression of something is non-problematic: I take someone’s claim as a reason to believe 
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that some other claim also ought to be true. But the pragmatic interpretation reveals a problem. 
According to Brandom, practical attitudes of individual agents have priority over normative 
statuses in that the former institute the latter. What this means is that the authority of norms 
derives entirely from their actual acknowledgment by someone. And it is explaining the 
relationship between individual attitudes (how we take things to be) and statuses (how things 
ought to be objectively) that, according to Brandom, is the clue to solving the objectivity problem 
and the keystone of his whole theoretical edifice. 
In making a claim or producing a judgment, we make a move in the game of giving and 
asking for reasons, which always amounts to attributing and/or undertaking certain commitments. 
In order to solve the problem of the objectivity of discursive norms, Brandom introduces an 
asymmetric relationship between the attitudes of attributing and undertaking, where attributing a 
commitment is given priority over undertaking one. Whenever others are entitled to attribute a 
commitment to a player, she cannot but count as having this undertaken commitment. Thus, 
attributing a commitment by a scorekeeper has priority over undertaking it by a player, and, as 
everyone who plays the game of giving and asking for reasons is involved both in attributing and 
undertaking commitments, the objectivity of norms governing our discursive practices, according 
to Brandom, is seen as a perspectival feature of the game of giving and asking for reasons as a 
whole. Our perspectives produce discursive practices that mean something only relative to each 
other and are interlocked by the mutual recognition of our responsibilities towards each other. 
These responsibilities are cashed out, or made explicit in the process of our exchange of 
judgments. 
This line of arguments reveals three major interrelated issues. First, given the fact that 
Brandom’s objectivity is purely formal and has nothing to do with the character of conceptual 
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contents qua contents, Brandom’s normative pragmatics, as it is developed in MIE, seems to face 
a criterion problem. In the absence of any maxim eliciting the relationship between conceptual 
contents and the mode of action that leads to the acknowledgement of those contents73, it remains 
to be seen based on what criterion we might be inclined to abandon our own opinions and not to 
treat others as obliged to adjust to us, in case our acknowledgements are at variance with each 
other. As has been discussed in section 1.3 (in brother vs. judge example), even though our 
commitments are linked with those of others inferentially, and the self-corrective discourse seems 
to be able to take care of any misapplications, together those commitments always form a variety 
of local systems of beliefs that usually contradict each other in a number of ways. As I have 
shown, a mismatch between my inferential commitments as a player and a scorekeeper and my 
commitments as a relative can be more significant than Brandom seems to be ready to admit – in 
spite of the fact that you and I can keep using the term “felony” indefinitely long without the 
slightest trace of disagreement. In short, Brandom’s inferential approach might seem too holistic 
and broad to be able to take this locality of language games into account.  
The worry about the local character of any system of beliefs entails the second issue. On 
the one hand, the game of giving and asking for reasons as a whole is characterised by inferential 
links between assertions. On the other hand, every assertion is tied to a variety of social roles. But 
being a father presupposes a number of commitments to be undertaken/attributed that might 
conflict with being a citizen. The question, therefore, is whether the game of giving and asking 
for reasons can offer a way to negotiate between the two and to make them come to terms with 
one another. In other words, the correlation of inferential roles of judgments and assertions with 
local institutional roles we play by making those judgments and assertions presupposes some 
                                                          
73 That is, in the absence of what Peirce calls a method of belief fixation. 
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kind of story about social institutions. Unlike Wittgenstein, who insisted on the absence of one 
singular feature or practice that is central, or common to all games, Brandom claims that 
language has an assertional core, or a “downtown” – “the region around which all the rest of 
discourse is arrayed as dependent suburbs” (RP: 120). However, it is not immediately clear how 
the existence of such a core might help us find a missing link between social roles and the 
inferential form of the game of giving and asking for reasons. 
In MIE this problem is reflected in the clear distinction between the "I-Thou" and "I-We" 
kinds of relationship (MIE: 598-601). Brandom grants priority to symmetric interactions between 
first and second persons over asymmetric interactions between the first person and a collective 
body – a community, or an institution. It is the former kind of interactions, not the latter, that is 
the smallest atom of social communication and the basic structure of mutual recognition. 
Meanwhile, considering “I-Thou” as the basic recognitive relation means disregarding one of the 
core ideas of Hegel's Phenomenology. Hegel develops Kant's theoretical and practical syntheses 
as a set of consecutive stories, in which the conceptual evolution of consciousness from sense-
certainty to Spirit is illustrated by concrete institutional "I-We" forms. This approach makes the 
interpretation of Hegel's idea of recognition in MIE essentially limited to the master-slave 
dialectics, i.e. to the relationship between two individual wills, I and Thou. 
In ST (chapters 1 and 5 in particular) Brandom changes his mind and tells an institutional 
story culminating in language as the most fundamental structure of mutual recognition. In chapter 
5 of ST Brandom ultimately arrives at the idea of a community. This community is unalienated 
and historically grounded. For Brandom, it means that the community consists of self-conscious 
individuals who know where they came from and who are fully aware of the fact that the norms 
that determine their communion and ground their freedom do not originate in some inner recesses 
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of the human mind, but are a hard won result of a long social and political evolution. 
Consequently, inferentialism of the core language game is now grounded in the historical 
development of a particular set of social institutions. 
It is important for Brandom to establish a relationship between the external constraint on 
our performances exerted by the scorekeeping game as a sum total of all individual perspectives, 
on the one hand, and the emergence of new meanings, or the creative character of our 
performances, on the other hand. An attempt to establish this relationship is recurrent in a number 
of Brandom’s writings since his 1979 “Freedom and Constraint by Norms.” In section 1.4 I 
suggested that the reason for this is that the idea of the scorekeeping game itself does not   
explain how it happens that communal practices do not just reiterate established truths, but 
produce new meanings, i.e. how the communicative system Brandom envisages exists in time, 
grows and gets reinterpreted.  
Brandom’s institutional story ends up with language itself as the primary basis for mutual 
recognition. Brandom claims that it is language, the very grammatical structure of it, which 
possesses generative powers. At some point in MIE, and still later in RP, when tackling the idea 
of linguistic creativity, Brandom refers to Chomsky’s generative grammar. According to 
Chomsky’s model, any natural language presupposes the capacity to produce and interpret 
sentences that have never been encountered before. When we speak, we combine a finite number 
of elements to create a potentially infinite number of larger structures. In section 1.4 I argued that 
there is a twofold problem with this reference. First, early Chomsky’s attack on physicalism in 
understanding language acquisition takes him too far in the opposite direction and has Cartesian 
connotations that does not seem to have any place within Brandom’s theory. Second, according 
to Chomsky, due to the derivational relations any natural language has with the deep universal 
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grammar of the context-free language of thought, linguistic creativity coexists with any social 
discourse. But the fact that such creativity underpins any social discourse, a totalitarian just as 
well as a liberal one, is inadmissible for Brandom, who ties it to his particular idea of a 
community of scorekeepers. Given this, Brandom’s theory might still stand in need for a link 
between the notion of the scorekeeping game and the idea of linguistic creativity. 
I do not want to say that the problem with Brandom’s referring to Chomsky is that 
Brandom has to hold that the creativity of human language is dependent on democratic relations 
among scorekeepers. What I do want to say is that Brandom certainly needs a link between 
freedom/creativity and constraint that is not Kantian. First, according to Kant, one is free as long 
as one acts in accordance with norms. But those norms – and this is absolutely crucial – are not 
linguistic. Second, Kant’s conception of freedom presupposes the idea of the incognizable, which 
Brandom, as a Hegelian, cannot accept. Of course, even being a slave or a serf, I can create an 
indefinitely large number of grammatically correct combinations of my words. I sure do. But how 
does that explain the link between this capacity of mine and the idea of constraint?  To repeat one 
of Brandom’s claims, “it is only by virtue of being constrained by the norms inherent in social 
practices that one can acquire the freedom of expression which the capacity to produce and 
understand novel utterances exhibits” (Brandom 1979: 194). He refers to Chomsky on this 
account, but this is most obviously not what a Chomskean theorist would ever be even remotely 
considering to admit. According to Chomsky, semantic novelty does not depend on social norms 
in any imaginable way. The question is, therefore: What the Chomskean semantically grounded 
novelty has to do with the Brandomean socially and pragmatically grounded constraint?  
In chapter 5 of ST Brandom tells the story about common law judges. In this story, a 
judge forgives past performances of other judges and trusts in future forgiveness of her own 
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performances by those who will judge them in the future. In the end of section 1.4 I argued that 
the existence of the link between the forgiven past and the trusted future by itself does not entail 
that any novelty will actually ever occur. As an alternative, Brandom could follow Wittgenstein 
who shows that neither grammatical analysis, nor appealing to past usages tells us anything 
substantial about meanings. As, according to Wittgenstein, we cannot explain how exactly a 
particular rule is followed, we simply have to assume that learning and communicating are 
always creative. But, as I further suggest, for the reason that Brandom refers to Chomsky without 
providing any details on his reading of Chomsky’s theory, it is hard to see where exactly 
Brandom’s take on generative grammar meets with Brandom’s Wittgenstein.  
 
 
4.2. McDowell: the real 
In MW McDowell demonstrates a different approach to Kant. He reworks Kant’s constructivism 
into three claims that constitute his direct realism: (1) mind and world share their conceptual 
nature; (2) the sphere of the conceptual has no outer boundary; and (3) the fact that the sphere of 
the conceptual has no outer boundary can be reconciled with the fact that there is a rational 
external constraint on what we think about the world. These claims rest on McDowell’s 
reinterpretation of the relationship between receptivity and spontaneity as presented by Kant in 
his “Analytic of Principles.”  
As McDowell demonstrates in the first two lectures of MW, we are tempted to choose 
between two contrary intuitions. At one extreme, we are inclined to lay stress on spontaneity. 
Taken in separation from receptivity, it amounts to a network of thoughts, which stand in rational 
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relations only to each other and which, therefore, cannot say anything about the world. At another 
extreme, we tend to adhere to receptivity and end up being confined to passive processing of the 
non-conceptual sensory given. McDowell’s reinterpretation aims to show that receptivity and 
spontaneity form a package and that, as McDowell claims in MW from the very beginning, 
“spontaneity extends all the way out to the conceptual contents that sit closest to the impacts of 
the world on our sensibility” (MW: 11).  
Granting that spontaneity is a key characteristic of concept use, McDowell concludes that 
our experience is always conceptual and that it does not need to involve private objects of any 
kind that mediate between the perceiver and the world: the former is fundamentally and 
immediately open to the latter. This conclusion, in turn, leads McDowell to two major suggestions 
that create the transition point from his direct realism to his version of idealism. The first 
suggestion amounts to the idea of the mutual directedness of experiencing mind and experienced 
world: our experience is directed on the world, and the world bears on our experience. The 
second suggestion, which McDowell cashes out in the beginning of lecture two, is that the mutual 
directedness of mind and world does not require that there is a distance between the two, which 
might presuppose some sort of intermediary Given. As McDowell seems to imply, our 
acceptance of both suggestions, together with the thesis about mind and world sharing conceptual 
nature, makes his idealism fully compatible with his direct realist stance. Whereas the claim that 
the world is made of a mental stuff, taken as it stands alone, may give raise to the wrong 
conclusion that the former is a mere shadow of the latter, when considering mind and world as 
mutually directed on one another (i.e. when claiming that what is thought and what is thinkable 
are, as McDowell puts it, “the same sort of thing”), we don’t have to worry about such an 
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unwelcome result (MW: 28). This, according to McDowell, shows that giving priority to one 
direction and not the other is justified by nothing except our established linguistic habits. 
McDowell’s next task is to justify the link between the thesis about our openness to the 
world and the requirement that there must be a rational constraint on our empirical thought from 
outside it – the constraint that would “ensure a proper acknowledgment of the independence of 
reality” (MW: 28). At this point, McDowell faces a principal question of how reality, which 
shares its (conceptual) nature with an experience of it, can be independent from this experience. 
In order to answer this question, McDowell makes an important distinction. He concludes that 
reality revealed in empirical judgments is independent from our acts of empirical thinking, but 
not from the conceptual contents that are thought. The constraint is from outside of the act of my 
thinking that I am sitting on a chair now, not from outside of the fact that I am sitting on a chair 
now. And, as I am open to the world in my empirical thinking, the fact that I am sitting on a chair 
now is precisely what I directly experience, given that my experience is veridical.  
To sharpen the distinction, McDowell stresses the fact that a proper understanding of the 
rational constraint necessarily presupposes the idea of contents that are “ultimate in the order of 
justification” (MW: 28). Moreover, he seems to claim that these contents, or thinkables become 
available in our linguistic exchanges and constitute points of agreement between us, no matter 
how different we might be in terms of our perception, our cultural and social background, etc. 
McDowell insists on our capacity to reach agreement based on contents, and rejects both 
Davidsonian coherentism, because it leads to the purely causal connection to the world, and 
Habermas’s agreement based on the belief in the availability of totally transparent, non-coercive 
public structures of argumentative speech. That said, McDowell does not clarify whether by 
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speaking of contents shared in linguistic exchange he means that the contents are by necessity 
available through argumentation in any natural language.  
In lecture four McDowell introduces the ideas of second nature and Bildung (MW: 66-
86). These ideas fulfill several key objectives in MW. First, in representing a naturalized form of 
platonism, they mediate between two extremes: on the one hand, a purely mechanical, or 
“disenchanted” understanding of nature, and, on the other hand, what McDowell calls “rampant 
platonism,” a standpoint from which the structure of the space of reasons is independent from 
anything “merely human,” and which, therefore, “makes our capacity to respond to reasons look 
like an occult power, something extra to our being the kind of animals we are” (MW: 83). In thus 
situating his naturalized form of platonism, McDowell aims to render rationality autonomous, but, 
at the same time, fully integrated into nature. McDowell’s second objective is to put his earlier 
discussion of the relationship between receptivity and spontaneity into a wider context. Namely, 
he uses the ideas of Bildung and second nature to create a link between Aristotle’s account of 
moral character and Wittgenstein’s idea of initiation into a custom, on the one hand, and 
language, on the other hand.  
With the idea of Bildung in play, McDowell makes some changes in his interpretation of 
the idea of conceptual content. In the last lecture of MW McDowell discusses language as a 
“repository of tradition” (MW: 184), where “tradition” is understood as a set of customs, being 
initiated into which means being initiated into second nature. And, by virtue of this initiation, 
being open to the world as it really is: our access to the space of reasons that constitute our 
second nature is part of the lives we live as the kind of natural creatures that we are. On the one 
hand, language stores conceptual contents and, as stored by language, the contents are 
recognizable as such and traceable back from the judgments we exchange. But, on the other hand, 
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according to McDowell, language not only preserves tradition and makes it available as an 
inheritance of the past, but also performs its reflective modification, because “a standing 
obligation to engage in critical reflection is itself part of the inheritance” (MW: 126). 
My claim is that the changes McDowell makes to the idea of conceptual content as expressed 
in language understood as a repository of tradition is incompatible with the idea of conceptual 
contents as a ground of agreement traceable back from our judgments. On the one hand, according to 
McDowell, conceptual contents open us to something that is thus-and-so and that possess certain 
haecceity. These conceptual thus-and-so-nesses, as strictly distinct from acts of thinking, become 
available in our linguistic exchanges and constitute points of agreement between us, no matter 
how different we might be in terms of our perception, as well as our cultural and social 
background. All we need to do, as McDowell suggests, is to go back in our reasoning far enough 
to reach the contents that sit closest to the impacts of the world on our sensibility. On this 
account, there is a structural analogy between thoughts, experiences and judgments, in describing 
which McDowell makes a direct reference to the very first paragraph of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: 
one may think that spring has begun, and report that spring has begun, and it also may be that 
spring has begun.  
On the other hand, as a good Sellarsian, McDowell claims that conceptual contents 
always come in bundles, any single state of affairs ultimately reveals itself in experience only as a 
part of the world as a whole. Likewise, my making a claim about something presupposes, in a 
non-overt form, a number of other related overt claims. In making a claim, I actualize certain 
conceptual capacities, and these actualizations constitute an inferentially organized network. On 
this account, contents are something we perpetually reflect upon and change our minds about. We 
change our minds in the course of Bildung – a process defined by McDowell as the 
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transformation of human beings, who are born mere animals, into thinkers and intentional agents 
who partake in second nature. As second-natural creatures, we are initiated into our conceptual 
capacities within the framework of a particular communal tradition, where conceptual material 
undergoes perpetual reassessment.  
From this perspective, meaning something is not so much being open to factuality, as it is 
doing something; and what is properly external to individual acts of empirical thinking, therefore, 
is not objective factuality, but the social understood as patterns of interrelation between 
communal practices and environment. Thus understood, conceptual contents form inferential 
networks which we can never be open to in the way we are, according to McDowell, open to the 
factual. The reason is that what particular instances of using language reveal within such 
networks is based on the interplay between explicit statements and norms implicit in discursive 
practices. We can go back and forth changing the configuration of our commitments to the norms, 
but there is no way we can play it all back to the contents that sit closest to the impacts of the world 
on our sensibility. On this account, as there is nothing between discursive practices and the world 
that might be called “experience”, there is nothing that can relate to the impacts of the world in 
such way. 
From the factual perspective, given that institutional, cultural, and normative 
presuppositions framing uses of different languages vary, McDowell owes us an account of how 
we can come to an agreement with each other based on contents that are constitutive of second 
nature and, as McDowell seems to imply, that appeal to any natural language. If an agreement is 
based on our openness to matters of facts, we do need to know how we confirm that we are open 
to the same regions of the conceptual. At the same time, from the second, social-historical 
perspective, this sort of account is not needed, as the normative force pushing us towards an 
agreement, and the conditions that are necessary for it originate from and are wired in 
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recognition-based pragmatic know-hows implicit in discourse, which do not presuppose the 
strong direct realist commitments that McDowell’s factual perspective on conceptual contents 
seems to require.  
Given the conflict between the two interpretations of the idea of conceptual content, I 
suggest that, in order to accommodate both of them within his theory, it seems to make little 
sense for McDowell to try to give an account of how Bildung, a process that is essentially social, 
can possibly open us to the sphere of the conceptual that, according to McDowell, is self-standing 
and expressly independent of social matters74. Instead, McDowell needs to offer us an account of 
how norms and regularities of second nature emerge from first-natural laws. In other words, we 
need a theory that would explain the relationship between social acts and objective contents and, 
in so doing, would provide some sort of a genealogy of the normative75. Until such a theory is in 
place, McDowell’s appeal to second nature can only restate the problems he ascribed to the idea 
of the “first” one in new terms.  
 
 
4.3. Peirce: The social as the real. Between Brandom’s inferentialism and McDowell’s realism 
It is often believed that the view of language that considers what we mean in terms of what we do 
may run the risk of ruling out realism.  It seems to be intuitively obvious that, when meanings are 
construed entirely in terms of social practices, it becomes unclear how, in what manner, and 
under what conditions this takes into account the world the expressions conveying those 
                                                          
74 “Of course the category of the social is important. Bildung could not have its place in the picture if that 
were not so. But the point is not that the social constitutes the framework for a construction of the very 
idea of meaning” (MW: 95). 
75 See also Gaskin 2006: 36-39 
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meanings are about. The central idea of this allegedly pragmatist construal is believed to be that 
the fundamental communicative relationship is not the one between an individual mind and the 
world, but between an individual and her community, where opinions the community supports 
are always privileged, in the sense that whatever the community deems to be correct is 
considered correct. On this account, whereas any judgment of an individual is falsifiable, there is 
no point of view from which the community as a whole can go wrong. It is often argued that such 
an account makes connection to the world problematic, if not downright unintelligible.  
One of the solutions to this problem is to begin, not with the relationship between the 
individual “I” and the communal “We”, but with the relationship between “I” and “Thou”. This 
approach cancels the privilege of the community because it presupposes that there is no bird’s 
eye view over and above individual communicative perspectives, and that objectivity is a feature 
inherent in every such perspective due to the way it is related to other perspectives. But this 
phenomenalist position has two challenges to meet. The first one is to explain how, given that 
individual beliefs are all there is to communication, these beliefs acquire objective status. The 
second one is to resolve the discrepancy between judgments that express the aforementioned 
shared feature and those that express particular institutional roles and social positions, and often 
do enter into various conflicts with each other. These conflicts are usually resolved not by 
appealing to the normativity that is somehow inherent in our rational capacities as such, or in 
some sort of global communicative game we allegedly play, but locally, by reconsidering the 
meaning of particular institutional practices we share.  
Another way to approach the idea of the objectivity of what we think and say about the 
world, which have been discussed here, is through the appeal, not to discursive practices, but to 
experience. On this view, the goal is to construe occurrences of experience not as proxies of 
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objects or facts mediating between the experiencing subject and the world, but as exercises of the 
subject’s capacity to be open to the world as it really is. In this case, language enters the picture 
not so much as something that explains how communication actually works, but as something 
that explains how the capacity in question is being acquired and maintained. Although language 
is thus viewed as a repository of conceptual material accumulated by tradition, and a primary 
instrument of human upbringing accomplished through the critical reassessment of the tradition, 
the social character of the upbringing, accumulation, and reassessment within this approach is 
acknowledged, but not in any way problematized. Overall, this character is simplistically 
described as mere communal agreement, or consensus, which by itself is not enough to guarantee 
objectivity of any kind. What we need is the world, whereas the social as such, from this point of 
view, plays an important, but not in any way decisive or crucial part in constructing the idea of 
meaning. On this account, the social, of course, is not entirely separated from the worldly. What 
actually does the job of constructing the idea of meaning is a nature that is specifically adjusted 
to humans and that opens for them the world as it really is. The principal problem of this 
approach is that, while it brings mind into direct contact with the world, it puts the communal and 
institutional character of human knowledge almost entirely out of sight, and has nothing to say 
about how communication between knowers actually works. 
If this description is correct, the two approaches to objectivity seem to complement one 
another, one laying stress on the social, another aspiring to keep the world in view. But these 
approaches cannot be made into one whole in which their downsides would be mutually 
corrected. The challenge, therefore, is to offer a middle ground account where a denial of the 
distinction between objective assessment and communal consensus would not amount to an 
antirealist position. My overall claim is that such an account is provided by Peirce’s pragmatism 
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and his semiotics, which mediate between Brandom’s normative pragmatics and McDowell’s 
direct realism. Peirce’s theory has resources that might be used in dealing with the issues of 
Brandom’s and McDowell’s accounts as outlined in sections 4.1-4.2. I will conclude by offering 
a summary of those resources and the ways in which they might be used. 
 
1. I, Thou, and We 
Just like Brandom, Peirce recognizes the “I-Thou” relationship – in the restricted sense 
that, according to Peirce, the first definition of reality is negative: initially reality reveals itself 
through the discovery of the fact that some of my beliefs are erroneous as compared to yours. 
Peirce, by using the notion of the awareness of error as an outcome of this relationship, provides 
a strong link between objective opinions and the social character of knowledge: errors made by 
individuals are ultimately corrected by a communal inquiry carried out sufficiently far. But, 
whereas Brandom makes the “I-Thou” relationship the basic atom of the global social-recognitive 
web of discursive practices he calls “the game of giving and asking for reasons,” for Peirce the 
tension between ego and non-ego by itself amounts only to the recognition of the brute force of 
“the other,” which needs an additional link to the “We” of a community provided in the notion of 
an interpretant. Brandom’s take on the “I-Thou” relationship results in a phenomenalist approach 
to discursive practices, which Brandom then tries to reconcile with his realism about discursive 
norms. Peirce’s interpretation of the relationship seems to be more in line with Hegel, who 
describes recognition in the “I-Thou” master-slave dialectic in the beginning of the second 
chapter of his Phenomenology as a struggle between two independent wills in pursuit of their 
individual projects. According to Hegel, the structure of mutual recognition that the struggle 
between the two self-consciousnesses results in is by no means complete. Further on in the text of 
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Phenomenology it is reinterpreted as a moment in the development of a variety of social 
institutions that succeed one another until finally turning into the absolute knowing understood as 
the final shape of self-consciousness.  
 
2. Realism, idealism, and modality 
The second similarity between the two approaches is that both Peirce and Brandom insist 
on the link between objectivity and modality. Brandom’s modal thesis tells us that descriptive 
language does not constitute an autonomous discursive practice, and that the prerequisite for 
one’s ability to use this language is the mastery of the practical skills needed to understand modal 
talk. The meaning of an expression, according to Brandom, is always defined against two 
different sets: a set of counterfactual claims describing conditions of compatibility of the 
expression with a speaker’s background beliefs, and a set of consequences of the expression’s 
applications in such-and-such circumstances. In a similar manner, according to Peirce, what 
constitutes the meaning of my statement “this diamond is hard,” is the sum total of conditional 
propositions that describe possible results of my interactions with the object, to which the 
concept of hardness is ascribed. 
Brandom uses his modal realism, as it is discussed in ST, as a tool devised to enrich the idea 
of perspectival objectivity. In presenting modal vocabulary as capable of specifying not only 
discursive norms, but also objective facts, relations, and laws, Brandom attempts to show how our 
recognitive attitudes towards each other are interwoven with our cognitive stance towards the 
world. There is a problem, however. On the one hand, Brandom insists that scorekeeping is only 
possible if there is an implicit normative residue in every act of giving and asking for reasons, i.e. 
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that what is ultimately the case is definitely out of our expressive reach. Brandom’s idealism 
presupposes that “there are no finally adequate set of determinate concepts” (ST5: 204), and that 
the unrestrained fallibility of our knowledge does not constitute any threat to perspectivally 
construed objectivity. Perspectival objectivity requires only that what we think is correct is correct 
by our best lights. On the other hand, his modal realism requires that “having conceptual content, 
standing in relations of material incompatibility and consequence, does not require anyone to think 
or believe anything” and that, “if Newton’s laws are true, then they held before there were thinkers, 
and would hold even if there never were thinkers” (ST1: 24). As the Becher-Lavoisier example 
shows, holding on to both of these positions is likely to constitute a problem.  
Peirce’s realism is based on the distinction between the reality of would-bes, or 
thirdnesses, which are expressible in series of conditionals and related to each other by means of 
habits, and the actuality of things, facts, and events, which are concrete realizations of those 
would-bes and related to each other by the brute causal force. Reality, thus, is a characteristic 
only of laws and regularities, none of which can be reduced to any finite collection of facts or 
events here and now. Their reality consists in their capacity to affect our actual conduct – not just 
causally, but in terms of creating the possibility to make predictions of future events and to 
correct our habits in adjusting to possible results of those predictions. Thus, possible future, as it 
were, affects our present, thereby introducing an element of self-control to our thought and 
conduct. As a result, there is no conflict between Peirce’s realism about general objects and his 
objective idealism, which Peirce defined as 
[…] the doctrine of F.W.J. Schelling, that the relation between the subject and the object of 
thought is one of absolute identity. It supposes that all things exist in the absolute reason, that 
matter is extinct mind, and that the laws of physics are the same as those of mental 
representations. (W8:391). 
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3. Linguistic novelty and rational constraint 
In both MIE and in ST Brandom faces the question of how the game of giving and asking 
for reasons accommodates linguistic creativity. The rationale behind raising this question is that 
the scorekeeping game presupposes the idea of interpretative equilibrium, which neither 
guarantees nor even suggests that, in playing the game, we will perform interpretations and not 
simply reiterations. In answering this question, Brandom refers to Chomsky’s generative 
grammar and Kant’s 2nd Critique. As a Kantian, Brandom postulates the link between novelty 
and constraint76: according to Kant, freedom can receive a positive definition only in the form of 
a regulative principle that lays constraints on our behavior77. In referring to Chomsky, Brandom 
lays stress on the fact that any natural language has novelty of expression as one of its essential 
features. At the same time, he makes the claim a Chomskean would not be willing to endorse; 
namely, that the freedom of expression is acquired by virtue of norms inherent in social practices. I 
suggest that Brandom’s theory stands in need of explaining how Chomskean linguistic novelty 
translates into a particular set of social practices.  
As Peirce shows in NL, there is an irreducibly triadic relation among a sign, its object, 
and an interpreting unit, where the sign always stands to this unit in the relation of future 
interpretation. As the latter always leads to the creation of a new sign, novelty appears to be a 
necessary inherent characteristic of every act of interpretation, linguistic as well as non-linguistic. 
As has been discussed in section 3.3, according to Peirce’s description of different methods of 
belief fixation, this general interpretive creativity does not accompany just any kind of social 
discourse (recall that Brandom sets the task of finding a way to reconcile novelty and constraint 
                                                          
76 See, e.g., Brandom 1979. 
77 See section 1.2. 
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within the framework of the game of giving and asking for reasons as the communicative 
structure, which underlies discourse as a whole). According to Peirce, the one particular kind of 
social discourse that it does accompany is described by Peirce in FB as the fourth method of 
fixing beliefs, or the method of science. 
 
4. Habits vs. contents 
Peirce, like McDowell, recognizes the importance of experience, the notion of which 
supports his realist intuitions. It is the conceivable experiential outcomes of our interactions with 
the environment that define what we mean when we use language. Just like McDowell, Peirce 
agrees with Kant in that there is no experiential intake without the contribution of our conceptual 
capacities, but rejects Kant’s transcendental story. Peirce’s notion of sign, just like McDowell’s 
notion of the conceptual, grows out of a reinterpretation of Kant’s transcendental deduction of 
categories, but, as a result of this reinterpretation, acquires an ontological meaning Kant’s 
transcendental idealism cannot accommodate. According to McDowell, there is nothing beyond 
the sphere of the conceptual, and for anything at all to be an object of cognition is to be a 
conceptual content. Similarly, in post-NL Peirce, categories receive ontological interpretation 
which suggests that there is nothing beyond the sphere of signs, and for anything at all to be an 
object of cognition is to be a sign.  
Along with this similarity, there is a substantial difference. As has been shown in section 
3.2, Peirce’s reinterpretation of Kant’s deduction of the categories led Peirce to formulating three 
kinds of reference that, taken together, formed the basis of his theory of signs: a sign is a 
mediating representation capable of standing for something else in some respect to something or 
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someone who can interpret it. Peirce emphatically denies that, as McDowell puts it, experiencing 
something is being directly open to the world, and insists that a sign’s identity is always in its 
reference to something that this sign itself isn’t. And yet Peirce’s deduction yields the same 
result, which McDowell’s introduction of the idea of openness to the world is initially aimed at: 
as Peirce’s deduction shows, it is exactly because of the opaqueness of signs’ structure that signs 
are capable of referring not exclusively through causal connection. An important advantage of 
Peirce’s approach is that, in yielding this result, Peirce appeals not to the troublesome idea of 
contents, but to the idea of habits. According to both Peirce’s maxim and his definition of a sign, 
it is what we habitually do in order to obtain knowledge about the world that is constitutive of the 
way the world really is. 
 
5. Community and the end of inquiry 
Peirce defines reality as the object of the ultimate agreement in opinions of inquirers 
attainable in the long run. This idea of the future community of inquirers is regulative in the 
Kantian sense of the term: while by itself it neither constitutes nor supports any empirical 
knowledge, it serves the heuristic purpose of regulating the ideas that constitute and support such 
knowledge as well as actions guided by those ideas. Being thus incapable of referring to any 
actual state of affairs, it does not tell us whether any particular belief is, in fact, true. But in 
establishing the ideal state of knowledge, what it does tell us, as a regulative idea, is that before 
we achieve that state, the meaning of any and every sign will consist in its future interpretability 
(or in what habits of conduct it is going to bring about), and that, therefore, no current state of 
knowledge is final.  
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The idea of ultimate communal agreement in the form of reference to a future 
interpretation is first expressed by Peirce in NL and SC. On this early Peirce’s view, the content 
of any sign lies in its interpretability by some further sign. Eleven years later, in HMIC, Peirce 
formulates his maxim of pragmatism, which explains what this future interpretation consists in78. 
The maxim says that whatever there is to know about an object or a fact amounts to practical 
outcomes of what we are prepared to do given that we accept certain statements about this object 
or fact as true, and some other statements as false. Consequently, a statement expressing the 
content of an appropriate concept is considered to be correct or incorrect depending on how we 
would act on it, i.e., only in relation to patterns of possible human behavior. On this view, the 
link between what we mean and reality cannot be reduced to a mere agreement here and now. But 
neither can it result – as it does in McDowell’s case – from the all-encompassing nature 
responsible for the immediate feeling of externality available to humans and unavailable to other 
species. Rather, it results from our interaction with and adjustment to the ever-changing 
environment. On this view, any experience is an experience of nothing else but this interaction, 
and there are no contents that can be independent from acts of the interactive experience.  
The idea of ultimate communal agreement in the form of reference to a future 
interpretation does not entail that we don’t know what any sign means presently. What a sign 
means here and now amounts to our current account of habitual actions, which involve our 
interactions with the sign’s object, which we currently deem possible, and which we are prepared 
to perform given that circumstances are such-and-such. The idea of ultimate communal 
agreement does entail, however, that any one of our beliefs is fallible, which is to say that inquiry 
                                                          
78 See sections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. 
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may undermine any one of our beliefs in the course of time (although not all of them at once). As 
has been discussed in section 3.2, Peirce’s suggestion here is that, if we accept his notion of an 
extended community, we should agree that in many cases we do have objectively true 
knowledge, but that, nevertheless, we cannot be absolutely certain about this fact in any particular 
case.  
This suggestion partly recalls McDowell’s idea of our openness to the world, which, 
likewise, does tell us that in many cases, when we consider our judgments about the world as 
correct, we do, in fact, know things as they really are. The principal difference between the two 
views, however, is that, whereas for McDowell “it does not matter much that one can be misled” 
(MW: 9) and “the sheer intelligibility of the idea [of our openness to the world] is enough” (MW: 
113), Peirce’s maxim at least tells us something important about the role (statistically interpreted) 
errors play in our obtaining reliable knowledge about the world. In referring to the full account of 
meaning as the sum total of practical effects, the maxim of pragmatism represents the method, 
about which we know that it will be right on average in the long run. According to the statistical 
construal of the maxim (briefly discussed in section 3.3), it is rational to act only if the single case 
we are dealing with presently is considered as a member of the infinite series of similar, or 
comparable cases. Meanwhile, neither I, nor you or any finite number of researchers can actually 
confront the sequence. Therefore, neither I nor you are being rational unless here and now, in every 
decision we make, we identify ourselves with the unlimited community of future decision makers. 
It is this community, not any limited historical one or a particular member of it, that is, as a matter 
of fact, a proper subject of knowledge.  
Kaplan (2009) stresses the fact that this sort of reasoning makes any logical choice also an 
ethical one: “It is this ethical principle – making our own the interests of the whole of mankind – 
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which Peirce insisted was basic for the logic of probability” (Kaplan 2009: 254). From this 
perspective, first, there can be no sharp distinction between facts and values: any decision made on 
the basis of the method of science, which presupposes an individual’s identification with the 
extended community, is immediately connected with an ethical choice. Second, as neither an 
individual can represent a proper epistemic subject, nor the world can mean anything without a 
communal research effort, there can be no sharp distinction between final opinion and the object 
of such opinion. Thus, Peirce’s notion of a community supports Peirce’s Schellingean idealism, 
according to which “the relation between the subject and the object of thought is one of absolute 
identity” (W8: 391). McDowell also, just like Peirce, defines reality as that which is thought in 
cognitions. But the problem with his account is that he defines the contents of thoughts as, on the 
one hand, open to us as real matters of fact available through practices of human upbringing and 
initiation into a custom, and, on the other hand, a result of communal practices that challenge and 
reassess those contents. This is not to say that these two ways to define contents are utterly 
incompatible with one another. But in MW McDowell does not give any detail on how it exactly 
works, in which sense conceptual contents that we are opened to are independent of those 
practices, and how our being in possession of a second nature can be reconciled with our cultural 
and linguistic differences. 
In order to make his point about the objectivity of conceptual contents stronger, 
McDowell uses an example about cold fusion. On his view, in claiming that “cold fusion has not 
occurred,” we state a hard fact that will hold no matter what. But, as I claimed in section 2.5, 
from another perspective, given that the very idea of fusion at some point may (and most likely 
will) be radically reframed in the way the theory of phlogiston was reframed by the idea of 
oxidation, the question about the truth or falsity of the claim “Cold fusion has not yet occurred” 
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would be as irrelevant as the question of the truth or falsity of the claim “no phlogiston has ever 
been released”. The conceptual framework, within which the idea of phlogiston made sense, 
underwent a drastic change after Lavoisier discovered that the loss of mass of copper carbonate 
was the result of its giving out not phlogiston, but carbon dioxide gas. An important point is that 
the difference between what is given away in each of the two cases is not the difference in name 
only. What is given out does not represent the same stuff differently named, but rather signals a 
change in experimental practices as well as expected outcomes of those practices. Of course, “no 
phlogiston has ever been released” still has a truth-value – just as, for instance, “no yahoo has 
ever learned English” or “no snark has ever been caught” have truth-values – but whether, in light 
of what the idea of oxidation implies, it represents something in the world to which we are open 
in the way McDowell suggests, is an open question. 
This situation can be avoided if what we place above our limited selves is neither a self-
regulating game, where the mutual distribution of commitments says nothing about what is actually 
at stake in every particular move, nor the self-standing structure of experiential matters of fact, but 
the rule of action that fuses reasons and reality into the method-driven human effort addressed to 
the future. Consequently, what makes knowledge objective, in Peirce’s case, is our fixing beliefs 
according to such a rule of action as it is formulated in the maxim of pragmatism. The maxim 
implies the idea of a future community, because, in defining the meaning of a sign as the sum 
total of habits it would produce, it thereby defines the ultimate aim of inquiry, which, to use 
Peirce’s own words, it is  
to get a settlement of opinion in some conclusion which shall be independent of all individual 
limitations, independent of caprice, of tyranny, of accidents of situation, of initial conditions […] 
a conclusion to which every man would come who should pursue the same method and push it far 
enough. (W 3:19) 
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Science, according to Peirce, deserves our allegiance because it shows the most powerful way to 
transcend subjective beliefs and, in aiming at those beliefs that survive inquiry, latches on in a 
systematic way to reality. Peirce’s account treats the truth or falsity of a belief as independent of 
what any actual inquirer or limited group of inquirers happens to think, and thus fulfills quite 
successfully the requirement that both Brandom and McDowell consider to be of crucial 
importance in their arguments against Wright’s position (as described in section 1.1 above). 
Consequently, for Peirce, just as for both Brandom and McDowell, objectivity is something more 
than a mere agreement here and now. But, from a Peircean perspective, to make this point, we 
don’t have to worry either about how to proceed from individual ascriptions to objective 
assessments, or about tackling the relationship between the contents of our experience and the 
language we use to store and reassess those contents. If this is correct, Peirce’s pragmatism, in 
approaching the idea of objective knowledge in terms of practical effects of habitual action, may 
be represented as a middle ground account that mediates between McDowell’s realism about 
conceptual content and Brandom’s phenomenalism about discursive practices.  
 
6. Scientific community and the role of error 
I will conclude by discussing one last, historico-institutional aspect of Peirce’s idea of 
extended community, which is important for a proper understanding of how objectivity fits into 
Peirce’s version of pragmatism, and which can explain the difference between Peirce and 
Brandom. As has just been discussed, in Peirce’s case, what stands in opposition to the individual 
and subjective is a peculiar interpretation of the social understood as representing objective 
knowledge. This interpretation is embodied in a set of institutional practices according to the 
method of science that helps us fix our beliefs more effectively than the other three methods 
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described by Peirce in FB. Throughout this paper, Peirce indefatigably lays stress on the fact that, 
although each of the four methods has its merits, only the method of science succeeds in 
developing the conception of truth as something public and supports the system of institutions 
that are best suited for yielding truth as a result. The idea of extended community appears to have 
a particular institutional form, within which the notion of error plays a highly important role. 
Peirce lays stress on the capacity to err as on essentially human capacity and links it to the 
evolutionary idea of fortuitous variation: 
Inanimate things do not err at all; and the lower animals very little. Instinct is all but unerring; but 
reason in all vitally important matters is a treacherous guide. This tendency to error, when you put 
it under the microscope of reflection, is seen to consist of fortuitous variations of our actions in 
time. But it is apt to escape our attention that on such fortuitous variation our intellect is nourished 
and grows. For without such fortuitous variation, habit-taking would be impossible; and intellect 
consists in a plasticity of habit (CP 6.86). 
There is a further link between the evolutionary role of errors and the institutional 
framework in which the capacity to err finds its best possible expression. Both Charles Peirce and 
his father Benjamin had been very explicit in their general statement that any good university 
(and, more broadly, any good research institution) had to nourish its scientific elite, and that the 
elite, in return, was to take the entire responsibility for science both as a field of practical 
experiments and as a social institution. On this view, science isn’t supposed to be under any 
immediate social obligation79. The meaning of science proper, according to both Peirces, depends 
on two crucial conditions. First, science should be as far as possible from any kind of 
considerations of immediate practical application of its results: The Peirces saw it as an activity 
valuable and worth pursuing for its own sake. Second, only science can be considered a domain 
of human effort where there’s absolutely no contradiction between belief and action.  
                                                          
79 Among many other sources on the subject, see Lenzen 1968; Peterson 1955; Menand 2001: 177-200; 
Struick 1968: 413-419. 
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Here is how these conditions are justified. By the end of the 1850s, within the short period 
of time between Laplace’s Celestial Mechanics and Darwin’s The Origin of Species science had 
been imbued with statistical methods, for which a concept of error was one of the essentials that 
supported the living thread between nature and the researcher. By applying probability theory and 
mathematical statistics to discrepancies of observation, a nineteenth-century scientist not only 
knew that her calculations contained a certain amount of errors; she actually needed these errors 
in order to build her explanatory model. By studying the distributions of her errors, she could 
retrieve the truth about nature by using the errors as tools for arriving at true beliefs. As Louis 
Menand puts it in The Metaphysical Club, statistical methods, in showing that every belief is 
falsifiable, “conquered uncertainty by embracing it” (Menand 2001: 182).  
Given this role of error, together with Peirce’s perspective on the responsibilities of 
science before the wider social world, the scientific community can be viewed as representing an 
ideal pattern of social life: whereas other social contexts often presuppose the need to conceal 
errors, statistically approached, errors themselves appear to be the principal building blocks of 
scientific practice. Keeping in mind the fact that, in the case of science, errors become an 
important public asset, accepting the idea of scientific community necessarily involves the 
defiance of any kind of pre-established unifying forms and conventions – including those “here 
and now” social ones, which cannot be tested and falsified. In other words, scientific logic tends 
to deny any possibility of non-reflective actions dictated by some beliefs fixed once and for all. 
Moreover, this logic insists on following a certain method that entails the rules for achieving a 
concrete result – the truth – and not, the norms of conduct (which would be exactly the case, for 
instance, for Kant’s categorical imperative). The method is a master formula from which norms 
are to follow unambiguously.  
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Now to the aforementioned second condition, which states that science constitutes an 
exclusive domain of human effort where there’s no contradiction between belief and action. 
According to Peirce’s maxim of pragmatism, my ideas about reality consist in conceived 
conditional resolutions about my possible behavior. In following the maxim, therefore, I always 
act on my beliefs. Otherwise I am simply not doing science. For a researcher, knowing always 
involves doing, and, therefore, there can be no agreement in words only: every agreement 
between me and you presupposes us getting involved in a shared communal practice.  
That said, on Peirce’s view, only scientific community, a community without definite 
limits, offers a method of fixing beliefs whose application can ground a claim for objectivity. The 
reason for this is that, in the use of the method of science, reality is no longer determined by 
individual will (as it is in following the method of tenacity), social contract (as the method of 
authority has it), or a priori rules (as prescribed by the a priori method). According to Peirce, 
only the method of science succeeds in defining knowledge as a live communal practice, where 
the meaning of every concept should presuppose an account of the practical consequences of its 
possible applications80. And the needed constraint, in this case, is a necessary consequence of the 
self-corrective character of scientific practices. 
                                                          
80 One of the concerns that is usually raised about this approach to objectivity is the relationship between 
scientific research and democratic values. For instance, Kitcher (2011) sees this relationship as highly 
problematic and standing in need of close scrutiny and revision. Kitcher’s view is that science should be 
made accountable to society, and it is strongly opposed to the theories that claim the relationship 
between science and democracy to be inherently harmonious simply by virtue of some natural affinity 
between the two (science as an unbiased research and a free exchange of information, and democracy as 
a necessary basis for open society and freedom of speech). A detailed analysis of Kitcher’s view is, of 
course, well beyond the scope of the present research. But, even if Kitcher is right, whether the appeal to 
a particular institution is not the ultimate price for any kind of objectivity talk is a question that is yet to 
be answered.  
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